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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the relation between corporate governance and firm 
performance. The theme of this study is that the widely documented long-term underperformance in 
equity carve-outs can be partly explained by weak corporate governance.  
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the 
performance of a sample of firms that initiated a carve-out during the period 1983-2004. Using the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) entrenchment index, 
as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide evidence that firms with better 
shareholder rights protection outperform those with weaker rights protection. Results indicate that the 
weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of underperformance. Overall, the results are robust to 
measures of firm performance and to model specification.  
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between firm performance and board 
structure. In particular, I study how board size, board independence, and CEO duality influence firm 
performance. I find that board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but 
positively associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to 
firm performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and non-
financial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. The conflicting 
evidence on board size, between financials and non-financials, seems to suggest that the scope and 
complexity of a firm‟s operations drives board size.   
The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates corporate ownership and firm performance. I focus on 
insider ownership, outside blockholder ownership, and ownership concentration.  Results show that 
insider ownership is negatively related to firm performance even at low levels of insider ownership levels. 
It is plausible that the combination of parent ownership and management ownership in the subsidiary 
exacerbate the entrenchment effect thus overwhelming the incentive alignment effects that theory posits. I 
document a positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. And finally, I 
show that the level of ownership concentration increases (decreases) in anticipation of positive (negative) 
changes in firm performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications:   G32, G34, G38, K22   
Keywords: Carve-outs; GIM-Index; Entrenchment-index; Divisive restructurings; Anti-takeover 
Provisions; Corporate Boards; External Directors; Board Size; Board-insiders; Board Independence;  
Ownership Structure; Insider-Ownership; Managerial-Ownership; Blockholders.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction  
This dissertation examines the relation between corporate governance and firm 
performance. The theme of the study is that the widely documented poor performance of equity 
carve-outs, following the announcement, can be partly explained by weak corporate governance. 
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the 
performance of a sample of firms that announcement a carve-out during the period 1983-2004. 
Using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) 
entrenchment index, as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide 
evidence that firms with stronger shareholder-rights protection outperform those with weaker 
rights protection. Results show that the weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of 
underperformance.  This evidence is robust to various measures of firm performance and to 
model specification.  
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between board structure 
and firm performance. In particular, I explore the potential influence of board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality on firm performance and whether the cross-sectional variations 
in these attributes across the sample can explain inter-firm performance disparity. I find that 
board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but positively 
associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to firm 
performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and 
non-financial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance and to 
model specification. The conflicting evidence on board size between financial and non-financial 
firms suggests that board size may be largely driven by the scope and complexity of a firm‟s 
operations and should not be prescribed across firms.   
The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates the relation between corporate 
ownership and firm performance. I explore to what extent insider ownership, outside block-
holder ownership and ownership concentration moderate the relation between ownership 
structure and firm performance in equity carve-outs. I find that contrary to extant evidence 
positing a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of 
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ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the 
case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the 
subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and to overwhelm the incentive 
alignment effects at very low levels of insider ownership. I present evidence in support of the 
positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The presence of 
outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly dominant 
parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of ownership 
concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm 
performance.  Overall, these findings seem to suggest that dominant parent firms, at least in the 
case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency problem.  As a matter of 
governance policy in the case of equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms may be 
necessary to moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms.   
 
2. Motivation and Contributions  
 
2.1 Motivation 
 
Beginning with Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of Nations, and much later in a seminal 
exposition on the demerits of the corporate form by Berle and Means (1932), the idea of 
divorcing corporate ownership from corporate control and its implications for firm value has 
preoccupied financial economists. Berle and Means (1932) went as far as suggesting that the 
corporate form was an untenable form of organization. Despite this criticism, control and 
ownership of the modern public firm are still separated. Specialization, one of the basic tenets of 
free markets, suggests that atomistic owners with relatively small stakes in the firm may have 
neither the incentive nor the skills to run the firm. Consequently, shareholders (principals) are 
better off hiring professional managers (agents) to whom they delegate decision rights to pursue 
the objective of maximizing share value. Although in this organizational form the modern firm 
has proved to be a very efficient means for raising and deploying capital, this efficiency does not 
come without cost. When corporate ownership and control are separated agency conflicts 
invariably arise. The interests of the managers, acting as agents, may not necessarily be in 
alignment at all times with those of shareholders (principals) on whose behalf they are acting. 
These principal-agent conflicts are what constitute the fundamental problem that belies the 
notion of corporate governance.  
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Corporate governance can be defined as a complex system of mechanisms intended to 
overcome the conflict of interests inherent in the corporate form. The inability of the firm to 
establish an effective system of corporate governance therefore poses significant risk to outside 
investors and is detrimental to the survival of the firm itself. This critical importance of corporate 
governance has spawned an extensive literature. Some studies explore whether various 
governance mechanisms are optimally chosen to maximize shareholder wealth, others investigate 
whether governance mechanisms are chosen independent of each other or jointly to resolve 
conflicts of interest, and the rest examine the independent or joint influence of governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. In spite of these research efforts the existing evidence is still 
mixed and largely inconclusive for various reasons that I discuss below. The three essays re-
examine the relation between corporate governance and firm performance by attempting to 
mitigate the major econometric problems that plague previous studies.  
  
First, previous corporate governance studies have generally been hampered by a number 
of econometric issues.  Chief among these are: the endogeneity problem, poor measurement of 
variables, omitted explanatory variables, selection bias, and lack of data. The main objective of 
this dissertation is to re-examine the relation between corporate governance and firm 
performance using methodological approaches that control for these problems. The goal is to run 
alternative estimation methods and successively increase their complexity with a view to 
discerning the effect on coefficients. The idea here is that if any statistically significant changes 
in the coefficients can be observed, then it is plausible that the choice of econometric models in 
earlier studies may partly explain the largely mixed evidence. To the extent that the choice of 
estimation models in this study is more reliable than simple OLS approaches implemented in the 
majority of earlier studies, I present new evidence that sheds light on whether and how corporate 
governance influences firm performance.  
 
Second, the persistence of governance structures across time is well documented and 
often cited as one of the factors that weaken findings in previous studies. This auto-correlation 
renders empirical tests on the association between corporate governance and firm performance 
weak and unreliable. I argue that some of the conflicting evidence that exists may be due to this 
problem. To mitigate this persistence problem, I exploit the experimental setting presented by the 
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structural break in governance following the announcement of a carve-out transaction. Further 
investigation in this set up is likely to shed more light on the evolution of governance structures 
and whether these changes have any impact on firm performance.  
 
 Finally, although an extensive IPO literature exists that addresses market reaction and 
post firm performance [Eckbo, et al. (2000), Brav, et al. (2000), and Ritter and Welch (2002)], 
issues involving equity carve-outs are not directly addressed. Equity carve-outs are 
fundamentally different from traditional IPOs and spinoffs. The strong ties that continue to bind 
carve-out subsidiaries to their parent are non-existent in other IPO transactions. In addition, 
following most carve-outs the subsidiary gets new management with separate compensation and 
incentive structures. I argue that parent firms, with the approval of their boards, exercise 
significant discretion in this restructuring. It is reasonable to hypothesize that some of the 
performance issues raised following carve-out announcements can be partly attributable to 
agency conflicts between the parent firm and minority shareholders in the subsidiary. 
Considering that some of these costs are borne by the new minority shareholders, it raises the 
issue of minority shareholder-rights protection in equity carve-outs, which I investigate in the 
first essay. Further investigation of equity carve-outs is also likely to shed light on the merits and 
demerits of having a corporate blockholder with majority control. And to what extent other 
forms of ownership such as institutional ownership and the presence of external blockholders can 
moderate these potential agency problems. I attempt to answer these questions in the third essay. 
 
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that a gap still exists in our understanding of how 
corporate governance in general, and the specific mechanisms in particular, influence firm 
performance. Denis (2001), in a survey “The Last 25-years of Corporate Governance Research‟, 
highlights our limited understanding of the influence of governance on firm performance and 
delineates areas for future research. She posits that our understanding of corporate governance 
requires further work in the following areas: (1) why various corporate governance mechanisms 
should be expected to mitigate the agency problem, (2) how these mechanisms interact with each 
other and with other important characteristics of the firm, (3) a need to develop theoretical inner 
workings of governance mechanisms such as the board. More importantly, she asserts that 
existing governance literature fails to establish an unambiguous link between the quality of 
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governance and firm performance. My dissertation attempts to fill this gap by focusing on three 
governance mechanisms: the quality of shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and 
corporate ownership.  
 
2.2 Contributions 
 
The three essays in this dissertation fit within the corporate restructuring strand on one 
hand, and corporate governance literature on the other. These essays make three important 
contributions to extant literature. First, in light of the severe econometric issues that confound 
earlier corporate governance studies, I present evidence supported by improved empirical 
techniques, in particular the instrumental variables approach (IV) and the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). Second, as discussed earlier the persistence of governance structures makes it 
harder to empirically discern changes in governance and the impact those changes may have on 
firm performance. In this study, I mitigate this issue by exploiting the experimental setting 
presented by the structural break in the governance structures of restructuring firms. This 
strategy also allows me to take an evolutionary approach to analyzing changes in corporate 
governance and their impact on firm performance. I present evidence that changes in 
shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and ownership structure have an impact on firm 
performance. Third, there is a dearth of evidence on the effects of blockholder ownership when 
the blockholder is a corporation. In the case of equity carve-outs, the parent firm happens to be 
the largest blockholder. I argue that the parent firm being also the largest blockholder puts it in 
too powerful a position that the interests of the fringe minority may be compromised. Consistent 
with this argument but contrary to extant evidence, results show a statistically significant 
negative relation between the level of control retained by the parent and the performance of the 
subsidiary following the announcement.  
 
3. Background  
 
3.1 The Agency Problem 
 
The notion of corporate governance is a consequence of the fundamental agency problem 
created by the potential set of conflicts of interest amongst various stakeholders of the firm 
including managers (agents), shareholders (principals), directors, debt-holders, employees, and 
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suppliers. Most studies focus on three main conflicts of interest:  manager-shareholder conflicts, 
shareholder-bondholder conflicts, and director-shareholder conflicts. In the following section I 
describe the main agency conflicts and discuss potential problems that are likely to arise in the 
absence of effective governance.  
 
Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders arise when managers, acting as 
agents on behalf of shareholders (principals), engage in activities that are detrimental to 
shareholders and inconsistent with the goals of shareholder value maximization. Four potential 
sources of conflict exist: managers‟ desire to remain in power even though it would be optimal to 
replace them, managers‟ choice of effort, managers being too risk averse, and the free cash flow 
problem. Conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders are important considering that 
corporate governance is highly reliant on a system of checks and balances. The shareholders 
(principals) who hire managers (agents) to run their firms cannot reasonably monitor them on a 
day-to-day basis. Instead, shareholders appoint a board of directors to which they delegate the 
responsibility of monitoring the managers to ensure that shareholders‟ interests are well served. 
A board that is independent of senior management is more likely to discharge this responsibility 
more effectively and objectively. Conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders arise 
when the former come to identify with managers‟ interests rather than shareholders‟. In these 
circumstances, a board beholden to senior management will tend to exacerbate the manager-
shareholder conflicts afore-mentioned. The issue of board independence and firm performance is 
the subject of my second essay.  
 
3.2 Governance Mechanisms 
 
Given the potential agency costs that separation of corporate ownership and control is 
likely to impose on shareholders, a system of mechanisms has evolved over time to help mitigate 
some of these costs. This system of mechanisms is what constitutes what is commonly referred 
to as corporate governance. Governance mechanisms can be broadly categorized as internal or 
external.  Internal mechanisms are those checks and balances within the firm itself that are 
designed to align the interests of various stakeholders. Examples of internal mechanisms include: 
the board, managerial compensation and succession, capital structure, and ownership structure. 
Corporate boards, as one of the key internal stakeholder-interest alignment mechanisms in the 
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governance of the modern public firm, have attracted the interest of researchers for a long time. 
The board of directors is an instrument designed to ensure that the resources of the firm are used 
in the best long-term interest of the shareholders. To effectively perform that function board 
members must be independent, resourceful, and have the experience to judge the actions of 
senior management. Some of the big questions about boards that empirical research has 
attempted to answer include: (1) What factors affect the composition of boards; (2) Whether and 
how board characteristics, such as proportion of external-to-insider directors and board size 
affect firm performance; and lastly (3) How effectively corporate boards accomplish their 
intended role as an interest alignment mechanism. Managerial compensation and succession is 
another internal mechanism intended to align the interests of managers and those of shareholders 
and is one of the top responsibilities assigned to the board of directors. Two important questions 
that empirical research has grappled with for some time are the level of managerial compensation 
and its sensitivity to performance. The issues at hand are whether managers are fairly 
compensated or over-compensated. And perhaps more importantly, since compensation contracts 
are designed to align manager-shareholder interests, to what extent is compensation sensitive to 
firm performance?  
 
External mechanisms include the market for corporate control, the judicial system, and 
product markets. In the event that a firm fails to institute an effective internal governance system, 
significant agency costs will be imposed on its shareholders. These costs will in turn be reflected 
in the firm‟s relative underperformance or low market valuation. Market participants outside the 
firm are likely perceive that as an opportunity to acquire the underperforming firm, replace bad 
management and create additional value for their shareholders by improving the operations and 
governance system. The judicial system plays an important role in disciplining managers and 
controlling the opportunistic behavior of other stakeholders. Systems of laws and regulations that 
govern a firm in a given jurisdiction have a significant impact on what managers and other 
stakeholders in a corporation can do and what they cannot do. Competitiveness in the product 
markets is another external disciplinary mechanism that aligns the interests of shareholders and 
management. Managers have a vested interest in the survival of the firm because their continued 
tenure depends on it. Ensuring that the firm they are managing not only survives but thrives in 
the product market necessitates that managers deploy the firm‟s resources efficiently and 
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productively. Even through the self-preservation motive may seem self-interested, shareholders 
are ultimately the beneficiaries of these actions when firm value increases. All these mechanisms 
are complementary in nature and none individually, is sufficient to mitigate the severity of 
potential agency conflicts. In this study, I focus on internal mechanisms and examine the 
influence of shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and corporate ownership on firm 
performance.  
 
4.  The Econometrics of Governance Studies 
 
The main objective of corporate governance is to mitigate agency conflicts amongst 
stakeholders of a corporation and to ensure that the firm‟s resources are deployed in a manner 
that is consistent with shareholder value maximization. Empirical studies in corporate 
governance seek to understand the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms and their 
potential impact on firm value. In most of these studies some proxies of firm performance, say, 
return on assets (ROA) or Tobin‟s Q, is projected onto a set of explanatory variables that 
represent a set of governance mechanisms. It is noteworthy that the empirical evidence on 
corporate governance is largely a mixed bag and far from conclusive. The conflicting evidence 
can partly be attributed to a number of econometric problems. In this section, I present the major 
problems and describe various approaches that I implement in this study to mitigate them.  
 
The first and perhaps most troublesome is the endogeneity problem. This problem 
manifests itself either as spurious correlation between the dependent and the explanatory 
variables or as reverse causality in regression models. In the first instance, spurious correlation 
confounds empirical results when no economic causal relation truly exists between the dependent 
and the independent variable but some unobserved variable is related to both the dependent 
variable and the independent variable. Empirically, we would observe a significant relation in 
our regression model between the dependent and independent variables, which however, is 
spurious and not causal. On the other hand, reverse causality taints regression results when we 
find a significant relation between the dependent and independent variables but there is no clarity 
on the direction of causality. Empirical results are likely to be biased and inconsistent without 
testing and effectively controlling for the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
Moreover, it is plausible that the unobserved heterogeneity across sample firms could potentially 
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explain the differences observed in firm performance if systematic cross-sectional differences 
amongst firms somehow influence performance. 
 
The omitted explanatory variable is the second problem that hampers empirical 
interpretation in corporate governance studies. In addition, lack of data and misspecified 
functional forms are known to exacerbate this problem. The omitted variable problem is difficult 
to resolve because it is not obvious which variables are missing or how many. Various 
approaches have been suggested. One approach is incorporate into the regression model an 
indicator variable for whether an explanatory variable is observed. Another approach is to 
stratify the model based on the range of values for an explanatory variable, with a separate 
stratum for those with missing explanatory variables. And lastly, inclusion of quadratic terms 
and the use of piece-wise regressions have also been shown to partially mitigate the problem.  
 
Third, empirical governance studies are saddled with the issue of sample selection-bias. 
The majority of samples used in governance studies consist of firms that are large, publicly 
traded, more profitable, and better governed. These are firms that are most likely to be covered 
by major data vendors. It is arguable that firm characteristics typical of such samples induce a 
certain level of bias in firm behavior, stewardship, and governance structures that in turn may 
bias the findings in extant literature. My final sample of equity carve-outs consists of a broad 
selection of firms ranging from small to very large corporations [Table 2].   
 
Fourth, serial persistence of governance structures across time is extensively documented 
in various studies such as Bhagat and Black (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Yermack 
(1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Madura and Nixon (2002). This empirical 
regularity tends to weaken the explanatory power of most econometric models implemented to 
ascertain the relation between governance and firm performance. In this study, I attempt to 
overcome this problem by exploiting the structural break in the governance system of firms 
which undergo restructurings, in particular equity carve-outs.  
  
 These empirical problems notwithstanding, a majority of previous governance studies 
take a simple OLS approach of projecting some measure of firm performance onto a set of 
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governance variables. The attempt to relate a complex set of inter-relationships via a simple 
linear model is likely to generate false evidence of causality in some instances where none exists 
or to negate causality when in fact it exists. More recent studies have implemented the 
simultaneous equations approach (SEM). The SEM approach ideally captures the notion of 
optimal joint-determination of governance mechanisms when it is appropriately identified. 
However, in the case of governance studies, this approach suffers from severe identification 
problems. Bhagat, et al. (The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies, 2005), assert that 
“…identification requires a combination of exclusion restrictions, assumptions about the 
distribution of the error terms, and strong restrictions on the functional form” which in their 
opinion is still an unresolved problem. Consequently, the evidence presented using the 
simultaneous equations method is also unsurprisingly mixed and in some cases contradictory.  
 
 Finally, variable measurement and definitional issues arise when attempting to reconcile 
extant evidence. It is true that corporate governance variables can only be measured imperfectly, 
however the issue is further complicated when variables are defined in different ways. Take for 
example, ownership, which is defined as „ownership by the board‟; „insider ownership‟; „CEO 
ownership‟; „block-holder ownership‟; or „institutional ownership‟ in various studies. 
Measurement problems also arise when choosing proxies for firm performance. Return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin‟s Q have been widely used with equally contradictory 
results. Clearly these disparities in variable definition and measurement obscure the 
interpretation of findings and frustrate any attempts at reconciling findings from disparate 
studies. Is sum, all the above issues individually and in combination have contributed to our 
limited understanding of whether and how corporate governance influences firm performance 
and to the largely mixed evidence. 
 
 The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay presented in chapter 2 
investigates the effect of shareholder-rights protection on firm performance. The second essay 
examining the relation between board structure and firm performance is presented in chapter 3. 
And lastly, chapter 4 presents the third essay analyzing the evolution of ownership structure in 
equity carve-outs and the impact that these changes have on firm performance.    
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Chapter 2 
 
Shareholder-Rights Protection and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Equity Carve-Outs 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
         Using improved estimation methods and exploiting the experimental setting presented by the 
structural breaks in a firm‟s governance structure through equity carve-outs, I investigate the association 
between the quality of shareholder-rights protection and firm performance for the period 1983-2004. 
Consistent with extant evidence, I find that in the short-run markets react positively to carve-out 
announcements, however, in the longer run equity carve-outs underperform the control group. I document 
negative monthly excess returns of -0.23% (-0.07%) for the 36-month (60-month) value-weighted index 
and -0.17% (-0.03%) for the 36-month (60-month) for the equally-weighted index of sample firms. 
Within the carve-out sample, results indicate that firms with weaker rights protection underperform those 
with stronger protections. Increased transparency has been advanced as one of the motives for equity 
carve-outs. Within this subset, subsidiary firms with weaker shareholder-rights protection again 
underperform those with stronger protections. These results are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004), and are robust to various measures of firm 
performance and to both proxies for the quality of shareholder- rights protection [GIM-index and the 
entrenchment index]. Overall, this evidence lends further credence to the notion that protecting 
shareholder-rights impacts firm performance, even in countries with strong judicial protections like the 
US.  
 
 
JEL Classifications:   G34, K22   
Keywords: Carve-outs; GIM-Index; Entrenchment-Index; Divisive Restructurings; Anti-takeover  
Provisions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It well known that agency conflicts, resulting from the separation of corporate ownership 
and control, significantly imperil shareholder interests if a firm fails to establish a sound and 
effective system of corporate governance. As a result, various governance mechanisms have 
evolved over time to ensure the primacy of shareholder interests in the public corporate form. An 
extensive academic literature debates the efficacy of these mechanisms. Existing evidence, 
though inconclusive, suggests that when well intentioned and reasonably implemented these 
mechanisms in combination significantly mitigate the agency problem. Invariably, it begs the 
question: Does effective corporate governance result in improved firm performance? To date the 
evidence that conclusively suggests a direct link between corporate governance and firm 
performance is very scanty, at best. I re-examine the association between governance and firm 
performance by implementing improved estimation techniques with the goal of mitigating some 
of the econometric issues that have plagued earlier studies. In this essay I focus on whether and 
how the quality of shareholder rights protection impacts firm performance.  
 
Governance mechanisms, even when in place, can still be subverted by management. A 
typical example is when management changes the by-laws or enacts provisions that erode or 
limit the rights of shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), henceforth GIM, construct 
an index that ranks firms based on the quality of shareholder-rights protection using a set of 24 
provisions. They show that firms with stronger rights protections earn abnormal returns of 
approximately 8.5% per year higher than those with weaker protections. In addition, such firms 
have higher market values, higher profits, and greater sales. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) 
on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟, using a set of six 
provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed to be more restrictive 
of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend the charter; 
super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. They show that increases 
in the index are monotonically related to reductions in firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
 
Following GIM (2003) and Bebchuk, et al. (2004), I test the hypothesis that long-term 
under-performance in equity carve-outs is partly explained by weak shareholder-rights 
  13 
protection. I find that strong shareholder-rights protection is associated with better firm 
performance. In particular, carve-out firms that exhibit stronger shareholder-rights protection 
exhibit moderate long-term underperformance while those with weaker shareholder-rights 
protection performed significantly worse than the control group. This study fits within both the 
corporate restructurings literature and the corporate governance strand linking governance to 
firm performance. I present new evidence linking the long-term underperformance observed in 
equity carve-outs to weak shareholder-rights protection. More generally, I present evidence 
linking corporate governance to firm performance. These results are consistent with findings by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) GIM (2003) and 
lend further credence to the notion that even in countries with strong investor legal protections 
such as the US, shareholder-rights protection remains important.  
 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 2 I review the literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection process. Empirical 
tests and findings are presented in section 4. Robustness tests are discussed in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
In this section I review relevant theories on equity carve-outs and shareholder rights 
protection and their main predictions on firm performance to develop testable hypotheses. Then I 
discuss extant empirical evidence both in support and negation of the main predictions.   
 
2.1 Theory on Equity Carve-outs 
 
Various motives have been advanced for carve-out transactions and by extension to 
explain the widely documented positive market reaction following the announcement [Schipper 
and Smith (1986), Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Boone 
(2001), and Anand Vijh (2002)]. Initiating a carve-out is presumed to be a strategic move on the 
part of the parent firm to correct some past mistakes, take advantage of a new business 
environment, or to mitigate an information asymmetry problem. Evidence shows that the market 
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expects any one of these motives to generate gains for the initiating firm. The positive reaction is  
reflected in the initial average (median) return of 4.9% (2.1%) documented by Schipper and 
Smith (1986) for equity carve-outs compared to the average negative return of -2 to -3% when 
parent firms issue seasonal equity (Smith 1986 a, b). Theories in support of restructuring gains 
fall in two broad categories: the divestiture gains hypothesis and the information asymmetry 
hypothesis.  
 
The divestiture gains theory postulates that when firms initiate a carve-out they are likely 
to realize gains from a number of sources including: the refinancing strategy, incentive alignment 
and corporate re-focusing strategy. The refinancing hypothesis suggests that raising equity 
capital is the primary reason for carve-outs. A capital constrained firm chooses to unbundle a 
business unit in order to alleviate its liquidity constraints. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms 
that initiate carve-outs exhibit higher leverage ratios, lower interest coverage ratios, and lower 
profit ratios than matched firms [Allen & McConnell (1998)]. The refinancing hypothesis 
predicts that both the parent and the subsidiary will show performance improvements resulting 
from less financial distress. The re-focusing hypothesis posits that value is created when 
previously over- diversified firms use carve-outs to re-focus their operations [Comment and 
Jarrell (1995), and Boone (2001)]. Moreover, corporate focus, it is argued, leads to more 
efficient contracting between managers and shareholders by enabling stock-based compensation 
that is more sensitive to firm performance than would be possible within a conglomerate. And 
lastly, the incentive alignment hypothesis posits that value is created in the subsidiary when 
managerial incentives in the unbundled unit are better aligned with those of shareholders in the 
subsidiary.  
 
The information asymmetry hypothesis is couched in the spirit of signaling models in 
Myers and Majluf (1984). Parent firms perceiving an undervaluation of some of their business 
segments choose to unbundle these units so as to enhance their transparency and thus unlock 
hidden value. The overall prediction is that carve-out subsidiaries that are less related to the 
parent will elicit a stronger positive market reaction and to outperform subsidiary firms that are 
more closely related to the parent.   
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2.2 Theory on Shareholder Rights Protection 
 
Motivated by agency theory, the strength of shareholder rights protection is deemed to 
moderate the negative consequences of separating corporate ownership and control. Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct the GIM-index to test the impact of shareholder rights 
protection on firm performance. The index is comprised of 24 governance characteristics 
identified by the Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC) to proxy for the quality of 
governance. They show that firms with stronger shareholder protections earn abnormal returns of 
approximately 8.5%. The stronger performance, they argue, is explained by lower agency costs 
resulting from a closer alignment of manager-shareholder interests. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2004) on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟, using a set of 
six provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed to be more 
restrictive of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend the 
charter; super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. The higher the 
index the weaker is shareholder rights protection. They show that increases in the index are 
monotonically related to reductions in firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q. A number of 
explanations are advanced. First, weak shareholder-rights protection may inhibit the removal of 
incompetent managers or board members thus prolonging mediocre performance. Second, given 
the entrenchment of current managers there will be limited scrutiny by the board, the market for 
corporate control, and much less by the rest of the shareholders. This lack of scrutiny invariably 
induces behaviors such as shirking, empire building, and perquisite consumption that increase a 
manager‟s private benefits on one hand but destroy shareholder value on the other. Therefore 
managers intent on continued enjoyment of private benefits are likely to shield themselves from 
disciplinary mechanisms by instituting charter amendments and bye-laws that restrict 
shareholder oversight. Overall, the prediction is that firm performance is positively related to the 
strength of shareholder right protection.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
 In the context of a domineering corporate blockholder and a minority fringe, the notion of 
shareholder protection becomes highly imperative. The divestiture gains and incentive alignment 
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theories on equity carve-outs suggest that we should expect improved firm performance 
following the announcement of the transaction. Although empirical evidence shows positive 
market reaction upon announcement of equity carve-outs, in the longer-term carve-outs in 
general underperform matched firms. To test for the impact of shareholder rights protection on 
firm performance, I relate the quality of shareholder rights protection (measured by the GIM-
index and the entrenchment index) to the performance of a sample of firms that initiated carve-
out transactions during the period 1993-2004. I conjecture that carve-out firms with stronger 
shareholder protection will outperform those with weaker shareholder rights protection.  
 
H1: Long-term carve-out performance is positively related to the quality of 
shareholder-rights protection. 
 
The corporate re-focus and information asymmetry theories, on the other hand, posit that 
value is created when previously over-diversified firms use carve-outs either to re-focus their 
operations [Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Boone (2001)]. In addition, corporate re-focus 
leads to more efficient contracting between managers and shareholders by enabling stock-based 
compensation that is more sensitive to firm performance than is possible within a conglomerate. 
Carve-out subsidiaries that are more closely related to the parent are predicted to earn larger 
abnormal returns upon announcement and to outperform those that are less related to the parent.   
To test the corporate refocus/information asymmetry hypotheses, I include a dummy variable 
(SIC) in the model specification coded as „1‟ if the subsidiary firm does not belong to the same 
2-digit SIC code as the parent or „0‟ otherwise. I argue that subsidiaries that are less related to 
the parent are the ones likely to benefit the most from the reduction in information asymmetry. If 
the quality of shareholder rights protection significantly influences post-carve-out performance, 
then subsidiaries with stronger rights protection are likely to outperform those with weaker rights 
protection. Consequently the prediction on the SIC dummy variable should be positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
H2: Carve-out subsidiaries that are less related to the parent firm and have stronger 
shareholder-rights protection will outperform subsidiaries that are less related to 
the parent and have weaker shareholder- rights protection.  
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2.4 Empirical Evidence  
 
2.4.1 Market Reaction to Equity Carve-outs 
 
Extensive empirical evidence has been documented in support of the idea that markets 
react positively to the announcement of equity carve-outs. Schipper and Smith (1986) examine a 
sample of 76 carve-outs from 1963 to 1984 and show excess returns averaging 1.83%. Anand 
Vijh (2002) using a sample of 336 carve-outs from 1980 to 1997 document excess returns of 
approximately 4.92% in the case where the pre-carve out subsidiary‟s assets are greater than the 
non-subsidiary‟s and excess returns of approximately 1.19% in the case of transactions where the 
pre-carve out asset levels are lower than the  non-subsidiary‟s. Allen and McConnell (1998) 
using a sample of 188 carve-outs for the time period 1978-1993, examine the effect that the use 
of proceeds has on post carve-out performance. They find that announcement period gains for 
firms that use proceeds to pay debt are higher than those of firms that retain the proceeds. 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) study a sample of 125 carve-outs for the time period 1990-1990 and 
document shareholder gains which they attribute to divestiture synergies. These results seem 
more compelling when compared to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), a closely related 
transaction. For example, Masulis and Korwar (1986) find excess returns for SEOs to be -3.25% 
on average. Myers and Majluf (1984) attribute the negative reaction in the case of SEOs to 
information asymmetry. They posit that managers with superior private information only issue 
seasoned stock when their shares are favorably valued. Hence, rational investors aware of the 
inherent moral hazard appropriately discount the firms‟ shares upon an SEO announcement. 
Considering that equity carve-outs are very similar to SEOs, this discrepancy in market reaction 
is still not well understood.  Byers & Lee (working paper) find that a change in top management 
prior to carve-out announcement is significant in explaining the favorable market reaction. 
Equity carve-outs involving incumbent management seem to elicit a similar reaction from the 
market as SEOs. They conjecture that the market views the capital raising efforts of new 
managers as a positive business strategy and less so if done by incumbent management.   
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2.4.2 Divestiture Gains  
 
In spite of this extensive literature on potential gains from equity carve-outs, empirical 
evidence on long-term performance of carve-outs remains largely unfavorable. Madura and 
Nixon (2002) document a positive relation between the level of financial distress prior to carve-
out announcement and the unfavorable long-term performance. Their cross-sectional results 
show that previously distressed parents and their subsidiaries significantly underperform 
previously non-distressed firms. Inter-temporal comparisons   between these two carve-out types 
show cumulative buy-and-hold returns for parents ranging from -7.19% to -19.97% in the first 
year; -12.9% to -61.91% in the second year; and -39.6% to -153.61% in the third year relative to 
matched firms. For the subsidiaries, cumulative buy-and-hold returns range from -17.59% to -
26.89% in the first year; -49.45% to -101.73% in the second year; and –62.41% to -192.13% in 
the third year. Mulherin and Boone (2000) study 125 equity carve-outs during the period 1990 – 
1999 and conclude that the positive wealth effects are due to synergistic gains. Allen (1998) also 
examines the long-run stock performance of a set of equity carve-outs at Thermal Electron and 
concludes that the positive effects are due to divestiture gains. GIM (2005) among others, 
contend that the event-study approach cannot adequately identify the impact of changes in 
governance on firm value in the possible presence of other contemporaneous corporate events. 
GIM in their study avoid this problem by taking a long horizon approach to examining the effect 
of governance changes on firm value.  
 
2.4.3 Information Asymmetry  
 
The re-focusing and information asymmetry hypotheses suggest that managers engage in 
restructurings in order to mitigate an under-valuation problem. Business units within diversified 
firms are more likely to be fraught with severe information asymmetry leading to an 
undervaluation problem [Nanda (1991)]. Managers of such firms seek to unlock this hidden 
value by divesting the units into independently trading entities. The divestiture, for instance, 
necessitates a different set of books for the subsidiary and a separate set of analyst coverage. 
Both of these developments are likely to enhance the subsidiary‟s transparency and gradually 
lead to the convergence of market value to fundamental value. Consistent with this view, the 
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information asymmetry hypothesis predicts a gradual increase in the subsidiary‟s market value 
upon announcement. For example, Burch and Nanda (2003) posit that diversification discounts 
partly reflect a value loss due to the diversified nature of the firm itself rather than selection bias 
or measurement error. Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) show that asset restructuring 
through spin-offs leads to efficient redeployment of the assets and improvements in investment 
efficiency. Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) present evidence that there is less information 
asymmetry and increased transparency following spinoffs. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) empirically test the information hypothesis on a set of spin off firms. Consistent with the 
predictions of the hypothesis, they find that firms which engage in spin-offs are less transparent 
than their industry and size matched peers. Moreover, upon announcement of the spin-off such 
firms experience significant reduction in their information asymmetry. The authors also present 
evidence of a positive relation between gains around the spin-off and the severity of information 
asymmetry. Lastly, they show that firms with higher growth opportunities and those seeking 
external financing have a higher propensity to engage in spin-offs, suggesting that the mitigation 
of the transparency problem is in anticipation of accessing capital markets. Dale, Mehrotra, and 
Sivakumar (1997) test the prediction that cross industry spin-offs generate more value than 
within industry spin-offs. They find strong evidence that spin-offs of firms that belong to 
different 2-didgit SIC codes create significantly more value than own-industry spin-offs. Vijh 
(1999) presents evidence on equity carve-outs suggesting that long-term returns for carve-outs 
increase with the number of business segments of the pre-carve-out firm, which lends credence 
to both the re-focusing and information asymmetry hypotheses.  
 
2.4.4 Shareholder-Rights Protection and Firm Performance 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) survey 27 developed countries 
on the basis of the quality of minority shareholder protections and present evidence that firms 
identified with better protections have greater market valuations. Klapper and Love (2003) on the 
other hand, examine firms from 14 emerging economies and present evidence suggesting a 
positive relation between the quality of shareholder-rights protection and both market valuations 
and firm performance. They posit that shareholder-rights protections seem to matter more in 
countries with weaker overall legal protections than those with stronger legal protections. Leuz, 
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Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) explore the relation between quality of shareholder–rights protection 
and earnings quality and show evidence that firms with weaker shareholder-rights protections 
have lower quality earnings. They posit that earnings management is likely to increase in 
environments where shareholders rights are relatively more restricted.  
 
3. Sample Selection and Data 
 
 
3.1 Sample Selection  
 
 
The sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) United States IPO 
data and cross checked with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index 
and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The initial sample comprises 421 firms (regulated 
and unregulated) that announced a carve-out transaction during the time period 1983 - 2004. For 
inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and have 
coverage by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT.  In addition, the firm must have 
coverage in at least one of the volumes published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC). Rights protection data for firms not covered by IRRC are collected from SEC filings in 
Edgar and/or the Fiche-Q files. Firms that constitute the final sample are then tracked 
individually from the date of announcement to the end of the sample period or when the firm 
ceases to exist, whichever comes first. 
 
The sample period is selected to generate a sufficiently large sample but also allow 
sufficient time (at least 3 years prior to and following the announcement date) for operating 
performance data analysis. After the initial screening and deletion of firms with missing data 
points, the final sample includes 101 firms (both regulated and unregulated) that engaged in a 
carve-out transaction during the time period 1983-2004 and meet all the above selection criteria. 
To control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms (SIC 6000), I 
include a binary variable coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise, in all regressions. For 
robustness, I construct two sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes 48 non-financial firms 
(industrials and utilities) and the second sub-sample includes 53 financial firms. Shareholder-
rights protection data from the IRRC is published in seven volumes: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 
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1999, 2002, and 2004. Each volume consists of roughly 1,400-1,800 firms, inclusive of all S&P 
500 firms. IRRC publications are issued every three years, so following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003), missing data for the interceding years are filled with the most recent annual 
survey data.  According to Core, et al. (2006) although this approach introduces autocorrelation 
in the data series they contend that the resulting measurement noise will be minimal given the 
general stability of the GIM-index across time.   
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution and size. Panel A shows the number of firms 
dropped and the reasons for their exclusion. Of the original sample of 421 firms, 144 firms were 
dropped either because they were unlisted or listed on exchanges other than 
AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE.  105 firms were not covered by either CRSP or COMPUSTAT, and 
61 firms had missing data points. Panel B shows the distribution of transaction announcements 
by year. The number of transactions announced per year ranges from 0 for 2003 to 12 for 1986 
and 1993. Lastly, Panel C presents the distribution of transactions by industry (2-digit SIC for 
industrials, utilities, and financials).  Financials had the highest number of transactions with 58 
announcements. Manufacturing had 25, other services had 12, wholesale/retail had 7, there were 
5 transactions for mining, lastly transportation, communications, and utilities reported 4 for a 
final sample of 111 firms.   
 
3.2     Description of Variables 
 
3.2.1 Proxies for Firm Performance 
 
Table 4, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are 
constructed. Dependent variables (firm performance), include Tobin‟s Q, return on assets 
(ROA), and return on equity (ROE). I use Tobin‟s Q, measured as the ratio of the firm‟s market 
value divided by the book value of its assets as a market based performance measure. Each 
firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of 
the right skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test.  
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity are accounting based measures of firm 
performance. Both variables are adjusted by subtracting the industry median return on assets 
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(ROA) and median return on equity (ROE), respectively. ROA (ROE) is constructed by dividing 
the firm‟s EBIT by the firm‟s average assets (equity). Dependent variables for the quality of the 
firm‟s shareholder rights protection include the GIM-index [Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)] 
and the Entrenchment-index [Bebchuk and Cohen‟s (2005)]. Each of the performance measures 
has its merits and weaknesses. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that ROA, although as an 
accounting measure it avoids the influences of the psychology of investors it is backward 
looking. Moreover, it is significantly influenced by changes in accounting policies and 
managerial discretion on how certain accounting items are treated.  Return on equity on the other 
hand, has less desirable distribution properties than the return on assets. Moreover, ROE may be 
affected by leverage, extraordinary items, and other discretionary items [Barber and Lyon 
(1996)]. Lastly, although Tobin‟s Q has the advantage of being forward looking, it is highly 
dependent on investor psychology and expectations. In addition, the numerator in Q includes 
estimates of intangible assets whereas the denominator excludes them. This feature is likely to 
distort comparisons between firms that do not similarly rely on intangible assets. For robustness I 
use all three measures.    
 
3.2.2 Proxies for Shareholder-Rights Protection 
 
I test the effect of shareholder rights on firm performance, using the GIM-index and the 
entrenchment index as proxies for the quality of shareholder rights protection. Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) construct the GIM-index using a set of 24 restrictions followed by the 
Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC) that proxy for the quality of governance. The 
GIM-index represents the number of rights restrictions on a firm‟s books. A high index implies 
more rights restrictions and consequently weaker shareholder rights protection, lower 
governance quality, and higher agency costs. GIM characterize firms with an index falling in the 
highest decile as „dictatorships‟ and those with an index falling in the lowest decile as 
„democracies‟. The sample GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16) provisions with a 
mean (median) of 8.2 (8.4) and a standard deviation of 2.69. I characterize firms that have a 
GIM-index equal to or greater than 8 as having weak shareholder rights protection and those 
whose index is lower than 8 as having strong shareholder rights protection. Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004) on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟- using a 
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set of six provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed more 
restrictive of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend by-
laws or charter; super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. The 
sample entrenchment index has a minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean 
(median) of 3.9 (3.8) and a standard deviation of 1.02. Firms with an entrenchment index equal 
to or greater than 4 are deemed „dictatorial‟ and those with an index lower than 4 are deemed 
„democracies‟.  
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
 
Control variables include log of market value of equity (L_MVE), log of total assets 
(L_TA), leverage (LEV), an indicator variable „SIC‟ for relatedness between the subsidiary and 
the parent, and a binary variable „FIN‟ for financial firms (SIC 6000). Log of market value of 
equity (L_MVE) and the log of the firm‟s total assets (L_TA), are used to control for firm size. 
Leverage (LEV) is used to control for the firm‟s financial risk and is computed as total long-term 
debt divided by the firm‟s total assets. For financial firms (SIC 6000), I use price-to-book value 
(PBV) as the control variable in place of leverage. For robustness I also include the log of the 
firm‟s market capitalization (L_BVE) to control for firm size.  If a firm belongs to the financial 
industry, the variable „SIC‟ is coded „1‟ or „0‟ otherwise‟. For relatedness between the parent and 
the subsidiary, SIC is coded „1‟ if both firms belong to the same 2-digit SIC code, or „0‟ 
otherwise. For long-run abnormal returns, I use the Fama-French three-factor model [Fama & 
French (1993)].  HML represents the monthly return for high book-to-market firms minus the 
monthly return for the low book-to-market firms provided by the Kenneth French website [Fama 
& French (1993)]. SMB is the monthly return for small capitalized firms minus the monthly 
return for the large capitalized firms also provided by the Kenneth French website [Fama & 
French (1993)]. Book-to-market value is a ratio of the firm‟s book value of assets divided by the 
firm‟s market value. The standard industry classification code (SIC) is used to proxy for the 
relatedness between the parent firm and the subsidiary.  
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that the 
pairwise correlation between contemporaneous firm performance variables and the main 
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explanatory variables is much weaker than that between firm performance and lagged 
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with 
lagged GIM-index are both statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.10 levels. Pairwise correlations 
between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with the lagged Entrenchment index are both 
statistically significant at 0.10 level. As a robustness check and to complement the IV and GMM 
analyses, I also run granger-causality tests on all firm performance dependent variables and the 
main explanatory variables to ascertain the direction of causation.  
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
A summary of the sample descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2. 
There is significant variability in firm characteristics for both parent firms and subsidiaries. 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for subsidiary firms with total market value of 
equity ranging from a minimum of $3.4 to a maximum of $58,514 with a mean (median) of $985 
($197) and a standard deviation of $212.  Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt 
divided by total assets ranges from 0.12 to 1.04 with a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.52) and a 
standard deviation of 0.18. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a maximum of 
0.79 with a mean (median) of 0.39 (0.31) and a standard deviation of 0.22. Tobin‟s Q is 
measured as market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets ranges from 1.18 to 
1.88 with a mean (median) of 1.44 (1.52). Return on assets is measured as earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets (EBIT/TA) and  the minimum (maximum) for the sample 
is -0.03 (0.16) with a mean (median) of 0.09 (0.12) and a standard deviation of 0.11. Return on 
equity is measured as net earnings divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock) 
and  ranges from a minimum of -0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.21 (0.23) 
and a standard deviation of 0.18. The GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16) 
provisions with a mean (median) of 8.2 (8.4) and a standard deviation of 2.69. The Entrenchment 
index has a minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean (median) of 3.9 (3.8) and a 
standard deviation of 1.02.   
 
Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for parent firms whose total market value 
of equity ranges from a minimum of $4.2 to a maximum of $82,644 with a mean (median) of 
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$2,742 ($728) and a standard deviation of $582. Leverage for parent firms ranges from a 
minimum of 0.16 to a maximum of 1.07 with a mean (median) of 0.59 (0.58) and a standard 
deviation of 0.20. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.47 to a maximum of 0.88 with a 
mean (median) of 0.73 (0.58) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Tobin‟s Q ranges from 1.01 to 
1.72 with a mean (median) of 1.56 (1.34) and a standard deviation of 1.28. The range for return 
on assets (ROA) for parent firms has a minimum (maximum) of -0.02 (0.13) with a mean 
(median) of 0.07 (0.09) and a standard deviation of 0.12. The return on equity (ROE) ranges 
from a minimum of -0.08 to a maximum of 0.24, with a mean (median) of 0.14 (0.16), and a 
standard deviation of 0.69. The GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16) provisions with 
a mean (median) of 10.1 (9.2) and a standard deviation of 2.07. The Entrenchment index has a 
minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean (median) of 4.9 (4.1) and a standard 
deviation of 1.18. Although the sample period covered in this study is asynchronous with those 
of Schipper and Smith (1986), Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991), Mulherin and Boone 
(2000), Boone (2001), and Anand Vijh (2002), sample characteristics presented here are fairly 
similar to those in these previous studies. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
 
In light of the afore-mentioned econometric problems, I argue that simple OLS 
approaches used in the many of the previous studies attempting to relate corporate governance to 
firm performance generate potentially biased and inconsistent estimates. It is plausible that this 
biasness and inconsistency in parameter estimation partly accounts for the largely mixed and 
inconclusive evidence.  In this study, I use panel data and alternate estimation techniques (fixed 
effects, IV, GMM, and granger causality tests), with the goal of mitigating the major 
econometric issues inherent in corporate governance studies. The use of panel data also allows 
for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity.  
 
First, as a frame of reference, I determine whether my sample is consistent with extant 
evidence that demonstrates positive initial market reaction to carve-out announcements.  I use the 
Fama-French three-factor model to analyze three-year and five-year returns on calendar–time 
portfolios of sample firms following the announcement. Fama-French factor returns and related 
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data are obtained from Kenneth French‟s data library. The calendar-time method offers a number 
of advantages over the cumulative (CAR) and buy-and-hold (BHR) return methods. First, it 
minimizes the cross-sectional dependence among sample firms and secondly, the test statistics 
generated are more robust if the sample used is non-random. Additionally, the sample used in 
this study exhibits some degree of industry clustering with approximately 52% and 23% of the 
sample being financial and manufacturing firms, respectively. Lyon et al (1999) posit that the 
presence of industry clustering renders controls for size and book-to-market alone statistically 
insufficient when implementing the cumulative (CAR) and buy-and-hold (BHR) abnormal return 
methods. Thus the empirical rejection levels that are yielded under the two latter methods would 
exceed the theoretical rejection levels due to the presence of industry clustering in this sample. 
Monthly abnormal returns are calculated using both value-weighted and equal-weighted 
methods. 
 
For each calendar month, I calculate the return on a portfolio composed of firms that 
were carved out within the last 36-month and 60-month periods. The calendar time return on 
these portfolios is used to estimate the following equation:  
 
Rpt – Rft = αi + ßi (Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit    (1) 
 
Where Rpt is the simple monthly return on a calendar-time portfolio (equally-weighted and 
value-weighted); Rft is the monthly return on three-month treasury bills; Rmt is the return on a 
value-weighted market index; SMBt is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios 
of small stocks and big stocks; and HMLt is the difference in the returns of high book-to-market 
stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The estimate of the intercept, αi provides a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean of the monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. 
 
 As an initial step, I run annual multivariate regressions using all three measures of firm 
performance. To test hypothesis H1, I regress a proxy for firm performance [ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin‟s Q] on each of the proxies for shareholder rights protection [GIM-index, and the 
entrenchment index (ENT-index)]. I include as control variables the log of total assets (L_TA), 
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firm profitability (EBIT), and firm leverage (LEV). To capture potential idiosyncrasies of 
financial firms, I include a binary variable (FIN) coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial (SIC 6000) 
or „0‟ otherwise. To test hypothesis H2, I add a dummy variable (SIC) coded as „1‟ if the 
subsidiary and the parent belong to different 2-digit SIC codes or „0‟ otherwise. I estimate the 
following model: 
 
    Adj_ROAit = α + ß1GIM-indexi,t-1 +  ß2L_TA i,t + ß3EBITi,t + ß4LEV i,t + ß5FINi,t + ß6SICi,t + εit   (2) 
 
Considering that simple OLS regressions do not capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity 
within the sample, I implement the fixed effects model to take full advantage of my panel data as 
it allows for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity. Moreover, results from a 
Hausman test indicate that the shareholder-rights proxies are endogenous which implies that the 
coefficient estimates from OLS would be biased and inconsistent. Hence, as a next step, I 
implement instrument variables with shareholder-rights proxies lagged twice as the instruments.  
 
I also implement GMM that does not require as stringent distributional assumptions and 
allows for convenient specification of heteroscedastic errors.  
 
 Lastly, the main objective of this study is to ascertain whether corporate governance has 
an impact on firm performance. In most of the earlier studies the direction of causation between 
governance variables and measures of firm performance was left indeterminate. In the presence 
of endogeneity, it still remains unclear whether good governance improves firm performance 
through closer monitoring or if in fact better performance leads to better governance. To 
determine the direction of causation between shareholder-rights protection and firm 
performance, I implement the granger causality test (Granger 1969). One of the advantages of 
Granger causality tests is that they do not require the use of instrument variables. In addition they 
allow for a wider range of changes in the explanatory variables than could be covered, say, in an 
event study. One weakness though, is that the presence of structural changes in the data can 
severely weaken the validity of the test results. To run Granger causality tests, I implement the 
following model: 
 
  ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 +   α2ROAt-2 + β1GIMt-1 +   β2GIMt-2 +   εt   (3) 
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  GIMt = φ0 + φ 1GIMt-1 +   φ 2GIMt-2 + β1ROAt-1 +   β2ROAt-2 +   νt  (4) 
 
In equation (1), the null hypothesis is that the quality of shareholder-rights protection, as proxied 
by GIM-index, does not Granger cause firm performance (ROA). Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would mean that shareholder-rights protection granger causes firm performance. In 
equation (2), the null hypothesis is that firm performance (ROA) does not Granger cause 
shareholder rights protection (GIM-index). Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that 
firm performance Granger causes shareholder-rights protection. I use the F-statistic/Wald-
statistic to test the following condition, for all equations:  β1 = β2 = 0  
 
5.       Empirical Results  
 
5.1 Long-run Abnormal Returns 
 
The intercept, αi, in the Fama-French three factor model that I estimate provides a test of 
the null hypothesis that the mean of the monthly excess return on the carve-out calendar-time 
portfolio is zero. Table 6a, Panel A presents Fama-French three factor model results for parent 
firms during the 36-month period following the announcement for equally weighted and value 
weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equally-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a   
-0.28% (-0.47%) excess rate of return per month which is statistically significant with t-statistics 
of -3.41 (-2.70), respectively. Panel B shows performance results for parent firms for the 60-
month period for equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equal-
weighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a 0.39% (-0.77%) per month. The equal-weighted 
portfolio has a positive and statistically significant coefficient while the value-weighted portfolio 
is negative and statistically significant (1.01 and -2.12, respectively). In both time periods, firm 
performance is worse for parent firms using value-weighted portfolios. Table 6(b), Panel A 
presents Fama-French three factor model results for subsidiary firms during the 36-month period 
following the announcement for equally weighted and value weighted portfolios. The intercept 
for the equally-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a -0.17% (-0.23%) excess rate of 
return per month both of which are both statistically significant with t-statistics of -4.56 (-1.90), 
respectively. Panel B shows performance results for subsidiary firms for the 60-month period for 
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equally-weighted (value-
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weighted) portfolio shows a -0.03% (-0.07%) per month. Both portfolios show negative returns 
and are statistically significant. The coefficients on MKT, SMB, and HML are all statistically 
significant. The coefficient on HML for the equally-weighted portfolio, however, changes signs 
from a negative sign for the 36-month period to a positive sign for the 60-month calendar period. 
Consistent with extant literature the results in general suggest that carve-out firms under-perform 
matched firms for both the 36-month and 60-month periods following the announcement.  
 
5.2 Fixed -Effects Regressions 
 
To ascertain which of the fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate, I run a 
Hausman test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random effects 
estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. If the difference is 
significant, then the fixed effects model is preferred. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of 
7.86 (0.0001) suggesting that the fixed effects estimates are more consistent. I therefore 
implement the fixed effects model.   
  
Table 7 presents results from a fixed-effects model. In Panel A, Model 1 presents 
estimated coefficients by regressing return on assets (ROA) on the GIM-index, parent-subsidiary 
relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability 
(EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on GIM-index is -0.17 and statistically significant 
at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 0.21 and also statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The 
sign for the coefficient on the indicator variable for financial firms is positive (0.12) but 
statistically insignificant.  Model 2 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on equity 
(ROE) on GIM-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm 
size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on GIM-
index is -1.08 and is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 1.01 and 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive, 0.33 
and statistically significant at a 0.05 level.  Model 3 in Panel A, presents estimated coefficients 
by regressing Tobin‟s Q (Adj. Q) on the GIM-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and 
financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage 
(LEV). The coefficient on GIM-index changes sign to positive 0.09, but it is statistically 
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insignificant. The coefficient on SIC is 0.09 and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The 
binary variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant.   
 
In Panel B, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on assets (ROA) 
on the ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm 
size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on ENT-
index is 0.08 but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on SIC is -0.17 and statistically 
significant at a 0.01 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive 0.31 but statistically 
insignificant.  Model 2 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on equity (ROE) on 
ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm size 
(L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on ENT-index 
is -1.42 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 0.98 and statistically 
significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive, 0.52 and 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level.  Model 3 in Panel A, presents estimated coefficients by 
regressing Tobin‟s Q (Adj. Q) on the ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and 
financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage 
(LEV). The coefficient on ENT-index is -0.18 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The 
coefficient on SIC is 0.16 and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for 
financial firms is statistically insignificant.   
 
Overall, the fixed effects results support hypotheses H1 and H2, positing a positive 
association between firm performance and the quality of shareholder rights protection. The lower 
the GIM-index and Entrenchment indices, the better protected are the shareholders and hence we 
should expect a negative sign on the proxy coefficients for the quality of shareholder-rights 
protection.  These results are also consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) who 
present evidence that firms with weak shareholder-rights protection exhibit significant stock 
market under-performance of approximately 8.5% relative to firms with strong shareholder-
rights protection and with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) who show that increases in the 
governance index are monotonically related to reductions in firm value (Tobin‟s Q).  
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5.3 Hausman Endogeneity Tests 
 
 
Table 8 presents results from the Hausman endogeneity tests. Panel A provides 
coefficient estimates when GIM_Indext-2 is used as an instrument. The coefficient (t-statistic) on 
GIM_Residuals is -0.04(-1.74) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 63.96 (78.12) for ROA. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on GIM_Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is 0.01(2.04) 
with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 18.44 (24.06). The coefficient (t-statistic) on GIM_Residuals 
using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.37(-1.94) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 33.08 
(42.43). They are all statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.05 levels of significance, 
respectively. In all three models the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the GIM_Residuals is 
zero is rejected. This implies the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of 
using the OLS method. Panel B provides coefficient estimates when ENT_Indext-2 is used as an 
instrument. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals is -0.08(-3.22) with an F-statistic 
(Wald-2) of 44.37 (68.04) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals using ROE 
as the dependent variable is -0.13(-1.87) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 33.23 (72.05). The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.09 (-
1.44) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 22.67 (46.16). All coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the ENT_Residuals is zero is again rejected suggesting the presence of 
endogeneity. In the presence of endogeneity, the OLS coefficient estimates are likely to be 
biased and inconsistent.  
 
5.4 Instrumental Variables Method (IV) 
 
 
Table 9 presents results from IV regressions. In Panel A, Model 1 presents estimated 
coefficients for return on assets (ROA) using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument. I include a binary 
variable for industry relatedness between the parent and the subsidiary (SIC), and an indicator 
variable for financial firms (FIN). I control for firm leverage (LEV), firm size L_TA), and firm 
profitability (EBIT ratio). The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.57 (-2.66) and 
statistically significant at a 0.01level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.11 (3.19) and 
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.28 (0.22) but 
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statistically insignificant. Panel A, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates on GIM_Index using 
return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for firm performance.  The coefficient (t-statistic) on the 
GIM-indext-1 is -0.24 (-1.80) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (t-
statistic) on SIC is 0.03 (1.88) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (t-
statistic) on FIN is 0.34 (1.68) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel A, Model 3 
presents estimates of coefficients from regressing return on Tobin‟s Q on GIM-index. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.71 (-2.24) and statistically significant at a 0.01 
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.40 (1.97) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. 
The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.09 (1.07) but statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 9, Panel B, presents coefficient estimates using the entrenchment index as a proxy 
for quality of shareholder-rights protection. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients from 
regressing the firm‟s ROA on Entrenchment-index (ENT_indext-1). I control for firm leverage, 
firm size, and profitability. The coefficient (t-statistic) on the ENT_indext-1 is -0.83 (-1.97). It is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level and the signs on the coefficients are consistent with the 
prediction of hypothesis H1 and the findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 1.04 (3.37) and 
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 1.07 (1.12) but 
statistically insignificant. Panel B, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using ROE as the 
dependent variables and ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. The coefficients (t-statistics) on the 
lagged Entrenchment index, ENT_indext-1, is -0.67 (-2.47) and statistically significant at a 0.01 
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.21 (1.91) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. 
The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.81 (1.97) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Panel 
B, Model 3 presents coefficient estimates from the regression using Tobin‟s-Q and ENT_indext-2 
as an instrument. The coefficients (t-statistics) on the ENT_indext-1 is 0.02 (1.73) and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level but has the opposite sign as that predicted by hypothesis H1. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.57 (2.16) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.34 (0.84) but statistically insignificant.  
 
Overall, the signs on the coefficients and statistical significance from the IV regressions 
support the hypothesis that firm performance is influenced by the quality of shareholder-rights 
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protection. These findings are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). In addition, consistent with Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Boone 
(2001), the IV results support hypothesis H2 which predicts that subsidiaries that are less related 
to the parent based on the 2-digit SIC code, will out-perform those subsidiaries that belong to the 
same 2-digit SIC code as the parent.  
 
5.5 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
Table 10 presents results from GMM regressions. In Panel A, Model 1 presents estimated 
coefficients from regressing return on assets (ROA) using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument. I 
include a binary variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the parent and the subsidiary, 
and an indicator variable for financial firms (FIN). I control for firm leverage (LEV), firm size 
L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio). The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -
0.43 (-2.74) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficients (t-statistics) on SIC and 
FIN are 0.11(1.32) and 0.04 (1.08) respectively but both are statistically insignificant. Panel A, 
Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using return on equity (ROE) as the proxy for 
performance. The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.22 (-2.67) and statistically 
significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficients (t-statistics) on SIC and FIN are 0.46 (1.81) and 0.32 
(1.77), respectively. Both are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel A, Model 3 presents 
estimates of coefficients using Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for firm performance and GIM-indext-2 as an 
instrument.  The coefficients (t-statistics) on the GIM-indext-1 and SIC are 0.08 (1.98) and 0.05 
(2.04), respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (t-
statistic) on FIN is 0.08 (1.17) but statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 10, Panel B, presents empirical results using the entrenchment index as a proxy for 
quality of shareholder-rights protection. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using ROA to 
proxy for firm performance and ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. I control for firm leverage, firm 
size, and profitability. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_indext-1 is -0.72 (-2.48) and 
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The signs on the coefficients are negative and support 
hypothesis H1. These findings are consistent with the assertions by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.09 
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(1.04) but statistically insignificant. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.11 (1.67) and 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel B, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using 
ROE as a proxy for firm performance and ENT_Indext-2 as an instrument. The coefficient (t-
statistic) on the ENT_indext-1 is -0.22 (-2.27) and is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.13 (1.69) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.52 (1.07) but statistically insignificant. Panel B, Model 3 
presents coefficient estimates from the regression of Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for firm performance. 
The coefficients (t-statistics) on ENT_indext-1 is 0.08 (-1.84) and statistically significant a 0.05 
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.02 (2.04) and statistically significant at a 0.01 
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.71 (1.26) and statistically significant at a 0.10 
level. Overall, GMM results support hypotheses H1 and H2 and are consistent with Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004); Comment and Jarrell (1995); 
and Boone (2001).  
 
5.6 Empirical Results – Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000) 
 
IV and GMM test results show a statistically significant coefficient on the indicator 
variable, FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). To examine whether there are any significant 
differences in the relation between shareholder-rights protection and firm performance for 
financials, I run separate IV and GMM regressions for only financial firms. Table 11(a) presents 
coefficient estimates using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument.  I use ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q as 
measures of firm performance in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All the coefficients on the 
GIM-index have negative signs as predicted by hypothesis H1 and H2 are statistically significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, with the exception of Tobin‟s Q in the case of GMM.  The 
results are qualitatively similar to the full sample evidence and are consistent with Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). Table 11(b) presents 
coefficient estimates using ENT_Indext-2 as an instrument. I use ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q as 
measures for firm performance in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All the coefficients on the 
ENT-indext-1 have negative signs as predicted by hypothesis H1 and H2 and are statistically 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels. The findings are qualitatively similar to the full 
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sample evidence and are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004).  
 
In sum the quality of shareholder-rights protection is positively associated with firm 
performance and this relationship seems invariant to firm performance measurement and robust 
to estimation model choice.  
 
5.7 Granger Causality Tests 
 
Table 12 presents empirical results from bivariate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests 
causality between proxies for shareholder-rights protection [GIM-index and ENT_index] and 
return on assets (ROA). The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that GIM-index does not 
Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 8.420 with a p-value of 0.0000. Hence, the null 
hypothesis is rejected implying precedence and information content in past GIM-index values on 
firm performance as measured by ROA. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger 
cause GIM-index, is 1.203 with a p-value of 0.5480.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis negates 
the presence of reverse causality in the Granger sense. Similarly, the F-statistic for the null 
hypothesis test that the ENT-index does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 12.621 
with a p-value of 0.0000. Rejecting the null hypothesis and implying precedence and information 
content in past ENT-index values on ROA. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not 
Granger cause ENT-index, is 0.04 with a p-value of 0.2860.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
precludes reverse causality in the Granger sense. The results for tests between the GIM-index 
and ROE and those between the ENT-index and ROE are qualitatively similar to those reported 
for ROA. Shareholder-rights protection seems to granger cause firm performance but the reverse 
is negated. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test GIM-index (ENT-index) does not Granger 
cause firm performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q is 1.325 (2.920) with a p-values of 0.0500 
(0.0600). The results weakly suggest that shareholder-rights protection Granger causes Tobin‟s 
Q. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause GIM-index 
(ENT-index) are 0.5720 (0.083) with a p-values of 0.2020 (0.7200).  The null hypothesis in both 
cases is not rejected, suggesting that firm performance does not Granger cause shareholder-rights 
protection.   
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Overall Granger causality tests indicate that the quality of shareholder-rights protection 
has precedent information content for moderating future firm performance. The evidence is 
robust to measures of firm performance and to both proxies for shareholder-rights protection. 
Consistent with the findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004), these results support hypotheses H1 and H2.   
 
6. Robustness 
 
There is wide cross-sectional variation in the sample characteristics as shown in Table 2. 
I test the robustness of my results to the use of alternative variable definitions/measures. First in 
place of Tobin‟s Q, I use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by 
total assets or the ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. The results are qualitatively similar 
to those reported using Tobin‟s Q.  To ascertain whether there are any statistically significant 
differences between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q values, I divide the 
sample into three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that fall into the top 40%, 
firms in the lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on the top 40% and the 
bottom 40%. Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those reported for the full 
sample. It is also likely that due to the wide ranges between the minimum and maximum sample 
descriptive statistics, outliers could be driving some of the reported results. I test for robustness 
by winsorizing the sample data at 1% and 5%.  In both cases the results obtained using 
winsorized data are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample. Lastly, I use the 
logarithm of Tobin‟s Q instead of levels to ascertain whether the effects based on changes may 
differ from the levels effect. Results from log Tobin‟s Q are qualitatively similar to thoise 
obtained using levels of Tobin‟s Q.  
 
7.   Conclusion 
The main purpose of this essay was to examine whether the quality of shareholder-rights 
protection moderates firm performance. By implementing improved estimation methods and 
exploiting structural breaks in firms‟ governance systems, I attempt to mitigate inherent 
weaknesses in previous governance studies. Using governance indices constructed by Gompers, 
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Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) to proxy for the quality of 
shareholder-rights protection, I find that strong shareholder-rights protection is associated with 
better firm performance. In particular, carve-out firms that exhibit stronger shareholder-rights 
protection exhibit moderate underperformance while those with weaker shareholder-rights 
protection performed relatively worse than the control group. Specifically, I present new 
evidence linking the long-term underperformance observed in equity carve-outs to weak 
shareholder-rights protection. More generally, I present evidence linking firm performance to 
corporate governance. These results are consistent with findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) GIM (2003) and lend further credence to the 
idea that even in countries with strong investor legal protections such as the US, shareholder-
rights protection within the firm remains critical.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection & Distribution 
Table 1 presents sample distribution and size.  Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the number 
and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to qualify for inclusion it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges 
and be covered by COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and IRRC. Rights protection data for firms not covered by IRRC are collected from 
SEC filings in Edgar and/or the Fiche-Q files. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because they 
are unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage by CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, IRRC, SEC filings, and Fiche-Q files. And an additional 61 firms were dropped due to missing data points. The 
final sample count is 101 firms consisting of regulated firms (2-digit SIC codes 60 and 49) and unregulated/industrial firms. 
Panel B presents the sample distribution by year of transaction announcement and Panel C shows sample distribution by 2-digit 
industry SIC. 
 
Panel A: Construction of the Sample   # of firms 
 
Total no. of firms:              421 
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:                 (144) 
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:                      (105)    
Firms with missing data:       (61) 
    
Final Sample Count:       111 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution by Year    # of firms 
 
1986       8 
1987       6 
1988       4 
1989       3 
1990       4 
1991       3 
1992       7 
1993       13 
1994       5 
1995       6 
1996       10 
1997       5 
1998       7 
1999       5 
2000       9 
2001       7 
2002       4 
2003       3 
2004       2 
 
Panel C: Distribution by SIC Two-Digit SIC  # of firms 
 
Mining, Oil & Gas   10   5 
Manufacturing   20-30    25 
Transport, Comm., Utilities  40   4 
Wholesale/Retail   50   7 
Financials   60   58 
Services (other)   70-80   12 
 
*Source: Security Data Company (SDC)  
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for subsidiary firms in Panel A and parent firms in Panel B. Some means are unusually low 
(high) due to the influence of outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and 
by winsorizing the data at 1% and 99%. Nevertheless, results obtained with unadjusted data are qualitatively similar.  
 
Panel A: Subsidiary Firms:    
 
Variable    Mean (Std. Dev) Median  Min Max 
 
Market Value of Equity a ($M) 985 212  197  3.4 58,514 
  
Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)  0.41 0.18  0.52  0.12 1.04 
 
Book-to-Market   0.39 0.22  0.31  0.21 0.79 
 
Tobin‟s Q   1.44 1.07  1.48  1.18 1.88 
 
Return on Assets   0.09 0.11  0.12  -0.03 0.16 
 
Return on Equity   0.21 0.18  0.23  -0.06 0.28 
 
GIM-Index (# of provisions)  8.2 2.69  8.4  5 16 
 
Entrenchment Index -  3.9 1.02  3.8  1 6 
(# of provisions) 
 
 
Panel B: Parent Firms:    
 
Variable    Mean (Std. Dev) Median  Min Max 
 
Market Value of Equity b ($M) 2, 742 582  728  4.2 82,644 
   
Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)  0.59 0.20  0.58  0.16 1.07 
 
Book-to-Market   0.73 0.13  0.58  0.47 0.88 
 
Tobin‟s Q   1.56 1.28  1.34  1.01 1.72 
 
ROA (EBIT/TA)   0.07 0.12  0.09  -0.02 0.13 
 
ROE (EBIT/EQUITY)  0.14 0.69  0.16  -0.08 0.24 
 
GIM-Index (# of provisions)  10.1 2.07  9.2  5 16 
 
Entrenchment Index -  4.9 1.18  4.1  1 6 
(# of provisions) 
 
Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT 
CRSP, IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q files 
 
 
a The number of subsidiary shares outstanding after the announcement times price per share at end of first day of   
    trading  
 
b The number of parent shares outstanding after the announcement times price per share at end of first day of trading  
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Table 3: Governance Provisions   
Table 3 provides the major governance categories and lists of related provisions that are used to construct the GIM-index and the 
Entrenchment Index. Detailed explanations of the categories and related provisions are available in the appendix of Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
 
Category    Related Provisions            
 
Delay:     Blank Check 
Classified Board 
Special Meeting 
Written Consent 
 
Protection:    Compensation Plans 
Contracts 
Golden Parachutes 
Indemnification 
Liability 
Severance 
 
Voting:     Bylaws 
Charter 
Cumulative Voting 
Secret Ballot  
Supermajority 
Unequal Voting 
 
Other:     Anti-greenmail 
Directors‟ duties 
Fair Price 
Pension Parachutes 
Poison Pills 
Silver Parachutes 
 
State:     Anti-greenmail Law 
Business Combination Law 
Cash-out Law 
Directors‟ Duties Laws 
Fair Price Law 
Control Share Acquisition Law 
 
 
Source: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
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Table 4: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Table 4 provides definitions of the empirical variables and their related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables 
presented elsewhere relate to number of time lags. 
 
Variable  Definition          Source 
 
Adj_Q   Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity        Tobin et al. (1977) 
divided by book value of assets 
 
Adj_ROA  Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on assets minus median industry return  
on assets 
  
Adj_ROE  Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on equity minus median industry return  
on equity 
 
BME   Book-to-market value ratio          Compustat 
    
B_EXTRN Proportion of independent board         IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q     
                                           members on board                                                          files   
   
B_SIZE Total number of board members         IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q     
                                                                                                                              files    
 
CTRL   Parent majority control in subsidiary              SDC  
 
EBIT Ratio  EBIT-to-total Assets ratio          Compustat   
 
ENT-Index  Entrenchment Index           Bebchuk et al (2005) 
 
FIN   Binary variable: „1‟ if financial firm         SIC Codes 
   or „0‟ otherwise         (6000 -6999) 
 
GIM-Index  Corporate Governance Index             Gompers et al (2003) 
 
HML   High book-to-market minus low         Fama- French (1993)  
book-to-market 
 
LEV   Leverage: debt-to-total assets             Compustat 
 
L_MVE   Log of firm‟s market value                            Compustat       
 
L_TA   Log of firm‟s total assets          Compustat 
 
PBV   Price-to-book value          Compustat 
  
ROA   Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)              Compustat 
 
ROE   Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)       Compustat 
 
SIC   Standard Industry classification code           Compustat 
 
SMB   the difference in the returns of small          Fama- French (1993)  
stocks and big stocks. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 provides pairwise correlations between the variables. For adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA next period 
values (t+1), are also presented to account for the delayed impact of shareholder-rights protection proxies (GIM-
index, Entrenchment_ index).  
  
 
N=111  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
1. Adj_Q  1.00  
 
2. Adj_Qt+1 0.96*** 1.00  
  
3. ROE  0.21* 0.26** 1.00   
 
4. ROEt+1  0.33* 0.42*** 0.67* 1.00     
 
5. ROA  -0.01* 0.28* 0.03 0.61* 1.00  
 
6. ROAt+1   0.07 0.01* 0.09* 0.01** 0.44 1.00 
 
7. GIM_Index  0.04 -0.04** -0.37 -0.29* 0.55 0.21 1.00   
 
8. ENT_Index -0.04* -0.49** 0.10 -0.27* 0.32 -0.01 0.78** 1.00         
 
9. L_TA  -0.11* -0.47* -0.38 -0.29 -0.03* -0.07 0.21* 0.44** 1.00 
  
10. LEV  -0.32* -0.10* -0.25 -0.02* -0.04 -0.13 0.33* 0.12 -0.78* 1.00  
 
11. EBIT    0.88*  0.81**  0.92  0.97*  0.78  0.74 0.46**  0.63* -0.52* 0.41* 1.00 
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Table 6a: Excess Return Factor Regressions (Calendar-time) – Parent Firms 
Table 6a provides results from calendar-time factor regressions for the excess returns on equally-weighted and value-weighted 
sample portfolios. The portfolios are comprised of firms that initiated carve-out transactions during the sample period. Panel A 
presents estimated coefficients for a 36-month period for equally-weighted and value-weighted sample portfolios and Panel B 
presents estimated coefficients for the 60-month period for equally weighted and value weighted sample portfolios. I use the 
Fama-French three-factor model and obtain the factor returns for MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French‟s website. The 
values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Panel A:  36-month Period   
 
                                  Equal-Weighted Returns   Value-Weighted Returns 
 
 
α   -0.28***     -0.47***  
   (-3.412)     (-2.702) 
 
MKT   1.38     1.09**    
    (1.614)     (2.033) 
 
SMB   0.71***      0.52* 
   (5.240)     (2.142) 
 
HML   -0.13***     -0.07*** 
   (-9.120)     (-3.201) 
 
Adj-R2   0.78     0.92 
    
  
  Panel B:  60-month Period 
 
Equal-Weighted Returns   Value-Weighted Returns 
 
α   0.39     -0.77**  
   (1.01)     (2.12) 
 
MKT   1.20*     1.04**    
    (1.874)     (2.362) 
 
SMB   0.48***     0.72 
   (2.514)     (1.08) 
 
HML   0.08**     -0.15*** 
   (2.019)     (-4.09) 
 
Adj-R2   0.87     0.90 
 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 6b: Excess Return Factor Regressions (Calendar-time) – Subsidiary Firms 
Table 6b provides results from calendar-time factor regressions for the excess returns of equally weighted and value-weighted 
sample portfolios for subsidiary firms. The portfolios are comprised of subsidiary firms that were carved out and returns are 
observed from the first day of trading following the announcement. Panel A presents estimated coefficients for a 36-month period 
for equally- weighted and value-weighted sample portfolios and Panel B presents estimated coefficients for the 60-month period 
for equally weighted and value weighted sample portfolios. I use the Fama-French three-factor model and obtain the factor 
returns for MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French‟s website. The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Panel A:  36-month Period   
 
                                  Equal-Weighted Returns   Value-Weighted Returns 
 
 
α   -0.17**     -0.23*  
   (-4.560)     (-1.902) 
 
MKT   0.87     1.22**     
   (1.614)     (2.154) 
 
SMB   0.73***      0.34*** 
   (6.040)     (3.142) 
 
HML   -0.09***     -0.13** 
   (-6.331)     (-2.401) 
 
Adj-R2   0.88     0.83 
    
  
  Panel B:  60-month Period 
 
Equal-Weighted Returns   Value-Weighted Returns 
 
α   -0.03*     -0.07**  
   (1.817)     (2.438) 
 
MKT   1.03**     0.54**     
   (2.874)     (2.311) 
 
SMB   0.09***     0.66* 
   (2.771)     (1.68) 
 
HML   0.17**     -0.32*** 
   (2.201)     (-3.271) 
 
Adj-R2   0.79     0.92 
 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 7: Fixed-Effects Model  
Table 7 provides coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model. Industry-adjusted ROAt, industry-adjusted ROE, and 
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q are regressed on governance indices (Panel A: GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index). I 
include a dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the subsidiary and the 
parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The values in parenthesis are t-
statistics and variable definitions are presented in Table 4. 
      Dependent Variable 
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α    -1.21***  0.01  -0.19*** 
    (-8.04)  (0.63)  (-4.27) 
 
GIM_indext-1   -0.17***  -1.08***    0.09    
    (2.35)  (3.78)   (1.27) 
 
L_TA     -0.18***  0.33  -1.04*** 
     (3.88)  (0.91)  (2.77) 
 
LEV     -0.01***  - 0.43***   0.02 
    (14.2)  (2.34)  (1.21) 
 
EBIT     0.11   0.73**   0.04 
    (0.74)  (1.89)  (1.14) 
 
SIC      0.21***   1.01**   0. 09** 
    (2.48)  (1.88)   (1.77) 
 
FIN     0.12   0.33**   0.27 
    (0.29)  (1.68)  (1.02) 
    
 
Panel B 
      Dependent Variable 
           ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α    -0.97**   0.42   -0.43*** 
    (1.88)  (0.79)   (-2.56) 
 
ENT_indext-1    0.08  -1.42***    -0.18***  
    (0.04)  (-3.44)   (-2.76) 
 
L_TA    -0.23***  0.22   -1.08*** 
    (2.41)  (0.87)   (2.44) 
 
LEV    -0.13***   0.03   -0.22** 
    (2.44)  (1.03)   (1.72) 
 
EBIT     0.48   1.09**     0.02 
    (0.29)  (1.73)    (1.11) 
 
SIC      0.17***   0.98**    0.16** 
    (2.68)  (1.74)    (1.81) 
 
FIN     0.31   0.52**     0.11 
    (0.48)  (1.72)    (1.03) 
 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 8: Hausman Endogeneity Tests 
Table 8 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on GIM_Index (Panel A) with the three firm performance 
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q) using GIM_Indext-2 as the instrument. I test the significance of the coefficient 
on the GIM_Index residuals. As exogenous variables, I include an indicator variables for financial firms (FIN) and 
relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and 
leverage (LEV).   
      Dependent Variable 
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α    -1.32*  -0.97**   1.02 
    (-1.34)  (-1.76)  (0.57) 
 
GIM_indext-1    -0.03**  -0.11*    0.23**    
    (-1.67)  (-1.62)   (1.82) 
 
GIM_Residuals   -0.04**          0.01***   -0. 37**    
    (-1.74)  (2.04)  (-1.94) 
 
L_TA    -0.22*   -0.03**                       -2.19***    
    (-1.54)  (-1.81)  (-3.41) 
 
LEV    -1.07*   -0.83**   -0.07 
    (-1.58)  (-1.68)  (-1.02) 
 
EBIT     0.11*                            0.82***                      0.53   
    (1.41)  (2.48)  (1.03) 
 
SIC     0.07   0.29   0.02* 
    (0.43)  (1.03)  (1.55) 
 
FIN     1.19   0.93*   0.78* 
    (1.12)  (1.63)  (1.34) 
    
Adjusted R2   0.14  0.07  0.11 
F-Statistic   63.96  18.44  33.08 
Wald (2)      78.12  24.06  42.43 
 
   *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
 
                             (Instrument:     GIM_Indext-2) 
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Table 8: Hausman Endogeneity Tests…cont 
Table 8 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on ENT_Index (Panel B) with the three firm performance 
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q) using GIM_Indext-2 as the instrument. I test the significance of the coefficient 
on the ENT_Index residuals. As exogenous variables, I include an indicator variables for financial firms (FIN) and 
relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and 
leverage (LEV).   
       Dependent Variable 
Panel B 
           ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     0.82  -0.04*   -0.78* 
    (0.76)  (1.31)  (-1.44) 
 
ENT_indext-1    -0.02  -0.32    0.05*    
    (-0.74)  (-0.94)   (1.34) 
 
ENT_Residuals    -0.08***   -0.13**   -0.09* 
    (-3.22)  (-1.87)  (-1.44) 
 
L_TA     -0.01*   -0.23*   1.03 
    (-1.48)  (-1.27)  (0.57) 
 
LEV    -0.43   -0.05**   -0.07 
    (-0.58)  (-2.17)  (1.02) 
 
EBIT     0.77*   0.83   1.03* 
    (1.38)  (0.78)  (1.53) 
 
SIC     0.77*   1.02**   0.94* 
    (1.31)  (1.73)  (1.28) 
 
FIN     0.68   0.94*   0.89* 
    (1.22)  (1.55)  (1.38) 
 
 
Adjusted R2   0.16  0.08  0.14 
F-Statistic   44.37  33.23  22.67 
Wald (2)      68.04  72.05  46.16 
 
  *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
                   
                   (Instrument:     ENT_Indext-2) 
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Table 9: IV Regressions  
Table 9 provides coefficient estimates from IV regressions of industry adjusted ROA on governance indices (Panel A: 
GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index) using GIM_indext-2 and ENT_indext-2 as instruments, respectively. I include a 
dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC), 
controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics and variable 
definitions are presented in Table 4. 
      Dependent Variable                                                                             
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     1.17***  -0.44   -1.68*** 
    (3.14)  (1.03)  (-9.28) 
 
GIM_indext-1    -0.57***  -0.24**   -0.71**    
    (-2.66)  (-1.80)   (-2.24) 
 
L_TA    -0.08***   -0.02   1.03** 
    (-2.48)  (-0.07)  (1.78) 
 
LEV    -0.43   -0.05**   0.07 
    (-0.58)  (-2.17)  (1.02) 
 
EBIT     1.24**   0.83***   0.76** 
    (1.77)  (2.48)  (1.83) 
 
SIC     0.11***   0.03**   0.40** 
    (3.19)  (1.88)  (1.97) 
 
FIN     0.28   0.34**   0.09 
    (0.22)  (1.68)  (1.07) 
    
Adjusted R2   0.38  0.15  0.27 
F-Statistic   10.53  7.00  3.83 
P-Values    [0.0018]  [0.0003]  [0.0520] 
      Dependent Variable 
Panel B 
           ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     1.02**  -0.76   -1.12*** 
    (2.16)  (0.97)  (-3.04) 
 
ENT_indext-1    -0.83**  -0.67***    0.02**    
    (-1.97)  (-2.47)   (1.73) 
 
L_TA    -0.41**   -0.38   0.93** 
    (-2.01)  (-1.02)  (1.81) 
 
LEV    -0.22   -0.05**   0.07 
    (-0.58)  (-2.17)  (1.02) 
 
EBIT     0.89**   0.47***   0.51 
    (2.03)  (2.88)  (0.79) 
 
SIC     1.04***   0.21**   0.57** 
    (3.37)  (1.91)  (2.16) 
 
FIN     0.07   0.81**   0.34 
    (1.12)  (1.97)  (0.83) 
 
Adjusted R2    0.23  0.12  0.28 
F-Statistic   10.28  9.70  14.04 
P-Values    [0.0005]  [0.0005]  [0.0020]  
 
  *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
   Instruments:  Panel A: Constant, GIM_Indext-2 
Panel B: Constant, ENT_Indext-2 
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Table 10: GMM Estimates  
Table 10 provides coefficient estimates from GMM regressions of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobins_Q on governance 
indices (Panel A: GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index) using GIM_indext-2 and ENT_indext-2 as instruments, 
respectively. I include a dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the 
subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV).  
      Dependent Variable 
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     0.69**   0.07***   -1.12** 
    (1.81)  (2.33)  (-1.91) 
 
GIM_indext-1    -0.43***  -0.22***    0.08**    
    (-2.74)  (-2.67)   (1.98) 
 
L_TA    -0.14***   -0.03   -1.05** 
    (-2.67)  (-1.02)   (-1.74) 
 
LEV                      -0.42                    -0.07***   - 0.12** 
    (-1.21)  (-2.37)   (-1.82) 
 
EBIT     1.18**   0.87**    0.74 
    (1.79)  (1.86)   (1.02) 
 
SIC     0.11*   0.46**    0.05** 
    (1.32)  (1.81)   (2.04) 
  
FIN     0.04   0.32**    0.08 
    (1.08)  (1.77)   (1.17) 
   
R-Square    -14.00  -18.34   -16.37 
Adj_R2    -12.34  -18.41   -11.54 
Durbin-Watson   4.78  3.79    4.07 
J-Statistic    6.31E-06  2.84E-03    3.46E-03 
      Dependent Variable 
Panel B 
           ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     1.04**   0.12**    1.15 
    (1.77)  (1.98)   (0.91) 
 
ENT_indext-1    -0.72***  -0.22**    -0.08**    
    (-2.48)  (-2.27)   (-1.84) 
 
L_TA     -0.01**   -0.09   -0.75** 
    (-1.73)  (-0.84)   (-1.81) 
 
LEV                      -0.47                   -0.08***  - 0.01** 
    (-1.12)  (-2.41)   (-1.98) 
 
EBIT     0.48**   0.53**    0.74** 
    (1.79)  (1.86)   (2.12) 
 
SIC     0.09   0.13**    0.02** 
    (1.04)  (1.69)   (2.04) 
  
FIN     0.11**   0.52*    0.71 
    (1.67)  (1.07)   (1.26) 
 
 
R-Square    -12.02  -10.12    -12.05 
Adj_R2    -10.82  -14.28    -9.34 
Durbin-Watson   5.06  4.03     2.84 
J-Statistic    4.32E-04  3.21E-02    6.93E-.2 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
   Instruments: Panel A: Constant, GIM_Indext-2 
Panel B: Constant, ENT_Indext-2 
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Table 11a: IV and GMM Regressions for sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000)  
Table 11a provides coefficient estimates from IV and GMM regressions for a sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000). I regress industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, and 
Tobins_Q on GIM_Indext-1 using GIM_indext-2 as an instrument. I include an indicator variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the subsidiary and the 
parent (SIC). I control for firm size (L_TA), Price-to-book value (PBV), and firm profitability (EBIT). 
                                    IV                                GMM 
 
Model       1    2   3      1    2        3 
                                           ROAt                    ROEt                  Tobin‟s Qt                  ROAt     ROEt  Tobin‟s_Qt   
 
Constant     0.03  0.24***   -1.06   -1.27   0.05   -1.04**   
    (0.57)  (2.58)  (-1.04)  (-0.11)  (1.08)  (-1.66)     
 
GIM-incdext-1   -0.98**  -0.91***  -0.24**   -0.03*  -0.62**  0.08**   
    (-1.87)  (-2.77)  (-2.08)  (-1.41)  (-1.83)  (1.79) 
 
L_TA    -0.32**  -1.01**   0.03   -0.74   -0.11**  -4.10**   
    (-1.71)  (2.29)  (0.07)  (-0.42)  (-2.17)  (-1.78)   
  
PBV    1.17**   2.22***  -   0.83**   0.62**  -   
    (1.68)  (2.69)    (1.78)  (2.03)     
    
EBIT    0.04**   1.86**   0.81   0.14**   0.08   0.41**   
    (2.08)  (1.75)  (1.07)  (2.02)  (0.17)  (1.88) 
 
Adj.R2    0.31  0.12  0.24  0.18  0.22  0.12    
F-statistic   42.18***  18.22**  34.37***  22.10**  28.54**  16.64** 
Model p-value   [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]   
     
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 11b: IV and GMM Regressions for sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000) 
Table 11b provides coefficient estimates from IV and GMM regressions for a sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000). I regress industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, and 
Tobins_Q on ENT_Indext-1 using ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. I include an indicator variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the subsidiary and the 
parent (SIC). I control for firm size (L_TA), Price-to-book value (PBV), and firm profitability (EBIT). 
                                    IV                                GMM 
 
Model       1    2   3      1    2        3 
                                            ROAt                    ROEt                  Tobin‟s_ Qt                  ROAt     ROEt  Tobin‟s_Qt   
 
Constant     0.74   0.63**   1.44**   -1.54   0.11*   -1.67*   
    (1.02)  (1.92)  (2.04)  (-0.09)  (1.29)  (-1.42)    
  
ENT-incdext-1   -0.53*   -0.08***  -0.37***  -0.43**  -0.22**   0.13*    
    (-1.67)  (-3.68)  (-2.44)  (-1.67)  (-1.91)  (1.42) 
 
L_TA    -0.04***  -0.78**   -0.03   -0.72   -0.41*  -3.87**    
    (-2.71)  (1.99)  (-0.47)  (-0.56)  (-1.33)  (-1.68)   
  
PBV     0.97**   1.09***  -   0.32**   0.34**  -    
    (1.73)  (3.01)    (1.69)  (2.03)     
    
EBIT     0.28*   1.01*   0.82   0.07**   0.17   0.57**    
    (1.69)  (1.71)  (1.33)  (2.11)  (0.53)  (1.93) 
 
Adj.R2    0.18  0.26  0.16  0.12  0.10  0.21    
F-statistic   28.17  34.37***  22.10**   8.54**  16.64**  9.57** 
Model p-value   [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]   
     
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
 
  
56 
 
Table 12: Granger Causality Tests  
Table 12 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between shareholder-rights protection [GIM-index and ENT-
index] and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA along with their 1-period lag.  
        F-Statistic  Probability 
  GIM-index does not granger cause ROA   8.420 [0.0000] 
  ROA does not granger cause GIM-index   1.203 [0.5480] 
Model 1-(ROA) 
    
  ENT-index does not granger cause ROA   12.621 [0.0000] 
 
ROA does not granger cause ENT-index   0.044 [0.2860] 
    
 
  
  
  GIM-index does not granger cause ROE   4.568 [0.0005] 
  ROE does not granger cause GIM-index   0.941 [0.3680] 
Model 2-(ROE) 
  
  
  
  ENT-index does not granger cause ROE   26.010 [0.0000] 
 
ROE does not granger cause ENT-index   1.045 [0.6200] 
        
  
  GIM-index does not granger cause Adj_Q   1.325 [0.0500] 
  Adj_Q does not granger cause GIM-index   0.572 [0.2020] 
    
 
  
  
  ENT-index does not granger cause Adj_Q   2.920 [0.0600] 
Model 3-(Adj_Q) Adj_Q does not granger cause ENT-index   0.083 [0.7200] 
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Chapter 3 
 
Board Structure and Firm Performance: The Case of Equity Carve-outs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 I investigate the effect of board structure on firm performance using a sample of carve-out firms 
for the period 1983-2004. The board as an internal governance mechanism is intended to align the 
interests of shareholders and those of management. An extensive literature attempting to evaluate how 
effectively boards perform this role exists; however, the evidence is mixed and largely inconclusive. In 
this essay I re-examine the effect of board structure on firm performance by implementing IV and GMM 
to ameliorate the empirical problems that plague past studies. I also exploit the experimental setting 
presented by the structural break in a firm‟s governance system through restructuring to mitigate the 
persistence of governance structures across time. Full sample results show that board size is negatively 
related to firm performance, board independence is positively associated with firm performance, and CEO 
duality is negatively related to firm performance. On the other hand, results from a sub-sample consisting 
of only financial firms board size is shown to be positively related to firm performance. In the case of 
board independence and CEO duality, results for financial firms are qualitatively similar to those for non-
financial firms – indicating a positive relation between firm performance and the two variables. Although 
Granger causality tests suggest reverse causality between board size and firm performance, it is not clear 
what explains the distinction between financial and non-financial firms in the case of board size.  
 
 
JEL Classifications:   G34, G38   
Keywords: Corporate Boards; External Directors; Board Size; Board-insiders; Board Independence.    
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate boards constitute one of the most important internal control mechanisms of the 
modern firm and have justifiably attracted significant interest from business researchers for a 
long time. The board as an internal control mechanism is tasked with overseeing, hiring, firing, 
and rewarding managers with the objective of aligning managers‟ interests with those of 
shareholders through its key committees – audit, compensation, and governance and 
nominations. Given the prominent role that boards play they have attracted significant attention, 
particularly, from empirical researchers. Some of the big questions that empirical research has 
attempted to answer include: (1) What factors affect the composition of boards; (2) Whether and 
how board characteristics such as the proportion of external-to-insider directors and board size 
affect firm performance; and thirdly (3) How effective corporate boards are in accomplishing 
their intended role as an interest alignment mechanism. As important as boards seem to be, 
though, Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) note a conspicuous dearth of formal theory on corporate 
boards. In the absence of formal theory on corporate boards, interpreting the extensive empirical 
findings is bound to be cloudy and subjective. This may partly explain the largely conflicting 
extant evidence.  
 
Limited formal theory notwithstanding, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) posit two 
alternative causes for the largely mixed evidence and present some interesting policy 
implications of their findings.  First, they argue that empirical studies on corporate boards, like 
other governance studies are seriously hampered by the endogeneity or reverse-causality 
problem.  It is still not clear whether good boards lead to better firm performance or whether past 
performance in fact influences the future composition of boards. Second, they posit that 
interpretation of the empirical results and related policy implications may vary depending on 
whether the empirical results are interpreted from an equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium 
perspective. For instance, they suggest that if the negative relation between board size and firm 
performance is perceived from an out-of-equilibrium perspective, it may imply causation and the 
encouragement of small boards. On the other hand, the equilibrium interpretation of these results 
may point to a spurious relation between board size and firm performance, and the implication 
that the two variables are driven by some other factor.    
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In addition to board size, board independence has attracted similar attention from 
scholars.  It is very critical that boards as monitors of management not only be impartial but also 
be perceived as such. Consequently, the presence of outside/unaffiliated board members on the 
board and the CEO not doubling as the chairman of the board are perceived as indicators of the 
degree of independence between the board and management. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that 
independent directors have an incentive to act as effective monitors in order to preserve their 
reputations. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), on the other hand, posit that a board‟s independence 
depends on the relative bargaining powers of the CEO and the board. More recently, as a result 
of corporate scandals, board independence has taken on a regulatory dimension. Sarbanes-Oxley 
and new securities exchange requirements now mandate that a majority of board members be 
independent as well as all directors on key committees. These developments seem to implicitly 
suggest that the presence of outside directors on a board ensures its effectiveness. From a 
shareholder wealth perspective, a more interesting question to ask then becomes:  Does an 
independent board necessarily improve firm performance?  As alluded to earlier, extant evidence 
does not conclusively answer this question. Some evidence suggests a positive relation between 
firm performance and board independence, other evidence posits a negative relation, and yet 
other studies find no relation.  
 
The majority of these earlier studies implement OLS regressions by projecting some 
measure of firm performance, say, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), or Tobin‟s Q 
on a given  proxy for board size and independence (composition and leadership). Given the 
potential endogeneity of board characteristics and firm performance, results obtained from 
simple linear approaches are potentially likely to be misleading. I argue that the econometric 
issues that generally afflict governance studies coupled with the limited formal theory to inform 
empirical research on board structure and firm performance have to a degree constrained the 
current state of inquiry on boards, thus impeding our full understanding of whether the form that 
boards take has any influence on performance or vice versa.  
 
The main objective of this essay is to re-examine the relation between firm performance 
and board structure using methodological approaches that control for the major econometric 
problems that plagued earlier studies. I argue that the largely mixed evidence on the effects of 
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board structure on firm performance can partly be attributable to inadequate methodological 
approaches used in these studies. To control for the potential endogeneity, I use panel data and 
start with pooled regressions. I then implement the instrumental variables method (IV), the 
generalized method of moments (GMM), and lastly I run granger causality tests between board 
structure and firm performance to ascertain the direction of causation.  I successively increase 
the complexity of the models with a view to discerning the effect on my coefficients. The idea 
here is that if any statistically significant changes in the coefficients can be observed, then it is 
plausible that the choice of econometric models in earlier studies may partly explain the largely 
mixed evidence. I then attempt to reconcile my results with existing evidence.  
 
 Second, I exploit the experimental setting presented by equity carve-outs to analyze the 
effects of the restructuring „shock‟ on board structure. Then following the announcement, I 
investigate to what extent board structure influences the performance of the carved-out 
subsidiaries. My prior is that if shareholder wealth maximization is the goal of management, then 
one would expect management of the parent company, with the approval of the board, to 
structure the subsidiary‟s board in ways most likely to maximize shareholder value. I investigate 
whether the parent firm‟s board structure has similarities with that of the newly created 
subsidiary. And if so, to what extent these similarities may influence the subsidiary‟s 
performance following the announcement.  
 
I find that board size is negatively related to firm performance for non-financial firms, 
consistent with the findings by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Mak 
and Yuanto (2003), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), and Charu Raheja (2005).  Board independence 
is positively associated with firm performance in support of the evidence presented by Charu 
Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000). Consistent with 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995) I find that 
CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. Results from a sub-sample consisting of 
only financial firms (SIC 6000), show that board size is positively related to firm performance. 
The findings for financial firms support the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran (2005) 
and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). A plausible explanation for the positive relation between 
board size and firm performance for financial firms is that banks being large holding companies, 
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the scope of operations is so complex that it requires larger boards provide a wider pool of 
expertise to run them.  What accounts for the positive association between board size and firm 
performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, Adams and Mehran argue, is that board size 
may be endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors from the 
target firm is absorbed by the acquirer. In support of this view Granger causality test results 
indicate reverse causality between board size and firm performance.   
 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 2, I review extant theory on board 
structure and firm performance, present the empirical evidence, and develop testable hypotheses. 
I present sample selection criteria, the data, and describe the variables in section 3. Section 4 
discusses the empirical tests and results. Robustness test results are presented in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
 In this section, I review extant theory on board structure and discuss related predictions, 
then I present the empirical evidence, and lastly, I motivate and develop testable hypotheses. 
Although the relation between board structure and firm performance has defied conclusive 
evidence, more recently, Charu Raheja (2005) posits that… “Optimal board design maximizes 
the probability that the majority of board members will vote against inferior projects and replace 
them with higher value projects. He goes on to say that “board size and independence affect the 
incentives of board members and play a crucial role in board effectiveness”…thus directly 
linking the performance of the firm to the effectiveness of the board, through the board‟s 
approval of value increasing projects and rejection of bad projects.  However, this assertion still 
leaves open the question of what constitutes an „optimal‟ board. A number of theories have been 
advanced to explain the structure of corporate boards, namely: the scope of operations 
hypothesis; the monitoring hypothesis; and the negotiation hypothesis. I review each of these 
theories, present related empirical evidence, and develop testable hypotheses to ascertain the 
relation between firm performance and board structure.    
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2.1 Theory on Board Structure 
 
2.1.1 The Scope of Operations Hypothesis 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that as a firm‟s operations expand, its production processes 
become increasingly complex and its organization more hierarchical. The board which is charged 
with the stewardship of the firm and overseeing its senior managers, invariably also grows in size 
as its responsibilities increase. Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2006) make the same argument, positing a 
positive association between board size and the complexity of operations, but predicate the 
increase in complexity on the introduction of new products and expansion into new geographical 
markets. Crutchley, Garner, and Marshall (2004) and Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2004), on the other 
hand, argue that given the complexity of operations and wider span of control larger firms are 
likely to suffer from significantly more agency problems, consequently requiring more 
independent (outside) board members to mitigate these problems. The main predictions from the 
scope of operations hypothesis are that: (1) board size is positively related to the scope and 
complexity of the firm‟s operations; (2) the proportion of independent (outside) directors on the 
board is positively related to the scope and complexity of the firm‟s operations.  
 
Yermack (1996) and Denis and Sarin (1999) present evidence that board size is positively 
related to firm size. Anderson, Bates, and Lemmon (2000) show that diversified firms have 
relatively more independent directors to monitor their extensive and varied operations. Boone, 
Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) using firm size, age, and number of segments as proxies for 
firm complexity, also present evidence in support of the scope of operations hypothesis, for both 
board size and board independence.  
 
2.1.2 The Monitoring Hypothesis 
 
The notion that the effectiveness of the monitoring role played by boards diminishes as 
the board gets larger is modeled by Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2006) as a trade-off 
between the managers‟ consumption of private benefits and directors‟ monitoring costs.  
Hackman (1990) makes the same „free-rider‟ and „cost-benefit‟ argument. He argues that large 
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boards create incentive problems similar to a free-rider problem, which makes it difficult for 
individual board members to actively participate in their supervisory roles. Moreover, as the 
board grows in size the costs of group-decision making such as communication and coordination 
costs rise, while at the same time reputation benefits in the eyes of the individual board member 
diminish. The idea here is that optimal board size will be that number at which the verification 
and monitoring costs of individual board members begin to rise. The overall predictions under 
the monitoring hypothesis are that (1) Board size and independence are positively related to 
managers‟ private benefits, and (2) board size and independence are negatively related to 
directors‟ costs of monitoring. Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2004) show that firms with greater growth 
opportunities have smaller boards and fewer outside directors. Similarly, Coles, et al. (2006) 
present evidence that a firm‟s R&D expenditures are negatively related to the number of 
independent (outside) directors.  Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) present recent 
evidence of a positive relation between board size and managers‟ private benefits using industry 
concentration and the presence of take-over defenses as proxies for managerial private benefits. 
However, they show no relation between board independence and managers‟ private benefits and 
directors‟ costs of monitoring.  
 
2.1.3 The Negotiation Hypothesis 
 
One of the reasons advanced for the existence of boards is that of an equilibrium solution 
to the severe agency problems that exist between managers and shareholders. Independent 
(outside) directors are often viewed as playing the role of monitors within the overall governance 
framework. Proponents of the negotiation hypothesis take the view that board composition is an 
evolutionary process that is largely shaped by the bargaining game between the CEO and the 
independent directors on the board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) posit that in this negotiation, 
the CEO prefers a less independent board whereas the outside directors wish to maintain their 
independence. The CEO‟s main bargaining chip is her ability. The authors make the case that if 
the CEO demonstrates that she possesses a set of special abilities and therefore is not easily 
replaceable, the board‟s independence will likely decline. Conversely, when the CEO presides 
over poor performance her reputation and bargaining power with the board suffers likewise, and 
she is more likely to be replaced. More recently, Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the longer 
 64 
 
a CEO has been tenured and the better skilled she appears relative to potential replacements, the 
stronger will be her bargaining power and the less independent will be the board. Kieschnick and 
Moussawi (2004) reaffirm the negative relation between board independence and CEO influence 
and argue that board independence will grow with institutional investor influence. Boone, Field, 
Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) using CEO‟s stock ownership and job tenure as proxies for CEO 
influence find a negative relation between board independence and these two variables.  
 
2.2 Board Structure and Firm Performance 
 
Most empirical studies that investigate the relation between board structure and firm 
performance tend to appeal to agency theory. The rationale is that senior managers to whom 
decision-making authority is delegated by the share owners of a corporation are self-interested 
and may pursue actions that do not necessarily align with those of the owners. Hence, the board 
of directors, being one of the important internal control mechanisms, is looked upon as a 
mechanism to align managers‟ and shareholders‟ interests through close monitoring. 
Consequently, when boards perform their role effectively, it is argued that actions that managers 
take will be geared towards fulfilling their cardinal duty of maximizing shareholder wealth. On 
the other hand, proponent‟s of the stewardship role of corporate boards argue that directors play 
an advisory role to senior managers and engendering unity at the top and avoiding unnecessary 
power struggles may in fact be a good thing in terms of shepherding and deploying the firm‟s 
resources.  The two polar views notwithstanding, some important questions that deserve attention 
when evaluating the impact of board structure on firm performance are: (1) What constitutes an 
effective board, and (2) How are the characteristics of an effective board related to firm 
performance?  An extensive literature exists although it is still largely mixed.  
 
2.2.1 Board Size 
 
In the case of board size, there are studies that posit a positive relation between firm 
performance and board size; there are those that show a negative association, and others that 
support the null hypothesis that board size has no effect on firm performance. Mak and Yuanto 
(2003) and Coleman and Biekpe (2005) present international evidence of a negative relation 
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between firm performance and board size and for Singapore and Malaysia, respectively. 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) also find a negative relation 
between board size and the market valuation of US firms. Charu Raheja (2005) argues that 
optimal boards maximize the probability that inferior projects will be rejected by the board and 
replaced with higher value projects, partly attributing the effectiveness of boards to small size. 
On the other hand, several management researchers, in particular Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and 
Ellstrad (1999) argue that large boards provide a wider pool of expertise that senior management 
can tap into thus predicting a positive relation between board size and firm performance. The 
null hypothesis between firm performance and board size is supported by Bhagat and Black 
(2002), Provost, et al., (2002), and Adams and Mehran (2002) who find no statistically 
significant relation between board composition and firm performance.  In this study, I 
hypothesize that small boards are more effective and will have a more significant impact on firm 
performance: 
 
H1: Long-term carve-out performance is negatively associated with board size.  
 
2.2.2 Board Independence 
 
 Part of Charu Raheja (2005) argument that optimal boards maximize the probability that 
inferior projects will be rejected by the board and replaced with higher value projects, is 
predicated on the notion that independent boards are more effective. This supports the notion that 
a positive association exists between firm performance and board independence.  Chung, Wright, 
and Kedia (2003) study the relation between a firm‟s R&D expenditures and firm value and 
present evidence of a positive relation for those firms with more independent boards. Brewer III, 
et al., (2000) shows that banking firms with independent boards command higher premium in 
takeovers than those with less independent boards. On the other hand, Anderson, et al., (1998) 
show that the ratio of independent directors is negatively related to the price-to-sales ratio for 
mono-product line firms. Yermack (1996) using the simultaneous equations approach, also 
documents evidence of a negative relation between the firm‟s Tobin‟s Q and an independent 
board. The effect however, disappears in a fixed effects setup. Lastly, Bhagat and Black (2002), 
Provost, et al., (2002), and Adams and Mehran (2002) find no statistically significant relation 
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between board independence and firm performance. In view of the largely mixed evidence, I re-
investigate the relation between firm performance and board independence. I hypothesize that 
independent boards are more effective monitors and hence will have a positive effect on firm 
performance: 
 
H2: Long-term carve-out performance is positively associated with the proportion of 
independent (outside) directors on the board.  
 
2.2.3 CEO Duality 
 
Related to board independence is the notion of board leadership. Separation of the role of 
CEO and board chairman has pre-occupied board scholars and regulators particularly following 
recent corporate scandals. Agency theory suggests that having the CEO also play the role of 
board chairman compromises the independence of the board and an ineffective board is likely to 
cause poor performance [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. Based on the monitoring hypothesis, it would 
seem obvious that the CEO who is supposed to be monitored by the board should not be the chair 
of the same board. Moreover, the negotiation hypothesis which posits that board structure is the 
result of bargaining between the CEO and the board, suggests that having the CEO act as 
chairman of the board bestows enormous bargaining advantage for the CEO over the board, 
invariably compromising its independence. Consistent with these views, Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) show evidence that firms which separate CEO and board 
chairman roles consistently outperform those with dual CEO/Chairman positions. On the other 
hand, proponents of the stewardship hypothesis suggest that the CEO is likely to be more 
informed about what is happening within the firm and therefore better placed to chair the board 
and act as the conduit for the exchange of critical information between the insiders and the 
outside directors on the board. This arrangement, they argue, minimizes the cost of information 
transfer and potential miscommunication between the board and management [Donaldson and 
Davis (1991)]. On the other hand, Baliga et al., (1996) and Dalton et al., (1998) find no 
significant association between CEO duality and firm performance. Given this dichotomous view 
on CEO duality, I include an indicator variable, (CEOt-1), coded „1‟ if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board or „0‟ otherwise, and test the following hypothesis:   
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H3: Long-term carve-out performance is negatively associated with CEO Duality. 
 
2.2.4 Board Structure and Performance: Financial Firms  
 
Adams and Mehran (2005) examine the relation between board structure and firm 
performance for US banking institutions and find that, contrary to the evidence for non-financial 
firms positing a negative (positive) relation between board size (board independence) and firm 
performance, board size is positively related to firm performance and no statistically significant 
association between board independence and firm performance. They argue that banks being 
large holding companies, the scope of operations hypothesis explains why they are likely to have 
larger boards. What accounts for the positive association between board size and firm 
performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, they argue, is that board size may be 
endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors from the target 
firm is absorbed by the acquirer. This argument is plausible, considering that their sample period, 
1959-1999, was a period characterized by significant M&A activity in the banking industry. 
Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming) studies board size and firm performance for US banks and 
Savings & Loans, for the period 1995-2002. Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005), he finds 
a positive relation between board size and firm performance and no relation between board 
independence and firm performance.  
 
To ascertain whether the relation between board structure and firm performance for 
financial firms differs from that documented for non-financial firms, I include a dummy variable 
(FIN), for financial firms in all full sample regressions. I also run separate IV and GMM 
regressions for financial firms.  
 
3. Sample Selection and Data 
 
 
3.1 Sample Selection  
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The sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) US IPO data and 
cross checked with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index and the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The initial sample comprises 421 firms (regulated and 
unregulated) that announced carve-out transactions during the time period 1983 - 2004. For 
inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and be 
covered by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT. Supplemental governance data is 
obtained from Q-files, Lexis-Nexis, Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs, The Corporate Library 
(TCL), and corporate proxy statements. For each year that a firm is in the sample, I gather 
complete data on the composition of the board, directors‟ relationships with the firm/senior 
management, and number of directors on the board. Firms that constitute the final sample are 
then observed for the entire sample period or until a given firm is re-acquired or summarily sold 
off. I use Weisbach (1998) methodology to classify directors as affiliated or non-affiliated. 
Directors who are current employees of the firm, retired, or their immediate families are 
classified as affiliated directors or insiders. Those whose only association with the firm is 
membership on the board are classified as unaffiliated or outside directors.  
 
 After the initial screening and elimination of firms that do not trade on 
AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE, have missing data points, or are not covered by CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 164 firms constitute the final sample (81 financials and 83 industrials). To 
control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms (SIC 6000), I 
include an indicator variable coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise, in all 
regressions. For robustness, I also run separate regressions on financial firms (SIC 6000).   
 
Table 13 presents the size and distribution of the sample. Panel A shows the initial 
sample size and break- down of the number of firms screened out and the reasons for their 
exclusion. Of the original sample of 421 firms, 144 firms are dropped because they are not listed 
on AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE.  Additionally, 105 firms are not covered by CRSP and/or 
COMPUSTAT and 8 firms had missing data on the structure of their boards.  Panel B shows the 
distribution of carve-out announcements by year. Firms that meet all requirements for inclusion, 
range from 5 for the years 1989, 1991, 2003, and 2004 to 14 for 2000. Panel C presents the 
distribution of announcements by industry (2-digit SIC). Financials (SIC 60), had the highest 
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number of transactions with 81 announcements, manufacturing (SIC 20-30) had 34, there were 
17 announcements for other services (SIC 70-80), 14 for wholesale/retail (SIC 50), 9 for 
transportation, communications, and utilities (SIC 40), and 8 for mining, oil, and gas (SIC 10).    
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 14 presents sample descriptive statistics. Board size has a mean (median) of 10.74 
(10.19) board members with a standard deviation of 2.31. The maximum (minimum) number of 
directors on the board is 18 (4). The proportion of independent directors to total directors on the 
board has a mean (median) of 73% (78%) with a standard deviation of 22%. The maximum 
(minimum) proportion of independent directors is 94% (31%). CEO/Chairman duality has a 
mean (median) of 0.26 (1.00) and a standard deviation of 0.52. The maximum (minimum) 
number for CEO/Chairman duality is 1.00 (0.00). Total market value of equity ranges from a 
minimum of $3.4 to a maximum of $58,514 with a mean (median) of $1,002 ($207) and a 
standard deviation of $244.  Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt divided by total 
assets ranges from a minimum of 0.12 to a maximum of 1.06 with a mean (median) of 0.43 
(0.54) and a standard deviation of 0.20. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a 
maximum of 0.79 with a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.39) and a standard deviation of 0.24. Tobin‟s 
Q which is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets, 
ranges from 1.18 to 1.92 with a mean (median) of 1.48 (1.57) and a standard deviation of 1.12. 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
(EBIT/TA) and  the minimum (maximum) for the sample is -0.03 (0.16) with a mean (median) of 
0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Return on equity is measured as net earnings 
divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock) and  ranges from a minimum of -
0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.24.  
 
3.3     Description of Variables 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q) 
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Table 15, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are 
constructed. The dependent variable is firm performance. Three variables including Tobin‟s Q 
(Adj_Q), return on assets (Adj_ROA), and return on equity (Adj_ROE) are used to proxy firm 
performance. Tobin‟s Q, is measured as book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of its assets. Each firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is then 
adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of the potential right 
skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test.  Return 
on assets (ROA) for each firm is calculated as the ratio of the firm‟s earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) to the book value of assets. Return on equity (ROE) measured as a firm‟s earnings 
before interest and tax divided by the firms total equity. Both variables are then adjusted by 
subtracting the industry medians for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), 
respectively.  
 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Board size is measured as the total number of directors on the board. An indicator 
variable coded „1‟ if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board or „0‟ otherwise. Board 
independence is the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) directors to the total number of directors on the 
board. Outside (unaffiliated) directors are defined as those non-executive board members who 
have no material relationship (either as partner, shareholder, or officer) with the company 
beyond their directorship. The IFC definition goes even farther and suggests that an independent 
director should be independent in character and judgment.  It specifically states that, “…an 
independent director is one who is not, and has not been employed by the company or any of its 
related parties at any time during the past five years; is not, and has not been affiliated with a 
company that acts as an advisor or consultant to the company or its related parties, nor is not and 
has not himself acted in such capacity at any time during the past five years; is not, and has not 
been affiliated with any significant customer or supplier of the company or its related parties…” 
among others. For robustness, I also use the change in board independence (Outside directors 
minus inside directors), in place of the proportion of outsiders.  
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3.3.5 Control Variables 
 
Control variables include book-to-market value (BME), log of market value of equity 
(L_MVE), and log of total assets (L_TA) used as control variables for firm size. Leverage 
(LEV), computed as total long-term debt divided by the firm‟s total assets, and Capital ratio are 
used to proxy for the indebtedness of non-financial and financial firms, respectively. For full 
sample regressions combining financial and non-financial firms, I include an indicator variable 
FIN for financials, to control for the regulatory and balance sheet differences. The sample 
distribution data presented in Table  13, Panel C depicts some degree of industry concentration 
particularly in manufacturing, services, and wholesale/retail. For robustness, I include an 
indicator variable for industry, SIC, based on the 2-digit SIC code.   
 
Table 16 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that 
the pairwise correlation between contemporaneous firm performance proxies and the main 
explanatory variables is much weaker than that between performance proxies and lagged 
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with 
lagged board size (B_SIZE) are negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Pairwise correlation between ROA and lagged B_SIZE is positive and insignificant. Correlations 
between Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA and board independence are all positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level for Tobin‟s Q and ROE, and 10% for ROA. Pairwise correlations between 
performance measures and CEO Duality are all negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. For further analysis, I run granger-causality tests between the three performance measures 
and board structure proxies to determine the direction of causation.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
 
Following the discussion on the econometrics of governance studies, I argue that simple 
OLS estimation methods are unlikely to yield unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates. I use 
panel data which allows for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity. First, I 
start with annual univariate regressions and then successively increase the complexity of the 
models by implementing a fixed effects model, then the instrumental variables method (IV), and 
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lastly, the generalized method of moments (GMM). As a robustness check, I also run granger 
causality tests to determine the direction of causation between board structure and firm 
performance. To test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, I project an industry-adjusted performance 
measure [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] on each of the proxies for board structure [B_SIZE, 
B_INDEP, and CEO]. I include as control variables the log of total assets (L_TA), firm leverage 
(LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT). To capture industry effects, I use a binary variable (FIN), 
coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial (SIC 6000) or „0‟ otherwise. For the IV and GMM models, I 
use 2 lags of board structure variables as instruments.  I estimate the following model: 
 
      Adj_ROAit = α + ß1B_SIZEi,t-1 +  ß2B_INDEP i,t-1 + ß3CEO,i,t-1 + ß4LEV i,t-1 + ß5L_TAi,t-1 + ß6FINi, t + εit   (1) 
 
One of the econometric problems discussed earlier is reverse causality. In the case of 
board structure and firm performance, it is not clear whether effective boards result in better firm 
performance in the future or whether in fact good performance causes firms to establish effective 
boards. I implement granger causality tests (Granger 1969) to test whether changes in board 
structure are followed by systematic changes in firm performance or vice versa. Granger 
causality tests have the advantage of not requiring the use of instrumental variables. I test the 
following models for each of the board structure proxies and measures of firm performance:  
 
Adj_ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 +   α2ROAt-2 + β1B_SIZEt-1 +   β2B_SIZEt-2 +   εt       (2) 
 
 B_SIZEt = φ0 + φ 1B_SIZEt-1 +   φ 2B_SIZEt-2 + β3ROAt-1 +   β4ROAt-2 +   νt       (3) 
 
 
In equation (2), the null hypothesis is that: board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause firm 
performance (ROA). Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that board size granger causes 
firm performance. In equation (3), the null hypothesis is that:  firm performance does not 
granger cause board size. Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that firm performance 
granger causes board size. The F-statistic/Wald-statistic is used to test the following condition, 
for all equations:                  β1 = β2 = 0  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 OLS Regressions  
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Table 17 presents test results from annual OLS regressions. Model 1 uses industry-
adjusted ROA as the dependent variable, Model 2 uses industry-adjusted ROE, and Model 3 uses 
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q, controlling for firm profitability (EBIT), leverage (LEV), firm size 
(L_TA), and whether the firm is financial or non-financial (FIN). The coefficients on board size 
(B_SIZEt-1)  are mostly negative and range from -0.87 to 0.19 with levels of significance 
ranging from 0.01 in year 1998, to 0.05 in 1988, 1990, and 2004, and 0.10 in 1984, 1985, 1989, 
1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004. The coefficients on board independence (B_INDEP)  are 
mostly positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the years 1983, 1991, 1992, 1998, 
2002, and 2003, and significant at the 0.10 level for the years 1984, 1986, 1989, 1997, and 2000. 
The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative and range from -1.42 to 0.91 with 
levels of significance ranging from 0.05 in 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 1999, and 2004, and 0.10 in 
1992. Model 2 uses adjusted return on equity (ROE) as a measure of firm performance.  The 
coefficients on board size (B_SIZE) are mostly negative and range from -0.54 to 0.22 with levels 
of significance ranging from 0.05 for years 1988, 1992, and 1996, to 0.10 in 1983, 1984, 1987, 
1989, 1991, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004. The coefficients on board independence 
(B_INDEP)  are mostly positive ranging from -0.11 to 0.94 and statistically significant at the 
0.05 level for the years 1989, 1997, 1998, and significant at the 0.10 level for the years 1985, 
1987, 1990, 1993, 2002, and 2004. The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative 
and range from -1.20 to 0.85 with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 in 1985, 1991, 1994, 
2001, and 2003, and 0.10 in 1997. Model 3 uses adjusted return on equity (ROE) as a measure of 
firm performance.  The coefficients on board size (B_SIZE) are mostly negative and range from 
-0.34 to 0.48 with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 for year 2003, to 0.10 for years 1986, 
1988, 1991, 1993, and 1998. The coefficients on board independence (B_INDEP) are mostly 
positive ranging from -0.11 to 0.87 and statistically significant at the 0.10 level for the years 
1985, 1988, 1992, 1998, and 2003. The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative 
and range from -1.18 to 0.37 with a 0.10 significance level for years 1983, 1988, 1996, and 2000.  
 
In general, though inconclusive, OLS multivariate results show a positive association 
between firm performance and board independence, a negative relation between CEO-duality 
and firm performance, and a negative relation between firm performance and board size. These 
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preliminary results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, and are consistent with the results 
presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., 
(2000). The results negate the findings by Bhagat and Black (2002) and Provost, et al., (2002), 
who document no relation between firm performance and board composition, and those of 
Yermack (1996) who shows a negative relation between firm performance and board 
independence.  
   
5.2 Fixed Effects Model  
 
I test the appropriateness of the fixed effects and a random effects model using a 
Hausman endogeneity test. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of 12.43 (0.0000) suggesting 
that the fixed-effects coefficient estimates are more consistent. Hence, I implement a fixed 
effects model. Table 18, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as 
the dependent variable. Board size (B_SIZE) has the opposite sign from that predicted by 
hypothesis H1 and the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on board 
independence (B_INDEP) has a positive sign as predicted by H2 but is also statistically 
insignificant. Consistent with hypothesis H3, the coefficient on CEO duality is negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The indicator variable for financial firms is also 
statistically significant suggesting that association between firm performance, as measured by 
ROA, may be different for financials that non-financial firms. Overall, results from the fixed 
effects model, using ROA as the measure for firm performance, do not support hypotheses H1 
and H2 but are consistent with hypothesis H3, which predicts a negative relation between firm 
performance and CEO-duality. The results on CEO duality are consistent with Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995). Model 2 uses return on 
equity (ROE) as a measure for firm performance. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZE) is         
-1.08 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on board independence 
(B_INDEP) is negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on CEO duality is negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The pooled regression results using ROE as a 
measure of firm performance support hypothesis H1 and H3. Results are also consistent with the 
evidence presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto 
(2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996). The indicator variable for 
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financial firms is positive and statistically significant suggesting that the relation between firm 
performance and board structure may differ from that of non-financial firms. Model 3 uses 
Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as a measure of firm performance. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZE) is 
-0.13 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on board independence 
(B_INDEP) is 0.28 and statistically insignificant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient on CEO duality 
is negative, -0.21, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Results support hypotheses.  
 
Overall, the fixed effects results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 which posit a 
negative relation between firm performance and board size; positive relation between firm 
performance and board independence, and a negative relation between CEO duality and firm 
performance, respectively.  
 
5.3 Hausman Endogeneity Test 
 
Table 19 presents results coefficient estimates when B_SIZEt-2, B_INDEPt-2 and CEOt-2 
are used as instruments. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals is -0.34(-1.41) with an 
F-statistic (Wald-2) of 7.44 (24.06) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals 
using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.06(-1.41) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.62 
(32.16). The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent 
variable is -0.11(-0.73) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 2.03 (4.18). The coefficients on the 
residuals for ROA and ROE are statistically significant at the 0.05. The coefficients on the 
residuals for Tobin‟s Q are statistically insignificant.  The null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the B_SIZE Residuals is zero is rejected for the first two models (ROA and ROE). This implies 
the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS method. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals is 0.21(1.59) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 
6.32(16.38) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals using ROE as the 
dependent variable is 0.43(2.77) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 26.72 (42.06). The coefficient 
(t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is 0.57(1.66) with 
an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 9.72 (27.03). The coefficients on the residuals for all the dependent 
variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the B_INDEP Residuals is zero is rejected, which suggests the presence of endogeneity and 
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hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on 
OWN_CON Residuals is -2.63(-1.88) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.62 (32.16) for ROA. The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.09(-
3.41) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 18.12 (22.01). The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON 
Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.28(-1.37) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) 
of 8.02 (24.92).  The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the OWN_CON residuals is zero is 
rejected for all models, suggesting the presence of endogeneity. In the presence of endogeneity, 
the OLS coefficient estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent. 
  
5.4 Instrumental Variables Method (IV)  
 
Table 20 presents results from IV regressions. The instruments for board structure 
variables are the 2 lags of B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients 
using return on assets (ROA) as a measure of performance. All the coefficients on board 
structure proxies B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.10, 
and 0.05 levels, respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the 
predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  Consistent with extant evidence board size is 
negatively associated with firm performance, while board independence is positively related to 
performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance.  The indicator variable 
for financial firms is statistically insignificant. These results are also consistent with the evidence 
presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., 
(2000) in the case of board independence,  and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto 
(2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board size, 
and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the 
case of CEO duality. Model 2 presents test results using ROE as the performance measure. 
Board size and CEO duality have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at 0.01 and 
0.10, respectively. Board independence has the opposite sign from that predicted by hypothesis 
H2 and is statistically insignificant. The results for board size and CEO duality are consistent 
with the evidence presented by Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996), in the case of board size. In the case of CEO 
duality, they are consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and 
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Westphal and Zajac (1995). Model 3 presents estimated coefficients using Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as 
the performance measure. All coefficients on board structure proxies B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, 
and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.05, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The signs on 
the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  Board size 
is shown to be negatively associated with firm performance, while board independence is 
positively related to performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance.  
The indicator variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant. Results are consistent with 
the evidence presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer 
III, et al., (2000) in the case of board independence,  and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and 
Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board 
size, and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995), 
in the case of CEO duality.  
 
5.5 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
Table 21 presents GMM test results. As instruments, I use 2 lags of board structure 
variables:  B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO Duality. Model 1 presents results using ROA as the 
performance measure. All coefficients on B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically 
significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also 
consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  Board size is negatively associated 
with firm performance, while board independence is positively related to performance, and CEO 
duality is negatively related to firm performance.  The indicator variable for financial firms is 
statistically insignificant. These results are also consistent with the evidence presented by Charu 
Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000) in the case of 
board independence,  and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board size, and Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the case of CEO duality. 
Model 2 presents results using ROE as the performance measure. Again, all three coefficients on 
B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 
H1, H2, and H3. Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q as the performance measure and still all three 
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instruments for board structure are statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 
H1, H2, and H3. Model 2 presents results using ROE as the performance measure. All coefficients 
on board structure proxies are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H3. Board size is shown to be negatively associated with firm performance, while board 
independence is positively related to performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm 
performance.  The indicator variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant. These results 
are consistent with the evidence documented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia 
(2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000) in the case of board independence,  and Coleman and 
Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack 
(1996) in the case of board size, and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and 
Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the case of CEO duality. All three models are also shown to be 
significant. All three models are statistically significant with J-statistics of 4.37E-03 for ROA, 
6.72E-03 for ROE, and 2.48E-03 for Tobin‟s Q.  
 
 
Overall, the signs and significance of the coefficients on board structure proxies suggest 
that firm performance is negatively associated with board size, positively related with board 
independence, and negatively related with CEO duality.  
 
5.4  Empirical Results - Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000)   
 
Full sample results indicate a statistically significant coefficient on the indicator variable, 
FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005) and Mohamed 
Belkhir (forthcoming), this suggests that the association between board structure and firm 
performance for financial firms may be distinct from that for non-financial firms. To ascertain 
what the differences are and whether the differences are statistically significant, I run separate IV 
and GMM regressions for financial firms. Table 22 presents the empirical results. For the 
instrumental variables approach (IV), Model 1 uses return on assets (ROA) as the performance 
measure. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) has the opposite sign as that predicted by 
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hypothesis H1 and it is statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on board independence 
(B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10 
level. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance and statistically significant at the 
0.10 level, consistent with hypothesis H3. Model 2 uses return on equity (ROE) as the 
performance measure. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative, contrary to 
hypothesis H1 and it is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The coefficient on board 
independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, and statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance but statistically 
insignificant.  Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as the performance measure. Contrary to 
hypotheses H1 and H2, the coefficients on board size (B_SIZEt-1) and board independence 
(B_INDEPt-1) are both negative, and statistically insignificant. CEO duality is negatively related 
to firm performance and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with hypothesis H3. 
 
For GMM, I use return on assets (ROA) as the performance measure in Model 1. The 
coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically 
insignificant.  The coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by 
hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. CEO duality is negatively related to 
firm performance and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with hypothesis H3. 
Model 2 uses return on equity (ROE) as the performance measure. The coefficient on board size 
(B_SIZEt-1) is negative, as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically insignificant.  The 
coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1)  is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, but 
statistically insignificant. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance and statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level.  Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as the performance measure. The 
coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically 
insignificant.  The coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by 
hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Contrary to hypothesis H3, CEO 
duality is positively related to firm performance but statistically insignificant. 
 
 Overall, results for the relation between board size and firm performance for financial 
firms seem to contradict hypothesis H1, which posits a negative relation between board size and 
firm performance. This evidence, however, is consistent with the findings by Adams and Mehran 
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(2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming) which posit a positive association between board 
size and firm performance for banking institutions. Results for board independence (B_INDEPt-
1) and CEO duality for financial firms are consistent with hypotheses H2 and H3. Board 
independence is positively related to firm performance and CEO duality is negatively related to 
firm performance.  
 
5.5 Granger Causality Tests 
 
Table 23 presents empirical results from bi-variate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests 
causality between board structure variables [board size, board independence, CEO duality] and 
return on assets (ROA). The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does 
not granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 5.183 with a p-value of 0.0001. The F-statistic for 
the test that ROA does not Granger cause board size (B_SIZE), is 7.011 with a p-value of 
0.0000.  Thus the reverse causality between ROA and board size cannot be rejected. The F-
statistic for the null hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause 
return on assets (ROA), is 6.801 with a p-value of 0.0050. The F-statistic for the test that ROA 
does not Granger cause board independence (B_INDEP), is 1.021 with a p-value of 0.4210.  The 
results suggest that ROA does not Granger cause board independence but board independence 
Granger causes ROA. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that CEO duality (CEOt-1) does 
not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 5.118 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for 
the test that ROA does not Granger cause CEO duality (CEOt-1) is 0.975 with a p-value of 
0.2732.  The results suggest that ROA does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality 
Granger causes ROA.  
 
Model 2 presents test results for bi-variate causality between board structure and return 
on equity (ROE). The null hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause return 
on equity (ROE), has an F-statistic of 3.840 and a p-value of 0.0050. The F-statistic for the test 
that ROE does not Granger cause board size (B_SIZE), is 12.001 with a p-value of 0.0000.  
Results suggest that we cannot reject reverse causality between ROE and board size. The F-
statistic for the null hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause 
return on equity (ROE), is 4.648 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROE 
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does not Granger cause board independence (B_INDEP) is 1.008 with a p-value of 0.2839.  The 
results suggest that ROE does not Granger cause board independence but board independence 
Granger causes ROE. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that CEO duality (CEO) does 
not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 8.246 with a p-value of 0.0001. The F-statistic for 
the test that ROE does not Granger cause CEO duality (CEO) is 0.320 with a p-value of 0.3392.  
The results suggest that ROE does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality Granger 
causes ROE.  
 
Model 2 presents test results between board structure and Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q). The null 
hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause Tobin‟s Q has an F-statistic of 
1.121and a p-value of 0.0520. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause 
board size (B_SIZE), is 4.056 with a p-value of 0.0002.  Results suggest that board size does not 
Granger cause Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q Granger causes board size. The F-statistic for the null 
hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause Tobin‟s Q is 5.820 
with a p-value of 0.0005. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause board 
independence (B_INDEP) is 0.872 with a p-value of 0.6040.  Results suggest that Tobin‟s Q 
does not Granger cause board independence but board independence Granger causes Tobin‟s Q. 
The F-statistic for the null hypothesis that CEO duality (CEO) does not Granger cause Tobin‟s Q 
is 7.004 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger 
cause CEO duality (CEO)  is 0.048 with a p-value of 0.5722.  These results suggest that Tobin‟s 
Q does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality Granger causes Tobin‟s Q.  
 
Overall, Granger causality tests suggest the presence of reverse causality between board 
size and firm performance, which may partly explain the mixed evidence reported. In the case of 
board independence and CEO duality, results show that both of these variables Granger cause 
firm performance but the reverse is rejected. It is important, though, to note that these results do 
not necessarily imply a causal relation between board independence or CEO duality and firm 
performance but rather precedence of information content i.e. past changes in the two board 
structure proxies can explain the latter.   
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6. Robustness 
 
I test the robustness of these results to the use of alternative thresholds for defining 
independent boards. All results with thresholds above 50%, outside directors yield qualitatively 
similar results.  I also test the robustness of my results to the use of alternative measures of firm 
performance/value. I use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by 
total assets and the ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. In both cases, results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported using Tobin‟s Q.  To ascertain whether there are any 
statistically significant differences between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q 
values, I divide the sample into three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that 
fall into the top 40%, firms in the lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on 
the top 40% and the bottom 40%. Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those 
reported for the full sample. Lastly, I winsorize the sample data at 1% and 5% to mitigate the 
potential influence of outliers. In both cases the results obtained using winsorized data are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample.  
 
7.   Conclusion 
In this essay I investigate the relation between board structure and firm performance. 
Consistent with prior findings by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Mak 
and Yuanto (2003), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), and Charu Raheja (2005) I find a negative 
relation between board size and firm performance for non-financial firms. Contrary to this 
finding, board size for a sub-sample of financial firms is shown to be positively associated with 
firm performance. The findings between board size and performance for financial firms support 
the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran (2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). I 
also find that board independence is positively related to firm performance for both financial and 
non-financial firms.  These results are consistent with the findings by Charu Raheja (2005), 
Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000). In support of the evidence 
presented by Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) I find that CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. Results from a sub-
sample consisting of only financial firms (SIC 6000), show that board size is positively related to 
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firm performance. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. Results 
from winsorized and non-winsorized data are also qualitatively similar.  
 
The findings for financial firms support the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran 
(2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). A plausible explanation for the positive relation 
between board size and firm performance for financial firms is that banks being large holding 
companies, the scope of operations is so complex that it requires larger boards provide a wider 
pool of expertise to run them.  What accounts for the positive association between board size and 
firm performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, Adams and Mehran argue, is that board 
size may be endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors 
from the target firm is absorbed by the acquirer. In support of this view Granger causality test 
results indicate reverse causality between board size and firm performance. Industry 
concentration does not seem to significantly influence the results, either.  
 
 In general, the results suggest that board size is largely driven by the scope of operations 
hypothesis and hence attempts at regulating „optimal‟ board sizes may be misplaced. On the 
other hand, the positive association between board independence, CEO duality, and firm 
performance seems to be robust to industry classification and to various measures of 
performance suggesting that these variables contribute significantly to board effectiveness which 
ultimately translates into superior performance.  
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Table 13: Sample Selection & Distribution 
Table 13 presents sample distribution and size.  Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the 
number and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to qualify for inclusion it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
exchanges and be covered by COMPUSTAT, CRSP. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because 
they are unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage by 
CRSP, COMPUSTAT, SEC filings, and Fiche-Q files. And an additional 8 firms were dropped due to missing data points. The 
final sample count is 164 firms consisting of 81 financial firms (SIC 6000) and 83 industrial firms. Panel B presents the sample 
distribution by year of announcement and Panel C shows the industry distribution by 2-digit SIC. 
 
Panel A: Construction of the Sample   # of firms 
 
              Total number of firms:             421 
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:                 (144) 
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:                      (105)    
Firms with missing data:        (8) 
    
Final Sample Count:       164 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution by Year    # of firms 
 
1986       10 
1987       9 
1988       7 
1989       5 
1990       6 
1991       5 
1992       9 
1993       16 
1994       7 
1995       8 
1996       13 
1997       8 
1998       9 
1999       8 
2000       14 
2001       12 
2002       8 
2003       5 
2004       5 
 
Panel C: Distribution by SIC Two-Digit SIC  # of firms 
 
Mining, Oil & Gas   10   8 
Manufacturing   20-30    34 
Transport, Comm., Utilities  40   9 
Wholesale/Retail   50   14 
Financials   60   82 
Services (other)   70-80   17 
 
*Source: Security Data Company (SDC) 
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14 provides the sample descriptive statistics. Some performance means are unusually low (high) due to the influence of 
outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and by winsorizing the data at 
99% and 1%. Results obtained from industry-adjusted and unadjusted data are qualitatively similar.  
 
Variable    Mean (Std. Dev) Median  Min Max 
 
Board Size   10.74 2.31  10.19  4.00 18.00 
  
Independent Directors (%)  0.73 0.22  0.78  0.31  0.94 
 
CEO    0.26 0.52  1.00  0.00 1.00 
 
Book-to-Market   0.41 0.24  0.39  0.21 0.79 
 
Tobin‟s Q   1.48 1.12  1.57  1.18 1.92 
 
Market Value of Equity ($M)  1,002 244  207  3.4 58,514 
  
Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)  0.43 0.20  0.54  0.12 1.06 
 
Return on Assets   0.08 0.13  0.11  -0.03 0.15 
 
Return on Equity   0.17 0.24  0.21  -0.06 0.28 
 
 
Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT 
CRSP, IRRC, Edgar, Fiche- Q files 
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Table 15: Variable Descriptions 
Table 15 provides descriptions of the variables used and related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables presented elsewhere relate to number of 
time lags. 
 
Variable  Description          Source 
 
Adj_Q   Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity        Tobin et al. (1977) 
divided by book value of assets 
 
Adj_ROA  Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on assets minus median industry return  
on assets 
  
Adj_ROE  Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on equity minus median industry return  
on equity 
 
BME   Book-to-market value ratio          Compustat 
    
B_INDEP Proportion of independent board         Edgar, Fiche Q     
                                           members on board                                                          Files   
   
B_SIZE Total number of board members         Edgar, Fiche Q     
                                                                                                                              Files   
 
EBIT Ratio  EBIT-to-total Assets ratio          Compustat 
 
Capital Ratio   Tier 1 leverage ratio for financial firms         10-K Reports 
 
CEO   Indicator variable: „1‟ = CEO/chairman             Edgar, Fiche Q     
                                           „0‟ = otherwise                                                             Files   
   
FIN   Indicator variable: „1‟ = financial firm         SIC Codes 
    „0‟= otherwise         (6000 -6999) 
 
LEV   Leverage: debt-to-total assets           Compustat 
 
L_MVE   Log of firm‟s market value                          Compustat       
 
L_TA   Log of firm‟s total assets        Compustat 
 
PBV   Price-to-book value        Compustat 
  
ROA   Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)             Compustat 
 
ROE   Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)      Compustat 
 
SIC   Standard Industry classification code          Compustat 
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Table 16: Correlation Matrix 
Table 16 presents pairwise correlations between the main variables. For performance variables (adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA), 
the following period values (t+1), are included to capture the potential delayed impact of board structure (B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and 
CEO) on firm performance.  
  
 
N=164  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
1. Adj_Q  1.00  
 
2. Adj_Qt+1 0.93** 1.00  
  
3. Adj_ROE 0.31* 0.28* 1.00   
 
4. Adj_ROEt+1 0.38** 0.43*** 0.78** 1.00     
 
5. Adj_ROA 0.04* 0.23* 0.11 0.64* 1.00  
 
6. Adj_ROAt+1  0.07 0.17* 0.12* 0.04* 0.47 1.00 
 
7. B_SIZE   0.06 -0.02** -0.33 -0.25* 0.73 0.31 1.00   
 
8. B_INDEP  0.02*  0.47**  0.22  0.28** 0.33  0.07* 0.56* 1.00 
 
9. CEO  -0.09* -0.18** -0.03* -0.12* -0.16* -0.54* 0.71* -0.62* 1.00 
 
10. L_TA  -0.14* -0.52* -0.41 -0.27 -0.13* -0.11 0.27* 0.51* 0.28 1.00 
  
11. LEV  -0.38* -0.13* -0.22 -0.10* -0.08 -0.14 0.29* 0.08 0.11 -0.66* 1.00  
 
12. EBIT Ratio  0.81*  0.74*  0.91  0.93*  0.81  0.72 0.51*  0.68* -0.24 -0.44* 0.38* 1.00 
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Table 17: OLS Regressions  
Table 17 presents estimated coefficients on board size (B_SIZEt-1)  and board independence (B_INDEPt-1)  from annual OLS regressions using ROA (model 1), ROE (model 2),  and 
Tobin‟s Q (model 3) as measures of firm performance. In Model 1, ROA is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), 
and firm profitability (EBIT). In Model 2, ROE is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and firm profitability 
(EBIT). And in Model 3, Tobin‟s Q is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT). 
Reported results are median regressions by year from 1983 to 2004.   
       
                                                        Model 1: Adj_ROA                  Model 2: Adj_ROE    Model 3: Adj_Tobin’s Q 
      
Year  B_SIZE    B_INDEP  CEO  B_SIZE       B_INDEP CEO  B_SIZE  B_INDEP  CEO 
 
1983  -0.13    0.89**  -1.04*  -0.18*   0.64  -0.42   0.02  -0.11  -0.02* 
1984  -0.08*    0.71*  -0.37  -0.23*   1.01  -0.09   0.13   0.43  -1.03 
1985  -0.51*    -0.42   0.02   0.02   0.48*  -1.01*  -0.12   0.26*  -0.42 
1986  -0.17    1.03*  -0.71*  -0.37  -0.02  -0.22  -0.34*   0.08   0.11 
1987   0.38    0.07  -0.84   0.13*   0.47*   0.10    0.77   0.19   0.07 
1988  -0.11**    1.21   0.04  -0.54**   0.53  -1.24   -0.27*   1.03*  -0.22* 
1989  -0.32*    1.08*  -1.11*   0.08*   0.94**    0.85   0.44   0.87  -1.18 
1990  -0.73**    0.58   0.23   0.12   0.37*  -0.81  -0.19   0.59   0.37 
1991  -0.87    0.92**  -0.19  -0.14*   0.87  -0.33*  -0.07*   0.11   0.08 
1992  -0.33*    0.67**  -0.44**  -0.27**   0.67   0.52   0.02   0.07*  -0.49 
1993  -0.81*   -0.02   0.17   0.22   0.09*  -0.91   0.11   0.98  -0.55 
1994  -0.24    1.25   0.52   -0.09   0.28  -1.20*  -0.08*   0.47   0.36 
1995   0.19    0.87*  -0.87*   0.63*   0.78  -0.78   0.21   0.04   0.25 
1996   0.15    1.01  -0.38  -0.44**   0.61   0.34  -0.03   0.71  -0.40* 
1997  -0.42*    0.78*   0.56  -0.29*   1.02**   -0.49**   0.48   0.34  -1.07 
1998  -0.02***    0.49**   0.04   0.10   0.74**   0.81  -0.23*   0.27*  -0.03 
1999  -0.07*    0.47  -0.83*   0.08*  -0.11  -0.72   0.08  -0.02   0.21 
2000   0.06    1.119*   0.01  -0.05*   0.39  -1.03   0.15   0.06  -0.09* 
2001  - 0.12*    0.61   0.27   0.14   0.74  -0.55*  -0.33   0.23  -0.77 
2002  -0.08    0.78**  -1.42*  -0.55*   0.44*   0.04   0.04   0.19   0.02 
2003   0.17    1.14**   0.91   0.07   0.29  -0.11*  -0.22**   0.21*  -0.11 
2004  -0.28**    -0.07   0.03  -0.47*   0.33*   0.02   0.16   0.09  -0.47 
 
Time Series mean  -0.28**   0.81**  -0.67*  -0.42*   0.74***  0.62*  -0.38*   0.56  -0.44 
Time series σ:   0.44   0.64   0.77   0.58   0.87  0.82   0.49   0.67   0.48 
 T-statistic  -2.88   1.99   2.47  -1.75   3.02  1.67  -1.68   1.07   1.53 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 18: Fixed Effects Model  
Table 18 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model. Using industry-adjusted ROAt, industry-adjusted ROE, and industry-adjusted 
Tobin‟s Q to proxy for firm performance. Explanatory variables include board size (B_SIZEt-1)  and board independence (B_INDEPt-1) .  I include 
an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO also holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial 
firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
                         Dependent Variable      
                                                                                    
     ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α    0.71***  2.01   0.05** 
    (8.04)  (0.73)  (2.92) 
 
B_SIZEt-1     0.17  -1.08***  - 0.13***    
    (1.36)  (3.78)   (-11.27) 
 
B_INDEPt-1    0.08  -1.42     0.28**  
    (1.05)  (-1.44)    (2.31) 
 
CEO t-1    -0.34**   0.03*    -0. 21*** 
    (-2.48)  (1.92)    (-5.77) 
 
L_TA     -0.49*   -0.33    -1.04*** 
     (1.86)  (-0.98)     (7.77) 
 
LEV     -0.01***   0.43*      0.08*** 
    (-14.2)  (1.88)     (9.21) 
 
FIN     0.44*   0.39*      0.20 
    (1.83)  (1.71)     (1.02) 
    
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 19: Hausman Endogeneity Tests 
Table 19 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO. Dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin‟s Q. I use 2 lags of board size, board composition, and CEO duality as instruments (B_SIZEt-2, B_INDEPt-2, and CEOt-2) and test the 
significance of the coefficients on the residuals.    
ROA  Variable   Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  B_SIZE  -1.11(-1.35) 7.44 24.06 
   B_SIZE Residuals -0.34 (-1.41)          
  
     
  B_INDEP    1.63 (1.77)   6.32 16.38 
 
B_INDEP Residuals  0.21 (1.59)         
  
     
  CEO  -2.07(-1.49)    8.62 32.16 
  CEO -2.63 (-1.81)   
      
 
  
  
ROE                       Variable    Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  B_SIZE  -0.98(-1.04) 6.88 12.14 
   B_SIZE Residuals -0.06 (-2.87)          
  
     
  B_INDEP    2.11 (4.38)   26.72 42.06 
 
B_INDEP Residuals  0.43 (2.77)         
  
     
  CEO  -1.14 (-2.69)    18.12 22.01 
  CEO -0.09 (-3.41)   
      
 
  
  
Tobin’s Q                       Variable   Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  B_SIZE  -0.03(-0.57) 2.03 4.18 
   B_SIZE Residuals -0.11(-0.73)          
  
     
  B_INDEP    2.44 (1.80)   9.72 27.03 
 
B_INDEP Residuals  0.57 (1.66)         
  
     
  CEO  -0.34(-1.55)    8.02 24.92 
  CEO -0.28 (-1.37)   
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Table 20: IV Estimates  
Table 20 provides coefficient estimates from IV regressions of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q on board size (B_SIZE)  and board 
independence (B_INDEP)  using their corresponding 2 lags as instruments. I include an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO also 
holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values 
in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
      Dependent Variable                                                                             
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     3.71*   1.09    2.05** 
    (1.84)  (0.73)   (2.33) 
 
B_SIZEt-1     -1.11*  -2.04***   -0.81**    
    (-1.73)  (-9.78)   (-2.21) 
 
B_INDEPt-1    0.08*   -0.04     0.24**  
    (1.92)  (-0.38)    (2.02) 
 
CEO t-1    -1.17**   -0.03*    -0. 13* 
    (-2.03)  (-1.91)    (-1.77) 
 
L_TA     -2.09*   -1.33**     -1.04 
     (1.75)  (-1.98)     (-0.77) 
 
LEV     -0.51***   0.78*      0.08*** 
    (-11.32)  (1.82)     (3.21) 
 
FIN     0.44   0.05*      0.20 
    (1.04)  (1.84)     (0.96) 
    
Adjusted R2   0.28  0.18     0.31 
F-Statistic   11.17  9.22     8.17 
P-Values    [0.0000]  [0.0004]  [0.0052] 
 
   *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 21: GMM Estimates  
Table 21 presents GMM coefficient estimates of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q on board size (B_SIZE)  and board 
independence (B_INDEP)  using their corresponding 2 lags as instruments. I include an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO 
also holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). 
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
       
                                                                                                        Dependent Variable 
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
α     0.33   2.89    1.11** 
    (1.44)  (1.03)   (2.02) 
 
B_SIZEt-1     -0.74*   -1.19*   -1.20***    
    (-1.85)  (-1.73)   (-3.44) 
 
B_INDEPt-1    1.13**    0.28**     0.51*  
    (1.98)   (2.38)    (1.84) 
 
CEO t-1    -2.44*   -1.69*    -0. 79** 
    (-1.70)  (-1.68)    (-2.33) 
 
L_TA     -0.78   -1.02     -1.04 
     (1.54)  (-1.39)     (-0.77) 
 
LEV     -1.23*   -0.97      0.11** 
    (-1.74)  (-1.14)     (2.28) 
 
FIN     0.12*   1.79      0.04* 
    (1.77)  (1.01)     (1.86) 
    
R2    0.21  0.08    0.16 
Adjusted R2   0.24  0.11    0.18 
Durbin-Watson   7.92  9.22    6.83 
J-Statistic    4.37E-04  6.72E-03  2.48E-03    
          *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 22: IV and GMM Regressions - Financial Firms (SIC 6000) 
Table 22 provides estimated coefficients for a subset of financial firms from IV and GMM regressions on the B_SIZE and B_INDEP using their corresponding 2 lags as 
instruments.  I control for CEO-Duality, firm size (L_TA), capital ratio, and Price-to-book value (PBV). Dependent variables are industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin‟s Q for models 1, 2, 3 respectively.   
                                    IV                                GMM 
Model       1    2   3      1    2        3 
                                            ROAt                    ROEt                  Tobin‟s Qt                  ROAt     ROEt  Tobin‟s_Qt   
 
     -2.24  1.01**   0.98   0.38*   0.92*  -2.01*   
    (-1.57)  (1.97)  (1.35)  (1.68)  (1.88)  (-1.70)    
  
B_SIZEt-1     0.22   0.49*    0.06  -0.78   -0.01  -0.08   
    (-1.03)  (1.74)  (1.19)  (-1.63  (-1.77)  (1.03) 
 
B_INDEPt-1    1.14*   0.59*   -0.08   1.08*   0.32   0.17*    
    (1.82)  (1.66)  (-1.02)  (1.78)  (1.58)  (1.89) 
 
CEO t-1    -1.31*   -0.92   -0.89**  -0.02**   -1.15*    0.01   
    (1.81)  (-1.46)  (-1.98)  (2.32)  (-1.67)  (1.04) 
  
L_TA     -0.32   1.01**   0.46**    -0.68    1.12*  -0.27   
    (-1.23  (2.27)  (2.07)   (-0.42)   (1.57)  (-1.18) 
 
Capital Ratio    0.03**   0.43*   0.06   0.54*   0.07*   1.01   
    (2.11)  (1.85)  (0.97)  (1.80)  (1.69)  (1.37) 
 
PBV     1.02*   1.09*  -   0.88*   0.52**  -   
    (1.65)  (1.79)    (1.81)  (2.27)   
     
 
Adj.R2    0.12  0.24  0.16  0.18  0.28  0.08    
F-statistic   16.24**  6.58**  44.38*  8.64*  13.52**  24.34** 
Model p-value   [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0000]   
     
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 23: Granger Causality Tests  
Table 23 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between board structure [B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and 
CEO] and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA along with their 1-period 
lag.  
        F-Statistic  Probability 
  B_SIZE does not granger causes ROA   5.183 [0.0001] 
  ROA does not granger causes B_SIZE   7.011 [0.0000] 
     
  B_INDEP does not granger causes ROA   6.801 [0.0050] 
Model 1-(ROA) ROA does not granger causes B_INDEP   1.021 [0.4210] 
     
  CEO does not granger causes ROA   5.118 [0.0000] 
  ROA does not granger causes CEO   0.975 [0.2732] 
    
 
  
  
  B_SIZE does not granger causes ROE   3.840 [0.0050] 
  ROE does not granger causes B_SIZE   12.001 [0.0000] 
    
 
  
  
  B_INDEP does not granger causes ROE   4.648 [0.0000] 
Model 2-(ROE) ROE does not granger causes B_INDEP   1.008 [0.2839] 
    
 
  
  
  CEO does not granger causes ROE   8.246 [0.0001] 
  ROE does not granger causes CEO   0.320 [0.3392] 
        
  
  B_SIZE does not granger causes Adj_Q   1.121 [0.5200] 
  Adj_Q does not granger causes B_SIZE   4.056 [0.0020] 
    
 
  
  
  B_INDEP does not granger causes Adj_Q   5.820 [0.0005] 
Model 3-(Adj_Q) Adj_Q does not granger causes B_INDEP   0.872 [0.6040] 
    
 
  
  
  CEO does not granger causes Adj_Q   7.004 [0.0000] 
  Adj_Q does not granger causes CEO   0.048 [0.5722] 
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Chapter 4 
 
An Empirical Analysis of Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in 
Equity Carve-outs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
         This essay examines the relation between ownership structure and the performance of a sample of 
firms that initiated equity carve-outs during the period 1983-2004. The evidence presented in previous 
studies on ownership structure and firm performance is largely mixed and inconclusive. Various 
econometric issues such as the endogeneity problem, variable measurement, unobserved heterogeneity, 
and the serial persistence of ownership structures that plague empirical studies on governance have been 
partly to blame. I mitigate the afore-mentioned problems by exploiting the structural break in the 
ownership structure of firms following equity carve-out announcements and implementing alternative 
estimation methods, in particular the IV, GMM, and Granger causality tests. I find that contrary to extant 
evidence that posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of 
ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the case of 
equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the subsidiary seems to 
exacerbate the entrenchment effects which overwhelm the incentive alignment benefits at low levels of 
insider ownership documented in other studies. Consistent with extant literature, I present evidence in 
support of the positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The 
presence of outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly 
dominant parent firm. And lastly, results show that the level of ownership concentration, in particular 
ownership by the parent firm, seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes 
in firm performance.   
 
JEL Classifications:   G32, G34   
Keywords: ownership structure; insider-ownership; managerial-ownership, blockholders.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The idea of divorcing corporate ownership from corporate control and its implications for 
firm value and performance has preoccupied financial economists since the seminal paper on the 
subject by Berle and Means (1932), suggesting an inverse relation between diffuse ownership 
and firm performance. Morck et al., (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Holderness et 
al., (1999), present evidence suggesting an inverse relation between diffuse ownership and firm 
performance. On the other hand, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Himmelberg et al., (1999), and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no relation between ownership and firm value. Interestingly, 
Cho (1998), using the system of equations approach finds that firm value as proxied by Tobin‟s 
Q affects corporate ownership and not vice versa.   
 
As is the case with most governance studies, a number of empirical issues arise when 
attempting to relate corporate ownership to firm performance. First, corporate ownership is 
measured in several different ways such as ownership by the board; insider ownership; CEO 
ownership; block-holder ownership; and institutional ownership. This disparity in definition and 
measurement is likely to complicate any attempts to reconcile the results presented in various 
studies. Secondly, several studies such as Demsetz (1983), Jensen and Warner (1988), Seyhun 
(1998), and Himmelberg et al. (1999) show that corporate ownership and firm performance are 
endogenous. This endogeneity problem if not empirically tested and controlled for, invariably 
confounds the findings. Third, it is plausible that the so called unobserved heterogeneity problem 
explains the differences observed in firm performance if systematic cross-sectional differences 
amongst firms, such as size, affect ownership and performance. Lastly, the disparity in empirical 
proxies used for firm performance, such return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin‟s 
Q, and Market-to-book ratio most likely also account for some of the inconsistency in the 
empirical studies that attempt to relate corporate ownership to firm performance. Moreover, the 
persistence of governance structures, including ownership, across time that is alluded to by a 
number of researchers, such as Bhagat and Black (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Yermack (1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Madura and Nixon (2002), would 
tend to weaken the explanatory power of many econometric models intended to ascertain the 
relation between ownership and firm performance.  
 100 
 
To my knowledge, Sukesh Patro (2005), is the first study that takes an evolutionary 
approach to examining ownership structure and firm performance. He exploits the structural 
break in the ownership structure of spun-off firms during the period 1981-2000, to investigate 
what changes occur in the ownership structure, the determinants of those ownership changes, and 
the impact of these changes on firm performance. He finds that on average block ownership of 
spun-offs increases by approximately 7% and a significant proportion of that change, 
approximately 60%, occurs during the first year. He also finds that the ownership structure in 
these firms reaches a steady-state, on average, in 3 years from the date of announcement. In 
terms of the determinants of structural changes in ownership, he posits that parent-unit 
relatedness, firm size, and market-to-book ratio are significantly related to changes in ownership 
changes. Consistent with extant literature he concludes that, in general, ownership structures 
exhibit serial correlation but when circumstances warrant, ownership can significantly change to 
a new equilibrium.  
 
In this essay, I exploit the structural break in the ownership structure of equity carve-outs 
to re-examine the relation between ownership and firm performance. Patro‟s findings cannot 
necessarily be generalized to equity carve-outs due to the fundamental differences in their 
ownership structures. In the case of equity carve-outs, parent firms retain a significant ownership 
stake in the subsidiary, unlike spin-offs. This set-up essentially makes the parent firm a dominant 
blockholder in the subsidiary. I hypothesize that the monitoring benefits argument that is made 
for block-holdership in the presence of diffuse ownership may be compromised when the 
blockholder is also the parent. Considering that parent firms in equity carve-outs tend to be 
distressed while the subsidiaries have better growth opportunities, it may not be a stretch to argue 
that the interests of the minority shareholders in the carve-out subsidiary although they may 
compromised. I argue that these structural differences between carve-outs and spin-offs are 
likely to induce ownership changes that are dissimilar from those observed by Patro (2005). 
Focusing on equity carve-outs in this study is likely to generate new insight on the relation 
between ownership and firm performance, in particular the role played by a majority block- 
holder when that blockholder is the parent firm.      
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The objectives of this study are threefold. First, with a view to reconciling extant 
literature, I attempt to mitigate the econometric problems that confound previous studies to re-
examine the relation between corporate ownership and firm performance, the monitoring role 
that blockholders are deemed to play in the stewardship of the modern firm, and whether 
corporate ownership reverts to some optimal level over time. In particular, I implement the 
instrumental variables approach, generalized method of moments, and run Granger causality 
tests to control for the potential endogeneity of ownership and firm performance. Second, there is 
wide disparity in the definition and measurement of corporate ownership. Given the existing 
mixed evidence, it is arguable that test results are not necessarily invariant to the definition and 
measurement of corporate ownership. Various studies have defined ownership as managerial 
ownership, CEO ownership, officer and director ownership, insider ownership, closely held 
shares, or institutional ownership. The results from these disparate studies are equally varied. For 
robustness in this essay, I implement alternative measures of ownership to ascertain what impact 
if any, different ownership proxies have on the empirical results obtained. Third, to ascertain if 
measures of performance partly explain the mixed findings, I use both accounting and market 
based proxies for firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
Tobin‟s Q]. I then attempt to reconcile the results from all four models with the extant evidence.    
 
This study makes a number of contributions to extant literature. First, contrary to extant 
evidence that posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low 
levels of ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is 
rejected in the case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider 
ownership in the subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and overwhelm the 
incentive alignment effects at very low levels of insider ownership. I present evidence in support 
of the positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The 
presence of outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly 
dominant parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of 
ownership concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) 
changes in firm performance.  These findings seem to suggest that dominant parent firms, at least 
in the case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency problem.  As a matter 
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of governance policy in equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms may be necessary to 
moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review related theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Sample selection, data, and descriptive 
statistics are presented in section 4. Methodology is discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the 
empirical results. I discuss robustness test results in section 6. And section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Theories of Ownership 
 
An extensive literature linking corporate ownership and firm performance has evolved 
along two main dimensions. The first strand attempts to link the type of ownership to the 
performance of the firm. Major studies present evidence on insider ownership (officers & 
directors), managerial ownership, CEO ownership, institutional ownership, and corporations. 
The second strand links ownership concentration to performance. Concentration of ownership 
has been proxied by blockholder ownership - defined as a 5% share ownership in a corporation 
or greater and the Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration measured as the sum of squared 
ownership shares.  Both research strands base their empirical investigations on four salient 
hypotheses: (i) the incentive alignment hypothesis; (ii) the entrenchment effects hypothesis; (iii) 
Reverse causality – insider rewards and investments, (iv) the non-monotonous hypothesis; and 
lastly (v) the economics of natural selection.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) advance the incentive alignment argument which is rooted in 
agency theory. They argue that managers are self-interested agents who, if left alone and in the 
presence of asymmetric information [Hart and Holmstrom (1987)], will pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of the shareholders of the firm.  The incentive alignment hypothesis 
posits that granting managers an equity ownership stake in the firm is likely to improve firm 
performance due the alignment of the monetary incentives between principals [shareholders] and 
the agent [manager]. The main predictions under the incentive alignment hypothesis are twofold. 
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First, one would expect to observe a positive relation between managerial share ownership and 
firm performance. Second, the higher the information asymmetry problem by a given firm the 
higher managerial ownership is likely to be.  
 
Although, the incentive alignment hypothesis asserts that managerial share ownership in 
the firm mitigates principal-agent conflicts, the entrenchment hypothesis posits that beyond a 
certain threshold, increased managerial ownership may in fact be sub-optimal. Beyond this 
optimal threshold, the entrenchment effects overwhelm the incentive effects when powerful 
managers extract private benefits in the form of perquisite consumption, pet projects, and 
engaging in empire building to the detriment of the shareholder, contrary to the incentive 
alignment hypothesis [(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)]. The prediction here is that at low 
levels of managerial ownership [5%], the incentive alignment effects dominate the entrenchment 
argument however, at higher levels of managerial ownership [30% or higher], the relation 
reverses and the entrenchment prediction prevails.    
 
Contrary to the above hypotheses, the reverse causality hypothesis assumes that the 
direction of causality flows from ownership structure to firm performance. This hypothesis posits 
that firm performance may in fact be causing the changes in ownership that are observed. The 
idea is that when managers perform well firms reward them by granting them equity ownership 
[Kole (1996)]. One should therefore observe a positive relation between firm performance and 
managerial ownership.  On the other hand, Cho (1998) asserts that managers may prefer stock 
compensation when they expect their firm to over perform in the future. So, managerial share 
ownership is likely to be positively related to the firm‟s market value.  Lastly, the insider 
investment argument predicates observed changes in managerial ownership on managers‟ 
expectations of their firm‟s future performance. Managers‟ share holdings are predicted to 
increase when they have favorable expectations and to decrease when they expect poor future 
performance [Loderer and Martin (1997)].   
 
And finally is the economics of natural selection hypothesis which posits that ownership 
is an endogenously determined governance structure [Demsetz [1983], Demsetz and Lehn [1985] 
and Kole and Lehn [1997]. Predicated on the notion that financial performance determines 
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ownership, poorly performing firms will have inefficient ownership structures and soon or later 
will cease to exist. The prediction here is that in the long-run ownership in surviving firms 
should converge to the optimal structure. 
 
 In the next section I discuss the empirical evidence on the association between corporate 
ownership and firm performance. The evidence has evolved along two major research strands. 
The first strand examines the effect of ownership concentration on performance and the second 
focuses on how the type of ownership impacts firm performance.   
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence  
 
Extant empirical evidence on ownership and firm performance falls into two strands, 
namely: the concentration of ownership and type of ownership. In the case of the former, why 
some investors are motivated to concentrate a significant portion of their wealth in a single firm 
seems to contradict the tenets of modern portfolio theory. Various theories have been presented 
to explain this investment choice. First, the shared benefits argument is advanced to explain 
ownership concentration as a means to resolving the principal-agency problem. Large block 
ownership bestows to the owner monitoring and decision-making rights in form of directorships 
or company officer positions in which they can influence company decisions arguably for the 
benefit of all shareholders. Second, is the private benefits hypothesis. Blockholders can use their 
voting powers to access corporate resources for their own private benefit.  
 
A number of empirical studies relating ownership to firm performance use „block 
ownership‟ - defined as large shareholders who own at least 5% of the company‟s shares, to  
measure corporate ownership. Recent evidence on the relation between block ownership and 
firm performance is presented by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Holderness (2003) and Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2005). Consistent with earlier evidence 
presented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for US firms, that no statistically significant relation 
exists between ownership and firm performance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) using a system 
of simultaneous equations, model ownership endogenously in their study and distinguish 
between managerial ownership and other outside blockholders. They use the proportion of the 
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five largest blockholders as the proxy for ownership. They assert that ownership is endogenously 
determined but find no evidence that ownership affects firm performance (measured as Tobin‟s 
Q). Anderson and Reeb (2003) also find no relation between ownership and firm performance 
using a single regression approach and using Tobin‟s Q as a measure for firm performance. 
Holderness (2003) surveys the literature on blockholders and firm performance and concludes 
that ownership concentration has little, if any impact on firm performance. He makes two 
important observations: (i) that insider and outsider blockholders have disparate private 
benefit/shared benefit incentives; and that corporation blockholders present a set of governance 
issues not found with individual blockholders. Since in the case of carve-outs the most 
significant blockholder is a corporation, this essay attempts to determine the set of firm 
governance issues that corporation blockholders present and the impact, if any, that these issues 
may have on firm performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) investigate the relation of 
blockholder ownership and firm performance using samples of US, UK, and Continental 
European firms. They find no relation between ownership and firm performance for the US and 
UK firms but find a statistically significant negative relation between ownership and firm 
performance for Continental European firms.  
 
On the other hand, an extensive literature presents evidence relating firm performance to 
the type of corporate ownership. Important studies on ownership and firm performance use 
managerial ownership, insider ownership, officers & director ownership, CEO ownership, and 
corporation ownership as types of ownership, among others. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
investigate insider and blockholder ownership. They report a positive relation between insider 
ownership and firm performance but find no statistically significant relation between blockholder 
ownership and firm performance. Loderer and Martin (1997) use a simultaneous equations 
approach to examine insider ownership and firm performance. They find that insider ownership 
does not predict Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q has a negative relation with insider ownership. Cho 
(1998) also uses a system of equations approach to investigate managerial ownership and firm 
performance. He finds no causation from ownership to Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q affects 
ownership structure. Himmelberg et al., (1999) implement a fixed effects model and the 
instrumental variables approach using officers‟ and directors‟ ownership. They control for fixed 
firm effects and find no statistically significant relation between officer and directors‟ ownership 
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and Tobin‟s Q. Moreover, when they control for the endogeneity, they find a quadratic relation 
between ownership and firm performance. Holderness et al., (1999) confirm the endogeneity of 
managerial ownership and they document a positive relation between firm performance and 
managerial ownership in the 0-5% ownership range.  
 
Various studies examine the relation between institutional owners and firm performance. 
Institutional investors are in general expected to influence on firm performance because 
corporate monitoring is costly and given the significant investment stakes they are likely to hold, 
it is reasonable to assume that they have the incentive and the wherewithal to monitor managers, 
[Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980)]. However, the empirical evidence 
presented is largely mixed. It is not clear what makes some institutional owners better monitors 
and others less so.  Bushee (1998) attempts to characterize institutional investors based on their 
investment horizon outlook on the firms in which they buy ownership sakes and their trading 
styles. He delineates three groups: Institutional owners that frequently trade and diversify their 
portfolios are termed „transient‟. They are less likely to be effective corporate monitors. The 
second group comprises institutional owners who hold large and stable stakes in the firms they 
invest in. Because of the large stakes and long-term investment view, these institutional investors 
are assumed to be better monitors. Earlier studies that document a positive relation between 
institutional ownership and firm performance include McConnell and Servaes (1990), Nesbitt 
(1994), Smith (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) who document a positive relation 
between institutional investor ownership and firm performance. More recent evidence of a 
positive relation between institutional stock ownership and firm performance is presented by 
Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almazan et al., (2005), Borokhovich et al., (2006) and Cornett et al., 
(2007). On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and 
Miller (1999), and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no significant relation. Thus, the impact of 
institutional investor stock ownership on firm performance is still unclear. 
 
Lastly, there seems to be a dearth of research on the effects of concentrated ownership 
when the blockholder is another corporation. Holderness (2001) observes that “Blockholders that 
are corporations present a set of issues not found with individual owners…”.  To my knowledge 
no study specifically examines the effect that blockholders that are corporations have on firm 
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performance. This study using a sample of carve-out firms makes an additional contribution to 
extant literature by investigating the potential effects that a dominant blockholder that is also a 
corporation may have on the performance of another firm.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development  
 
In this section I develop three testable hypotheses to determine, first, whether ownership 
structure in equity carve-outs moderates their long-term performance. Second, to examine 
whether the concave relation documented in the case of insider ownership is supported in the 
case of equity carve-outs. And third, to test whether evidence of ownership reversion to some 
optimal level over time that is documented in various studies is supported in the case of equity 
carve-outs. Descriptive statistics show that the majority of the parent firms in the sample 
maintain a majority stake in the subsidiary in excess of 70%. The data also suggest that parent 
ownership levels in the subsidiary change very slowly over time. Approximately 35% of the 
subsidiaries are re-acquired, 20% of the parents‟ ownership stake increases following the 
announcement, and in the rest of the cases the parents‟ ownership stake decreases gradually or 
the subsidiaries are summarily spun-off.  
 
Various studies on insider ownership are surveyed in Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001), 
and Holderness (2001). The evidence suggests that firm performance improves at lower levels of 
insider ownership but declines at higher levels of insider ownership. Other studies that control 
for the endogeneity problem, discussed earlier, find no relation between ownership and firm 
performance. These findings seem to support the incentive alignment hypothesis at lower levels 
of ownership but are more consistent with the entrenchment effect at higher levels. I test the 
following hypothesis. 
 
H1: Performance in subsidiary firms is inversely related to the level of insider 
ownership.  
 
Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003), among others present evidence that the presence 
of an outside blockholder has a moderating effect on the actions of management and ultimately 
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on firm performance. A blockholder is defined as any shareholder who holds at least a 5% stake 
in the firm.  The idea is that ownership of a 5% or greater interest in the firm is sufficient 
incentive to monitor and influence managerial decision-making. I argue that in the case of equity 
carve-outs, where you have a dominant corporate blockholder (parent firm), the moderating 
effect of an outside blockholder is likely to be even more beneficial. I test the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H2: Long-term performance of subsidiary firms is positively related to the presence of 
outside blockholders or institutional shareholders.  
 
Whether or not firms target an optimal level of insider ownership still remains an 
empirical question. Zhou (2001) asserts that insider ownership changes so slowly and in some 
cases not at all. Core and Lacker (2001) suggest that adjusting ownership structure involves costs 
and when these costs are substantial there will be a tendency for ownership structures to depart 
from the optimal target. Patro (2005) observes that ownership is fairly stable but when 
circumstances warrant it does significantly change. He concludes that changes in ownership are 
endogenous to firm characteristics. Frye and Smith (2003), on the other hand, present evidence 
of faster changes in ownership in a sample of IPO firms. They report average increases in block 
ownership of 8% during the 4 years following the IPO. The insider investment argument predicts 
that insider ownership will change based on insider expectations about future firm performance 
[Loderer and Martin (1997)].   In the case of carve-outs, the dominant parent is likely to increase 
its stake in the subsidiary when it has favorable expectations about future performance and 
reduce it when the future looks bleak. I hypothesize that positive (negative) changes in the 
parent‟s ownership in the subsidiary precede improved (weaker) subsidiary performance.  
 
H3: Positive (negative) changes in a parent’s ownership stake in the subsidiary 
precede improved (weaker) subsidiary performance.  
 
4. Sample Selection and Data 
 
 
4.1 Sample Selection  
 109 
 
The initial sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) US IPO data. 
Ownership data is compiled from Thompson Financial, Compact Disclosure, and proxy 
statements. I cross check with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index 
and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. For those firms with data preceding 1987, I obtain 
data from the microfilm collection of proxy statements. The initial sample comprises 421 firms 
(regulated and unregulated) that announced carve-out transactions during the time period 1983 - 
2004. For inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and 
be covered by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT. Supplemental governance data is 
obtained from Q-files, Lexis-Nexis, Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs, The Corporate Library 
(TCL), and corporate proxy statements. For each year that a firm is in the sample, I gather 
complete data on insider ownership, the percent of parent ownership in the subsidiary, outside 
blockholders, and institutional ownership. The final sample is then observed for the entire 
sample period or until a given firm is re-acquired or summarily sold off.  
 
 The final sample is 170 firms comprising 83 financials and 87 non-financial firms. For 
all full sample regressions I control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of 
financial firms (SIC 6000) by including an indicator variable coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or 
„0‟ otherwise. For robustness, I also run separate regressions for only financial firms (SIC 6000).   
 
Table 21, presents the sample selection and distribution data. Panel A shows the number 
of firms dropped from the initial sample and the reasons for their exclusion. Of the original 
sample of 421 firms, 144 firms are dropped because they are not listed on 
AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE.  Additionally, 105 firms are not covered by CRSP and/or 
COMPUSTAT and 2 firms had missing data on ownership. Panel B shows the sample 
distribution by year of announcement. Firms that meet all requirements, range from a minimum 
of 5 firms for the years 1989, 1991, 2003, and 2004 to a maximum of 14 firms for 2000. Panel C 
presents the sample distribution by industry (2-digit SIC). Financials (SIC 60), had the highest 
number of transactions with 82 announcements, manufacturing (SIC 20-30) had 37, 19 
announcements for other services (SIC 70-80), 14 for wholesale/retail (SIC 50), 9 
announcements for transportation, communications, and utilities (SIC 40), and 9 transactions for 
mining, oil, and gas (SIC 10).    
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 22 presents sample descriptive statistics. Parent ownership in their subsidiaries has 
a mean (median) of 64.9% (71.1%) with a standard deviation of 8.9%. The maximum 
(minimum) proportion of parent ownership is 94.3% (8.2%4). Insider ownership, which is 
defined as the officers and directors in the subsidiary firm, has a mean (median) of 7% (6%) with 
a standard deviation of 2%. The maximum (minimum) insider ownership is 9% (2%). Outside 
blockholders are defined as non-executive/non-parent owners who hold at least 5% of the total 
outstanding shares of the firm. The mean (median) outside blockholder ownership is 28% (23%) 
with a standard deviation of 14%. The maximum (minimum) proportion owned by outside 
blockholders is 31% (8%). Ownership concentration is defined as the total proportion of 
outstanding shares owned by the officers and directors of the subsidiary firm, the parent firm, 
and outside blockholders. The mean (median) of ownership concentration is 81% (92%) and a 
standard deviation of 16%. The maximum (minimum) ownership concentration is 100% (14%).  
Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets ranges from a 
minimum of 12% to a maximum of 106% with a mean (median) of 43% (54%) and a standard 
deviation of 20%. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a maximum of 0.79 with a 
mean (median) of 0.41 (0.39) and a standard deviation of 0.24. Tobin‟s Q which is measured as 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets, ranges from a minimum of 
1.18 to a maximum of 1.92 with a mean (median) of 1.48 (1.57) and a standard deviation of 1.12. 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
(EBIT/TA) and  the minimum (maximum) for the sample is -0.03 (0.15) with a mean (median) of 
0.0.08 (0.11) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Return on equity is measured as net earnings 
divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock) and  ranges from a minimum of -
0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.24.  
 
4.3    Description of Variables 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q) 
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Table 23, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are 
constructed. The dependent variable is firm performance. Three variables including Tobin‟s Q 
(Adj_Q), return on assets (Adj_ROA), and return on equity (Adj_ROE) are used to measure firm 
performance. Tobin‟s Q, is measured as book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of its assets. Each firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is then 
adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of the potential right 
skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test.  Return 
on assets (ROA) for each firm is calculated as the ratio of the firm‟s earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) to the book value of assets. Return on equity (ROE) measured as a firm‟s earnings 
before interest and tax divided by the firms total equity. Both variables are then adjusted by 
subtracting the industry medians for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), 
respectively.  
 
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Parent ownership (PAR_OWN) is defined as the proportion of outstanding shares in the 
subsidiary that are owned by the parent firm. Insider ownership (IN_OWN) is defined as the 
proportion of shares in the subsidiary firm that are owned by officers and directors. Outside 
blockholders (OUT_BLOCK) are defined as non-executive/non-parent owners who hold at least 
5% of the total outstanding shares of the subsidiary firm. And Ownership concentration 
(OWN_CON) is defined as the combined proportion of outstanding shares owned by the officers 
and directors of the subsidiary firm, the parent firm, and outside blockholders.  
 
4.3.5 Control Variables 
 
To control for firm size, I use one of three variables - book-to-market value (BME), log 
of market value of equity (L_MVE), and log of total assets (L_TA). Leverage (LEV), computed 
as total long-term debt divided by the firm‟s total assets and Capital ratio are used to proxy for 
the indebtedness of non-financial and financial firms, respectively. For full sample regressions 
that combine financial and non-financial firms, I include an indicator variable „FIN‟ for 
financials (SIC 6000), to control for the regulatory and balance sheet idiosyncrasies of financials. 
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The sample distribution data presented in Table 1, Panel C depicts some degree of industry 
concentration particularly in manufacturing, services, and wholesale/retail. For robustness, I 
include an indicator variable for industry, to ascertain whether industry effects have any 
statistical significance.    
 
Table 24 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that 
the pairwise correlation between contemporaneous measures of firm performance and the main 
explanatory variables is much weaker than that between performance measures and lagged 
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between contemporaneous and lagged insider 
ownership and industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q are both negative and statistically significant at the 
0.10 level. Lagged insider ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Pairwise correlations between lagged outside blockholder ownership and adjusted Tobin‟s Q, 
ROA, and ROE are all positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Pairwise correlations 
between both contemporaneous and lagged ownership concentration and industry adjusted 
Tobin‟s Q are ROE are all negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The correlation 
between lagged ownership and ROA is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
 
5. Methodology 
 
 
To provide some preliminary evidence on the relation between corporate ownership and 
firm performance, I run annual multivariate regressions. Then in light of the econometric issues 
that plague previous studies, I successively increase the complexity of the models to mitigate 
some of these problems by implementing a fixed effects model, then the instrumental variables 
methodology (IV), and lastly, the generalized method of moments (GMM). As a robustness 
check, I also run granger causality tests to determine the direction of causation between 
ownership and firm performance. To test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, I project a measure of firm 
performance [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] on various proxies for ownership [IN_OWN, 
(IN_OWN)
2
, OUT_BLOCK, and (IN_OWN x PAR_OWN)]. I control for firm size using log of 
total assets (L_TA), firm leverage (LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT), and whether the firm is 
financial or non-financial by including an indicator variable coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial 
(SIC 6000) or „0‟ otherwise.  I estimate the following model: 
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Adj_ROAit = α + ß1IN_OWNi,t-1 + ß2(IN_OWN)
2
i,t-1 + ß3OUT_BLOCK,i,t-1 + ß4OWN_CONi,t-1 ß5LEV i,t-1 + ß6L_TAi,t-1 +  
           ß7FINi,t  + εit                                                                                                                               (1) 
 
 
To test hypothesis H3, I use ownership concentration (OWN_CON) as one of the explanatory 
variables and include a lagged variable of the dependent performance variable as the other 
explanatory variable. The coefficient on ß4, captures the effect of changes in ownership 
concentration on firm performance can be interpreted as a measure of the impact on performance 
resulting from a change in the ownership concentration. I test the following model: 
 
Adj_ROAit = α + ß1OWN_CONi,t-1 + ß4(Adj_ROAit-1) + ß5LEV i,t-1 + ß6L_TAi,t-1 + ß7FINi, t + εit     (2) 
 
 
For the IV and GMM models, I use 2 and 3 lags of the ownership variables as instruments. 
Lastly, I implement granger causality tests (Granger 1969) to ascertain whether changes in 
ownership structure are followed by systematic changes in firm performance or vice versa. I test 
the following models:  
 
Adj_ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 +   α2ROAt-2 + β1IN_OWNt-1 +   β2IN_OWNt-2 +   εt      (3) 
 
 IN_OWNt = φ0 + φ 1IN_OWNt-1 +   φ 2IN_OWNt-2 + β1ROAt-1 +   β2ROAt-2 +   νt      (4) 
 
 
I test the following null hypothesis in equation 2: Inside ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger 
cause firm performance (ROA). Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that inside ownership 
Granger causes firm performance. In equation (3), I test the null hypothesis that:  firm 
performance does not Granger cause inside ownership. Rejection of the null hypothesis would 
imply that firm performance granger causes board size. The F-statistic/Wald-statistic is used to 
test the following condition, for all equations:  β1 = β2 = 0  
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Annual OLS Regressions  
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Table 28 provides coefficient estimates from annual OLS regressions. Model 1 uses 
adjusted ROA as the dependent variable, Model 2 uses adjusted ROE, and Model 3 uses adjusted 
Tobin‟s Q, controlling for firm leverage (LEV), firm size (L_TA), and whether the firm is 
financial or non-financial (FIN). In the annual regressions, the coefficients on Insider ownership 
(IN_OWN) and all three measures of performance [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] are mostly 
negative at various levels of significance. The initial interpretation may be that for equity carve-
outs, the threshold at which the entrenchment effects begin to overwhelm the incentive alignment 
effects is much lower. For outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK) the coefficient estimates are 
mostly positive for all performance measures, with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 to 
0.10. The initial explanation may be that outside blockholders help moderate the potential 
entrenchment effects from insider owners. And for ownership concentration (OWN_CON), 
which is defined as the combined proportion of outstanding shares owned by officers and 
directors in the subsidiary firm, the parent firm, and outside blockholders, the coefficient 
estimates are mostly negative for all measures of performance. The preliminary interpretation 
may be that outside blockholders are not able to counteract the combined entrenchment effects 
from both insider owners and the parent firm.   
 
Table 28, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as the 
dependent variable. Explanatory variables include Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of 
insider ownership (IN_OWN)
2
, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership 
concentration (OWN_CON). I control for firm leverage and firm size. To control for the 
regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms, I include an indicator variable 
„FIN‟ coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise.  For all three performance measures 
[ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q], insider ownership (IN_OWN) has a negative sign as predicted by 
hypothesis H1 and all the coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level. Contrary to 
previous studies that show a convex relation between insider ownership and firm performance, 
the square of insider ownership (IN_OWN)
2
, has mixed signs and none of the coefficient 
estimates is statistically significant. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, coefficient 
estimates on outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), have positive signs and are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels for all performance measures. Ownership concentration 
coefficients are all negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimates on the 
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indicator variable, FIN, is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the models 
using ROA and ROE as the dependent variable. The significance of the coefficient on the 
indicator variable for financials may suggest that the association between firm performance, as 
measured by ROA and ROE, and ownership may be different for financials.  
 
Overall, OLS results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. In the case of insider ownership, 
the evidence is consistent with Loderer and Martin (1997) who find that insider ownership does 
not predict Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q has a negative relation with insider ownership. I find no 
quadratic relation between officers and directors‟ ownership that is reported by Himmelberg et 
al., (1999). Contrary to the findings by Holderness et al., (1999) of a positive relation between 
insider ownership and firm performance in the 0-5% ownership range, the evidence in this study 
does not suggest likewise. The explanation in the case of equity carve-outs may be that the 
existing parent ownership may affect firm performance the same way officers‟ and directors‟ 
ownership in the subsidiary does, hence negating the 0-5% threshold on which the Holderness et 
al., findings are predicated. Results for outside blockholders support hypothesis H2. Consistent 
with Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003), the evidence suggests that outside blockholders 
moderate the entrenchment effects of concentrated insider ownership. The coefficient estimates 
on ownership concentration are all negative but statistically insignificant. No conclusions can be 
drawn regarding its effect on firm performance or the prediction made in hypothesis H3.  
 
6.2  Fixed Effects Model  
 
Table 29 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model. I test the 
appropriateness of the fixed effects and a random effects model using a Hausman endogeneity 
test. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of 28.86 (0.0001) suggesting that the fixed-effects 
coefficient estimates are more consistent. Hence, I implement a fixed effects model. Table 29, 
Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. 
IN_OWN has the opposite sign from that predicted by hypothesis H1 with a coefficient (t-
statistic) of -1.38 (-1.69) and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (t-statistic) 
on (IN_OWN)
2
 is 0.17 (1.36) with an opposite sign to that predicted. The coefficient (t-statistic) 
on OUT_BLOCK is 1.24(1.72). It is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and consistent with 
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the prediction of hypothesis H2. OWN_CON has a coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.22 (-0.87) and is 
statistically insignificant.  Overall, the fixed effects results using ROA as the measure for firm 
performance do not support hypotheses H1 but are consistent with H2. Model 2 presents 
coefficient estimates when ROE is the measure of performance. The coefficient (t-statistic) on 
insider ownership is -0.79 (-1.71) suggesting a negative relation between IN_OWN and ROE. 
The estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as predicted in H1. Consistent with the 
prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate on outside blockholders is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient estimate on ownership concentration is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, as predicted in hypothesis H3. Model 3 uses 
industry-adjusted Q as the measure for firm performance. The coefficient estimate (t-statistic) on 
insider ownership (IN_OWN) is -0.04 (-1.65) has the opposite sign as that predicted by H1. 
Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate (t-statistic) on outside 
blockholders is 0.98 (1.81) and statistically significant at the 0.15 level. Ownership concentration 
is shown to be negatively associated with adjusted Q and the estimate is statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level as predicted in H3. The coefficient estimates on inside ownership (square of 
insider ownership) are negative (positive) for all three measures of firm performance which does 
not support the interest alignment hypothesis at lower levels of inside ownership nor the notion 
of a convex relation between insider ownership and firm performance.  
 
Overall, the fixed effects results support H2 but do not support hypotheses H1 and H3. The 
findings negate the findings summarized by Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness 
(2001), suggesting improvements in firm performance at low levels of insider ownership and 
decreasing performance at higher levels of insider ownership. 
 
6.3  Hausman Endogeneity Test 
 
Table 30 presents coefficient estimates when IN_OWNt-2, OUT_BLOCKBt-2 and 
OWN_CONt-2 are used as instruments. The coefficient (t-statistic) on IN_OWN Residuals is        
-0.06(-3.08) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 9.68 (44.07) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on 
IN_OWN Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.08(-2.87) with an F-statistic 
(Wald-2) of 11.03 (28.06). The coefficient (t-statistic) on IN_OWN Residuals using Tobin‟s Q 
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as the dependent variable is -0.48(-0.78) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 11.94 (22.63). The 
coefficients on the residuals for ROA and ROE are statistically significant at the 0.01. The 
coefficients on the residuals for Tobin‟s Q are statistically insignificant.  The null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the IN_OWN Residuals is zero is rejected for the first two models (ROA and 
ROE). This implies the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the 
OLS method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK Residuals is 2.11(2.38) with an F-
statistic (Wald-2) of 7.48(14.96) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK 
Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is 0.02(1.68) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 
9.24 (18.76). The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the 
dependent variable is 0.04(1.92) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 10.22 (19.07). The coefficients 
on the residuals for all the dependent variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 
levels. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the OUT_BLOCK Residuals is zero is rejected, 
which suggests the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS 
method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals is 0.03(0.74) with an F-statistic 
(Wald-2) of 4.64 (17.14) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using 
ROE as the dependent variable is -0.11(-2.27) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 6.98 (20.04). The 
coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is      
-0.55(-2.17) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.56 (23.08).  The null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the OWN_CON residuals is zero is rejected for ROE and Tobin‟s Q but is 
statistically insignificant for ROA. In the presence of endogeneity, OLS coefficient estimates 
will be biased and inconsistent. 
 
6.2 Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) 
 
Table 31 presents results from IV regressions. The instruments for corporate ownership 
are the 2 lags of the proxies for ownership: Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of insider 
ownership (IN_OWN)
2
, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration 
(OWN_CON). Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as a 
measure of performance. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H1, the coefficient estimate 
on insider ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The sign and 
statistical significance of the coefficient on OUT_BLOCK suggests a positive relation between 
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blockholder ownership and firm performance which is also significant at the 0.05 level, 
consistent with hypothesis H2. The coefficient estimate on ownership concentration is negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, as predicted in hypothesis H3.  Model 2 presents 
coefficient estimates when ROE is the measure of performance. Insider ownership is shown to be 
negatively associated with ROE and the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as 
predicted in H1. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate on 
outside blockholders is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient 
estimate on ownership concentration is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, as 
predicted in hypothesis H3. Model 3 uses industry-adjusted Q as the measure for firm 
performance. The coefficient estimate on insider ownership (IN_OWN) has the opposite sign as 
that predicted by H1 but statistically insignificant. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis 
H2, the coefficient estimate on outside blockholders is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.10 level. Ownership concentration is shown to be negatively associated with adjusted Q and 
the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as predicted in H3. The coefficient 
estimates on the square of insider ownership (IN_OWN)
2 
are positive for all three measures of 
firm performance which does not support the notion of a convex relation between insider 
ownership and firm performance.  
 
In sum, the evidence from IV does not support the findings summarized in Murphy 
(1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001), suggesting improvements in firm 
performance at low levels of insider ownership and decreasing performance at higher levels of 
insider ownership. A plausible explanation is that in the case of equity carve-outs, parent 
ownership in the subsidiary plays the role of insider ownership as measured in previous studies. 
So combining officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the subsidiary with the existing parent 
ownership causes the entrenchment effects of insider ownership to overwhelm the incentive 
alignment effects, thus negating the potential benefits of officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the 
0-5% ownership range that is documented in previous studies. On the other hand, IV results for 
blockholder ownership support the findings by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). The 
presence of an outside blockholder seems to have a moderating effect on the actions of insider 
owners (subsidiary management) and the parent firm and ultimately on firm performance. The 
investment argument predicts that insider ownership will increase (decrease) in anticipation of 
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positive (negative) changes in future firm performance [Loderer and Martin (1997)]. The 
negative coefficients on lags of insider ownership (IN_OWN) do not seem to support this view.   
 
6.3 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
Table 32 presents GMM coefficient estimates. The instruments are the 2 lags of the 
ownership variables: Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of insider ownership 
(IN_OWN)
2
, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration (OWN_CON). 
The signs on the coefficients for all the main explanatory variables are consistent with the H1, 
H2, and H3 predictions.  Coefficient estimates for insider ownership are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level for ROA and at the 0.10 level for ROE and adjusted Q. The square of insider 
ownership is shown to be positive contrary to previous findings. Coefficient estimates for outside 
blockholder ownership are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for ROA and at the 0.10 level 
for ROE and adjusted Q. Ownership concentration is shown to be negative and statically 
significant at the 0.01 for ROA and 0.05 for ROE and adjusted Q. All three models are 
statistically significant with J-statistics of 5.487E-03 for ROA, 3.89E-05 for ROE, and 2.57E-04 
for Tobin‟s Q.  
 
Overall, in the case of insider ownership, GMM results do not support the findings 
summarized in Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001). In the presence of 
significant parent ownership, entrenchment effects seem to overwhelm the incentive effects even 
at modestly low levels of officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the subsidiary. The evidence for 
blockholder ownership supports the findings by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). The 
presence of an outside blockholder has a moderating effect on insider ownership (subsidiary 
management and the parent firm) and ultimately on the subsidiary‟s performance. Consistent 
with Loderer and Martin (1997), parent firms seem to increase (decrease) their ownership in the 
subsidiary firm in anticipation of strong (weak) future performance.  
 
6.4  Empirical Results - Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000)   
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Some of the IV and GMM results show statistically significant coefficients on the 
indicator variable, FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). To ascertain whether the relation between 
ownership and firm performance differs for financials, I run separate regressions for a subset of 
financial firms. Empirical results are presented in Table 30.  In both IV and GMM regressions, 
performance measures [ROA, ROE, and adj_Q] are projected onto a set of ownership proxies 
[(IN_OWN), the square of insider ownership (IN_OWN)
2
, outside blockholders 
(OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration (OWN_CON)] with 2 lags, controlling for firm 
size, capital ratio, and price-to-book value. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the 
full sample. Consistent with the predictions in hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 insider ownership is 
negatively associated with firm performance contrary to the findings summarized in Murphy 
(1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001). The coefficients on blockholder ownership 
are positive for all performance measures and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, in support 
of the evidence presented by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). Ownership concentration is 
negatively related to firm performance with statistically significant coefficients in support of 
Loderer and Martin (1997).  These results in combination seem to suggest that the impact of 
corporate ownership on firm performance is not necessarily driven by industry characteristics but 
may be endogenous to the firm.  
 
6.5 Granger Causality Tests 
 
Table 31 presents empirical results from bi-variate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests 
Granger causality between insider ownership and various measures of firm performance [return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and adjusted Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null 
hypothesis test that insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause return on assets 
(ROA), is 17.21 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger 
cause insider ownership (IN_OWN), is 4.68 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Thus the reverse causality 
between ROA and insider ownership cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis 
test that insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 6.88 
with a p-value of 0.0050. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger cause 
insider ownership (IN_OWN), is 1.32 with a p-value of 0.0840. These results seem to suggest 
that past values of insider ownership have information precedence about future performance as 
measured by ROE but not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that 
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insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause adjusted Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 8.98 with a 
p-value of 0.0001. While the F-statistic for the test that adj_Q does not Granger cause insider 
ownership (IN_OWN), is 11.04 with a p-value of 0.0000. These results also seem to suggest the 
endogeneity of insider ownership and Tobin‟s Q. 
 
Model 2 tests Granger causality between outside blockholder ownership and various 
measures of firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and adjusted 
Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that outside blockholder ownership 
(OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 7.42 with a p-value of 
0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger cause outside blockholder 
ownership (OUT_BLOCK), is 5.33 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Thus the reverse causality between 
ROA and insider ownership cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that 
outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), 
is 4.08 with a p-value of 0.0005. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger 
cause outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) 0.87 with a p-value of 0.3400. These 
results seem to suggest that past firm performance has information precedence about future 
outside blockholder ownership and not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null 
hypothesis test that outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause 
adjusted Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 4.47 with a p-value of 0.0001. While the F-statistic for the test 
that adj_Q does not Granger cause outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK), is 6.82 with 
a p-value of 0.0000. These results also seem to suggest the endogeneity of outside blockholder 
ownership and Tobin‟s Q. 
 
Model 3 tests Granger causality between ownership concentration (OWN_CON) and 
various measures of firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
adjusted Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that ownership concentration 
(OWN_CON) does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 9.72 with a p-value of 0.0052. 
The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger cause ownership concentration 
(OWN_CON), is 4.38 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Thus the reverse causality between ROA and 
ownership concentration cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that 
ownership concentration (OWN_CON) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 1.12 
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with a p-value of 0.0015. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger cause 
ownership concentration (OWN_CON), is 9.81 with a p-value of 0.2800. These results seem to 
suggest that past values of ownership concentration have information precedence about future 
performance as measured by ROE but not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null 
hypothesis test that ownership concentration (OWN_CON) does not Granger cause adjusted 
Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 6.07 with a p-value of 0.0000. While the F-statistic for the test that adj_Q 
does not Granger cause ownership concentration (OWN_CON) is 3.89 with a p-value of 0.0050. 
These results suggest that ownership concentration and Tobin‟s Q may be endogenous. 
 
7. Robustness 
 
I test the robustness of these results to alternative measures of firm performance/value. I 
use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by total assets and the 
ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. In both cases, results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported using Tobin‟s Q.  To ascertain whether there are any statistically significant differences 
between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q values, I divide the sample into 
three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that fall into the top 40%, firms in the 
lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on the top 40% and the bottom 40%. 
Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those reported for the full sample. And 
lastly, results obtained from winsorized sample data at 1% and 5%, are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained for the full sample.  
 
8.   Conclusion 
There were three main objectives for this study. First, with a view to reconciling extant 
literature, I sought to mitigate the econometric problems that have confounded previous studies 
to ascertain which of the largely mixed extant evidence is supported. Second, due to the wide 
disparity in the definition and measurement of corporate ownership, one could argue that the 
mixed evidence is simply a reflection of differences in variable measurement.  For robustness in 
this study, I implement alternative measures of ownership to ascertain what impact if any, 
different ownership proxies may have on firm performance. And third, to ascertain whether 
measures of performance partly explain the mixed findings, I use both accounting and market 
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based proxies for firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
Tobin‟s Q] to reconcile the empirical with the extant evidence.  
 
I find that contrary to extant evidence, insider ownership contrary to extant evidence that 
posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of 
ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the 
case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the 
subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and overwhelm the incentive alignment 
effects at very low levels of insider ownership. These findings seem to suggest that dominant 
parent firms, at least in the case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency 
problem.  As a matter of governance policy for equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms 
may be necessary to moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms.  In addition, these results 
raise an interesting question.  Why in the majority of carve-out transactions do parent firms 
retain 70 - 99% majority control in the subsidiary, when in fact empirical evidence shows it to be 
sub-optimal? Assuming that the goal of management in the parent firms is value-maximization 
that ownership structure indeed reverts to the mean, other things being equal, one would expect 
to observe a gradual reversion of parent ownership in the subsidiary towards the 51% level.  I 
find no evidence to support this argument. Ownership decisions in the case of equity carve-outs 
may be driven by other strategic considerations.  Second, I present evidence in support of the 
positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The presence of 
outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly dominant 
parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of ownership 
concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm 
performance.   
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Table 24: Sample Selection & Distribution 
Table 24 presents sample distribution and size.  Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the 
number and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to be included it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges 
and be covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because they are 
unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. An additional 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage 
by CRSP, COMPUSTAT. Two firms were dropped due to missing ownership data. The final sample consists of 170 firms of 
which 82 are financial firms (SIC 6000) and 88 are non-financial firms. Panel B presents the sample distribution by year of 
announcement and Panel C shows the industry distribution by 2-digit SIC. 
 
Panel A: Construction of the Sample   # of firms 
 
              Total number of firms:             421 
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:                (144) 
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:                     (105)    
Firms with missing data:       (2) 
    
Final Sample:       170 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution by Year    # of firms 
 
1986       10 
1987       9 
1988       7 
1989       5 
1990       7 
1991       8 
1992       9 
1993       16 
1994       7 
1995       8 
1996       13 
1997       8 
1998       10 
1999       8 
2000       14 
2001       13 
2002       8 
2003       5 
2004       5 
 
Panel C: Distribution by SIC Two-Digit SIC  # of firms 
 
Mining, Oil & Gas   10   9 
Manufacturing   20-30    37 
Transport, Comm., Utilities  40   9 
Wholesale/Retail   50   14 
Financials   60   82 
Services (other)   70-80   19 
 
*Source: Security Data Company (SDC)  
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 25 presents sample descriptive statistics. Some performance means are unusually low (high) due to the influence of 
outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and by winsorizing the data at 
99% and 1%.  
 
Variable    Mean (Std. Dev) Median  Min Max 
 
Parent Ownership (%)   0.65 0.09  0.71  0.08 0.94 
 
Insider Ownership (%)  0.02 0.01  0.03  0.01 0.03  
  
Outside Blockholder Ownership (%) 0.14 0.05  0.12  0.05  0.18 
 
Ownership Concentration  0.81 0.16  0.92  0.14 1.00 
 
Book-to-Market   0.41 0.24  0.39  0.21 0.79 
 
Tobin‟s Q   1.48 1.12  1.57  1.18 1.92 
 
Market Value of Equity ($M)  1,002 244  207  3.4 58,514 
  
Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)  0.43 0.20  0.54  0.12 1.06 
 
Return on Assets   0.08 0.13  0.11  -0.03 0.15 
 
Return on Equity   0.17 0.24  0.21  -0.06 0.28 
 
 
Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT, SDC, 
CRSP, Thompson Financial, Proxy Statements. 
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Table 26: Variable Descriptions 
Table 26 provides descriptions of the variables used and related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables presented elsewhere relate to number of 
time lags. 
 
Variable  Description          Source 
 
Adj_Q   Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity        Tobin et al. (1977) 
divided by book value of assets 
 
Adj_ROA  Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on assets minus median industry return  
on assets 
  
Adj_ROE  Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return         Compustat 
on equity minus median industry return  
on equity 
 
BME   Book-to-market value ratio          Compustat 
    
EBIT    EBIT-to-total Assets ratio          Compustat 
 
CAP    Capital ratio or Tier 1 leverage ratio         10-K Reports 
   for financial firms 
  
FIN   Indicator variable: „1‟ = financial firm         SIC Codes 
    „0‟= otherwise         (6000 -6999) 
 
IN_OWN   Proportion of shares owned by officers        Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats. 
                             & directors, and parent firm 
 
(IN_OWN) 2  The square of proportion of shares owned      Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats. 
                             by officers & directors and parent firm 
 
LEV   Leverage: debt-to-total assets           Compustat 
 
L_MVE   Log of firm‟s market value                          Compustat       
 
L_TA   Log of firm‟s total assets        Compustat 
 
OUT_BLOCK  Proportion of shares owned by outside block-        Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats. 
                             holders (equal to or greater than 5%) 
 
OWN-CON  Proportion of shares owned by all blockholders       Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats. 
                             (equal to or greater than 5%) 
 
PBV   Price-to-book value        Compustat 
  
ROA   Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)             Compustat 
 
ROE   Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)      Compustat 
 
SIC   Standard Industry classification code          Compustat 
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Table 27: Correlation Matrix 
Table 27 presents pairwise correlations between the main dependent variables (adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA), and explanatory variables (IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, 
PAR_OWN).   
  
 
N=170  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
1. Adj_Q  1.00  
 
2. Adj_Qt+1 0.93** 1.00  
  
3. Adj_ROE 0.31* 0.28* 1.00   
 
4. Adj_ROEt+1 0.38** 0.43*** 0.78** 1.00     
 
5. Adj_ROA 0.04* 0.23* 0.11 0.64* 1.00  
 
6. Adj_ROAt+1  0.07 0.17* 0.12* 0.04* 0.47 1.00 
 
7. IN_OWN -0.05* -0.17* -0.03 -0.72* 0.28 -0.05 1.00   
 
8. OUT_BLOCK  0.11  0.39*  0.48  0.66* 0.17  0.61* 0.07 1.00 
 
9. OWN_CON -0.01* -0.04* -0.12 -0.02* -0.53* -0.78* 0.05 -0.13 1.00 
 
10. L_TA  -0.14* -0.52* -0.41 -0.27 -0.13* -0.11 0.27* 0.51* 0.28 1.00 
  
11. LEV  -0.38* -0.13* -0.22 -0.10* -0.08 -0.14 0.29* 0.08 0.11 -0.66* 1.00  
 
12. EBIT    0.81*  0.74*  0.91*  0.93*  0.81  0.72 0.51*  -0.068* -0.24 -0.44* 0.38* 1.00 
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Table 28: OLS Regressions  
Table 28 presents estimated coefficients on ownership proxies [IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and OWN_CON].  The dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q in Models 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. I control for firm size (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and industry (FIN). Reported results are median regressions by year from 1983 to 2004.   
       
                                                        Model 1: Adj_ROA                  Model 2: Adj_ROE    Model 3: Adj_Tobin’s Q 
      
Year  IN_OWN    OUT_BLOCK  OWN_CON IN_OWN       OUT_BLOCK OWN_CON IN_OWN        OUT_BLOCK       OWN_CON 
 
1983  -1.24    2.28*  -0.81   0.06   0.02  -0.21   0.14   3.27  -2.08 
1984  -0.84    1.46   0.22  -1.43**   2.28*  -1.04  -0.98*   1.01*  -1.21* 
1985  -0.07**    0.48   1.23   0.66   0.12  -2.47  -2.07   0.98  -0.93 
1986  -1.02    1.03  -1.41*  -1.24   3.05  -4.01*  -1.12   0.57   0.42 
1987   0.73    3.38*  -0.01  -0.25   0.11*   2.16    0.05   1.04   0.68 
1988  -2.14*    1.01   0.98  -0.89*   0.92  -0.08   -0.68*   0.73  -1.33 
1989  -0.92*    0.78*  -0.06*   0.02   1.34*    0.32  -0.47   0.12  -2.10* 
1990  -1.05    1.73*   0.55   0.63   0.64*  -0.62*  -0.51   2.41   0.56 
1991   0.04    0.87   0.68*  -0.57*   0.03  -0.04  -0.69   0.77*  -0.87 
1992   0.06*    2.44*  -0.77  -2.08*   0.81   1.13  -1.21*   1.02  -0.35 
1993  -0.54*    0.06   0.53   0.64   1.01*  -0.22  -0.32   0.48  -0.67* 
1994  -0.88    1.17   2.09*   -0.84   0.54  -1.38  -1.78*   0.03  -1.12 
1995   0.02    0.36*  -0.13  -0.40*   0.09  -0.29*   0.03   1.29   0.58 
1996  -1.23*    0.02   0.28   0.11   2.01   0.01  -0.55   0.35*  -0.28* 
1997  -0.71*    0.63*   0.07   1.08   0.17*   -2.31*  -0.44   0.52  -1.44 
1998  -0.06    2.49   1.17   2.17   0.76*   0.77  -0.54   1.07   0.01 
1999  -2.56*    0.77  -0.05*  -0.31*   0.42  -0.15   0.01   2.07   0.83 
2000   0.04    1.29*   0.21  -0.78*   0.06  -0.88  -0.97*   0.05  -1.04* 
2001  -0.27*    0.81   0.89   0.28   2.14  -0.17*  -0.51   0.44  -0.24 
2002  -0.11    0.04*  -0.51*  -0.36*   0.67*   0.36   0.68   0.72*   0.87 
2003   0.57    2.54   0.04   0.04   0.04  -0.04  -0.77*   1.04  -0.08* 
2004  -0.49*   -1.06   0.22  -0.09   2.07*  -1.09*   0.09   0.38  -0.31 
 
Time Series mean  -0.67***   1.02***  -0.34**  -0.08*   0.68*  -0.62*  -0.33   0.74*  -0.69* 
Time series σ:   0.56   0.77   0.77   0.46   0.92   0.76   0.58   0.84   0.76 
 T-statistic  -3.92   6.23  -2.09  -1.67   4.04  -3.08  -1.31   1.81   1.73 
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 29: Fixed Effects Model   
Table 29 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model using industry-adjusted performance measures [ROA, ROE, 
and Tobin‟s Q] on ownership proxies [IN_OWN, (IN_OWN)
2
, OUT_BLOCK, OWN_CON].  I control for financial firms (FIN), 
leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
                         Dependent Variable                                                                                         
     ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
Constant     6.23***  11.32***   2.19* 
    (4.33)  (6.04)  (1.88) 
 
IN_OWNt-1   -1.38*  -0.79*  - 0.04*    
    (-1.69)  (-1.71)   (-1.65) 
 
(IN_OWNt-1)
 2
    0.17  -0.04     0.42    
    (1.36)  (-1.17)   (1.28) 
 
OUT_BLOCKt-1    1.24*   2.37**     0.98*  
    (1.72)  (2.02)    (1.81) 
 
OWN_CONt-1   -0.22   -0.41    -0. 06 
    (-0.87)  (-1.07)    (-1.14) 
 
L_TA     -0.22*   -1.01     -0.07* 
     (-1.66)  (-1.57)     (-1.72) 
 
LEV     -1.32*  -0.43*     -0.08** 
    (-1.88)  (-1.72)     (-2.04) 
 
FIN     0.21*   0.07*      0.03 
    (1.68)  (1.75)     (1.04) 
 
 
    
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 30: Hausman Endogeneity Tests 
Table 30 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and OWN_CON. Dependent 
variables are ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q. I use 2 lags of insider ownership, outside blockholders, and ownership concentration as 
instruments (IN_OWNt-2, OUT_BLOCKt-2, and OWN_CONt-2) and I test the significance of the coefficients on the residuals.    
ROA                       Variable   Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  IN_OWN   -0.73(-2.44) 9.68 44.07 
  IN_OWN  Residuals -0.06 (-3.08)          
  
     
  OUT_BLOCK   4.79 (3.12)   7.48 14.96 
 
OUT_BLOCK Residuals  2.11 (2.38)         
  
     
  OWN_CON   0.22(1.02)    4.64 17.14 
  OWN_CON Residuals  0.03 0.74)   
      
 
  
  
ROE                       Variable    Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  IN_OWN   -1.14(-1.97) 11.03 28.06 
  IN_OWN  Residuals -0.06 (-2.87)          
  
     
  OUT_BLOCK  0.48 (2.37)   9.24 18.76 
 
OUT_BLOCK Residuals  0.02 (1.68)         
  
     
  OWN_CON   -0.47 (-1.57)    6.98 20.04 
  OWN_CON Residuals  -0.11 (-2.27)   
      
 
  
  
Tobin’s Q                       Variable   Coefficient (t-statistic)   
F-
Statistic  
Wald 
(2)    
  IN_OWN   -1.03(-3.14) 11.94 22.63 
  IN_OWN  Residuals -0.48(-0.78)          
  
     
  OUT_BLOCK   0.68 (2.39)   10.22 19.07 
 
OUT_BLOCK Residuals  0.04 (1.92)         
  
     
  OWN_CON   -1.37(-2.09)    8.56 23.08 
  OWN_CON Residuals  -0.55 (-2.17)   
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Table 31 – Instrumental Variables Regression 
Table 31 presents IV coefficient estimates of ownership instruments [IN_OWN, (IN_OWN)
2
, 
OUT_BLOCK,(OWN_CON)] using 2 lags of the original variables as instruments. The dependent variables are 
industry- adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size 
(L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
      Dependent Variable                                                                             
Panel A     ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
     0.67   2.31*    1.19* 
    (1.03)  (1.66)   (1.92) 
 
IN_OWNt-2    -3.47**  -0.94*   -0.03    
    (-2.15)  (-1.69)   (-1.23) 
 
(IN_OWNt-1)
 2    1.28*   0.02    0.78*    
    (1.71)  (1.44)   (1.81) 
 
OUT_BLOCKt-1    0.11**   0.54**     0.07*  
    (2.04)  (2.48)    (1.93) 
 
(OWN_CON)t-1   -2.39***  -1.04*    -2.33* 
    (-4.98)  (1.68)    (-1.87) 
 
L_TA     -1.02**   -0.78*     -0.64 
     (1.97)  (-1.83)     (-1.33) 
 
LEV     -0.07   -0.42*     -0.19** 
    (-1.41)  (-1.72)     (-2.15) 
 
FIN     0.04   0.23*      0.54 
    (1.02)  (1.74)     (0.91) 
    
Adjusted R2   0.34  0.24     0.22 
F-Statistic    8.12  3.78     12.03 
P-Values    [0.0000]  [0.0052]  [0.0002] 
Panel B      Dependent Variable 
           ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
Constant     1.02*   0.98    1.22 
    (1.73)  (1.18)   (1.03) 
 
IN_OWNt-3    -2.05  -0.15*    -0.37*    
    (-1.04)  (-1.66)   (-1.72) 
 
(IN_OWNt-3)
 2    0.48*   0.59*    0.01   
    (1.82)  (1.69)   (1.16) 
 
OUT_BLOCKt-3    1.02   0.06*     0.28*  
    (1.18)  (1.77)    (1.80) 
 
(OWN_CON)t-3   -0.15**  -0.83    -0.05 
    (-3.28)  (1.52)    (-1.31) 
 
L_TA     -0.97*   -0.33*     -0.09* 
     (1.67)  (-1.72)     (-1.69) 
 
LEV     -1.13   -0.88     -0.64* 
    (-1.08)  (-1.51)     (1.75) 
 
FIN     0.21*   0.51*      0.04 
    (1.68)  (1.79)     (1.53) 
    
Adjusted R2    0.34  0.27      0.18 
F-Statistic     4.88  6.09      5.39 
P-Values                [0.0001]  [0.0054]  [0.0042] 
    
                            *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 32: GMM Estimates  
Table 32 presents GMM coefficient estimates of ownership instruments [IN_OWN, (IN_OWN)
 2
 , OUT_BLOCK, (OWN_CON)].In Panel 
A, 2 lags of the original ownership proxies are used as  instruments. The dependent variables are industry- adjusted ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin‟s Q. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
       Dependent Variable 
 Panel A    ROAt  ROEt  Tobin’s Qt 
 
Constant     1.22*   2.79    3.83* 
    (1.68)  (1.03)   (1.81) 
 
IN_OWNt-1    -4.62***  -2.31*    -1.19*    
    (-7.28)  (-1.74)   (-1.68) 
 
(IN_OWNt-1)
 2    3.87*   1.51    4.66    
    (1.74)  (1.18)   (1.23) 
 
OUT_BLOCKt-1    1.47***    2.15*     1.03*  
    (3.68)  (1.71)    (1.66) 
 
(OWN_CON)t-1   -3.78*  -2.94**    -4.11* 
    (-2.98)  (1.98)    (-2.12) 
 
L_TA     -0.04*   -0.13**     -0.56 
     (1.68)  (-2.09)     (-1.01) 
 
LEV     -0.11*   -0.07     -0.33* 
    (-1.82)  (-1.51)     (-1.74) 
 
FIN     1.13*   0.94*      0.33 
    (1.68)  (1.76)     (1.29) 
    
R2    0.12  0.18     0.27 
Adjusted R2   0.18  0.26     0.31 
Durbin Watson   6.44  4.78     8.39 
J-Statistic    5.48E-03  3.89E-05  2.57E-04 
 
 
                *significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
  
135 
 
Table 33: IV and GMM Estimates - Financial Firms (SIC 6000) 
 Table 33 presents IV and GMM coefficient estimates for a set of ownership proxies [IN_OWNt-1, (IN_OWNt-1)
 2
 , OUT_BLOCKt-1, (OWN_CON)t-1] using 2 lags of the 
original variables as instruments, for a sub-sample of financial financials. I control for price-to-book value, capital ratios, and log of total assets. Dependent variables are 
industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q for models 1, 2, 3 respectively.   
                                    IV                                GMM 
Model       1    2   3      1    2        3 
                                           ROAt                    ROEt                  Tobin‟s Qt                  ROAt     ROEt  Tobin‟s_Qt   
 
Constant    -1.37   1.86*   0.77*   2.23*   0.88   -4.02*   
    (-1.01)  (1.66)  (1.68)  (1.72)  (1.02)  (-1.66)    
  
IN_OWNt-1   -2.16***   -0.58*   -1.05*  -1.82*   -3.14*  -0.72*   
    (-3.27)  (-1.70)  (-1.90)  (-1.68)  (-1.71)  (-1.82) 
 
(IN_OWNt-1)
 2    0.72   0.31*    0.55   2.22*   0.11   0.09   
    (1.44)  (1.86)   (1.11)  (1.65)  (1.07)  (1.54) 
 
OUT_BLOCKt-1   1.71*  1.73**   2.83   0.81   0.78**   2.03 
    (1.81)  (2.04)  (1.12)  (0.54)  (2.33)  (1.03)  
 
(OWN_CON)t-1   -1.47   -0.65   -0.36*  -4.11*   -1.22   0.47   
    (-2.63)  (-1.13)  (-1.72)  (-3.98)  (-1.03)  (1.11) 
 
L_TA     -0.66   -0.04*   -0.22*    -0.03    0.42*   -0.13   
    (-1.40)  (-1.93)  (-1.74)   (-1.35)   (1.65)  (-1.03)   
 
Capital Ratio    -0.17*   -0.39*   -0.24   -0.37*   -0.67*   -0.87**   
    (-1.74)  (-1.65)  (-1.57)  (-1.90)  (-1.80)  (-2.13) 
 
PBV     1.41*   0.79*  -   2.52*   0.85**  -   
    (1.81)  (1.68)    (1.69)  (2.31)  
     
 
Adj.R2    0.34  0.22  0.18  0.26  0.14  0.23    
F-statistic   8.04  3.87  6.22  3.34  4.18  7.14 
Model p-value   [0.0000]  [0.0005]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0004]   
     
 
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 34: Granger Causality Tests  
Table 34 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between ownership structure [IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and 
OWN_CON] and firm performance [Adj_Q, ROE, and ROA].  
        F-Statistic  Probability 
  IN_OWN does not granger cause ROA   17.21 [0.0000] 
  ROA does not granger cause IN_OWN   4.68 [0.0000] 
     
  
OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause 
ROA   6.88 [0.0050] 
Model 1-(ROA) 
ROA does not granger cause 
OUT_BLOCK   1.32 [0.0840] 
     
  
OWN_CON does not granger cause 
ROA   8.98 [0.0001] 
  
ROA does not granger cause 
OWN_CON   11.04 [0.0000] 
    
 
  
  
  IN_OWN does not granger cause ROE   7.42 [0.0000] 
  ROE does not granger cause IN_OWN   5.33 [0.0000] 
  
  
  
  
  
OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause 
ROE   4.08 [0.0005] 
Model 2-(ROE) 
ROE does not granger cause 
OUT_BLOCK   0.87 [0.3400] 
  
  
  
  
  
OWN_CON does not granger cause 
ROE   4.47 [0.0001] 
  
ROE does not granger cause 
OWN_CON   6.82 [0.0000] 
        
  
  
IN_OWN does not granger cause 
Adj_Q   9.72 [0.0052] 
  
Adj_Q does not granger cause 
IN_OWN   4.38 [0.0000] 
  
  
  
  
  
OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause 
Adj_Q    1.12 [0.0015] 
Model 3-(Adj_Q) 
Adj_Q does not granger cause 
OUT_BLOCK   9.81 [0.2800] 
  
  
  
  
  
OWN_CON does not granger cause 
Adj_Q   6.07 [0.0000] 
  
Adj_Q does not granger cause 
OWN_CON   3.89 [0.0050] 
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